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THE MESSIANIC FOX

By Rachel Wischnitzer-Bernstein

Faith in the impending resurrection, belief in the coming of the Messiah, and the salvation of the righteous, as proclaimed by Jewish religious doctrine, has found expression in Jewish art. As early as the middle of the third century we find the "Vision of the Resurrection of the Dry Bones," the figure of the ideal Ruler, as well as his Forerunner, and many other constituents of the eschatological symbolism, on the walls of a synagogue in Syria.[1] But the growth of this visionary, mystical art, vestiges of which are preserved also in Palestine, Greece, North Africa, and Rome, ends with the Islamic era. Already in the fifth and sixth centuries the cycle of eschatological images becomes schematised and conventional; it confines itself more and more to the vision of the restored Temple and the cultic objects of a transfigured celestial Feast of Tabernacles in which the pious is to participate in a world to come. We are familiar with this image from synagogue and catacomb paintings, synagogue mosaics, gilt glasses, lamps, etc.[2] Then, all of a sudden, we witness in the medieval Diaspora a revival of the most vehement messianic anticipations, accompanied by a renewed attempt toward pictorial representation, this time through the vehicle of manuscript illustration.

The liturgy of the synagogue, pervaded as it is with mystical rites invoking the glorious past of the Jewish nation, crystallizes in this period in the Prayer Book, the Mahzor for the religious year. And it is significant, in view of the prevailing reluctance to figurative representation, that the illustrator is allowed and, perhaps, even in a way

1. Carl H. Kraeling, "The Wall Decorations," *The Excavations at Dura-Europos; Preliminary Report of Sixth Season of Work* (New Haven, 1936), pp. 337-83; Du Mesnil du Buisson, *Les peintures de la Synagogue de Doura-Europos* (Rome, 1939); Emil G. Kraeling, "The Meaning of the Ezekiel panel in the Synagogue at Dura," *Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research*, April, 1940. The author of the present article has dealt with the messianic conception of the resurrection at the synagogue of Dura, in a paper read before the Meeting of the American Oriental Society in New York, in March, 1940. Her article dealing with the problem will soon appear elsewhere.

2. H. W. Beyer and H. Lietzmann, *Die jüdische Katakombe der Villa Torlonia in Rom* (Berlin, 1930), where the bibliography of the subject is discussed; R. Wischnitzer-Bernstein, "Die messianische Hütte in der jüdischen Kunst," *Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums*, Breslau, 1936 (illustrated).

encouraged in some quarters to amplify the implications of the text of the prayers. What he offers in terms of art to the imagination of the believer is often a most elaborate interpretation of the messianic allusions supplied by the rich inheritance of rabbinic literature and folklore, as well as by the Mahzor.

An image which we are able to identify in two different manuscripts is the *Fox*, whose symbolical significance has so far escaped attention. The fox, as such, is not unfamiliar to Hebrew manuscript illumination. We refer to the fox "who has stolen the goose" with the woman who is about to throw her spindle at him, a borderpiece in the Mishneh Torah of Maimonides, the famous manuscript of the Academy of Sciences in Budapest of 1296, signed and dated by the scribe and illuminator, Nathan ben Simon ha-Levi, of Cologne.[3]

The fox we are dealing with in this study is associated with the text of the Prayer Book and is meant to convey an image belonging to the symbolism of the Day of Atonement.

The earlier of the two manuscripts is the Mahzor of the Breslau State and University Library, MS. Or. 1 1 (Former Cod. IV f. 89), namely the second volume of the Mahzor, a huge and heavy codex which cannot be carried by one man alone. The first volume of the Prayer Book is missing. The prayers are compiled for the Ashkenasic ritual according to the usage of the German Jewish communities, with additions for various local rituals, such as that for Worms, and marginal versions for the Polish ritual. The codex numbers 300 leaves and measures 55,5 over 38 ctm. The liturgy includes New Year, Day of Atonement, Tabernacles, Feast of Rejoicing in the Law, and divers Sabbaths.[4]

The colophon of the scribe on fol. 130 verso helps to place the manuscript. Without mentioning his name, the copyist calls himself a disciple of the poet, Meir ben Baruch, of Rothenburg, who is known to have died in 1293. Taking into consideration the bold treatment of the

3. Elisabeth Moses, "Ueber eine kölner Handschrift des Mischne Thora," *Zeitschrift für Bildende Kunst*, 1926-27. In this manuscript, the fox illustrates a popular rhyme in no way connected with the text of the work, and is to be considered merely as a marginal ornamental device.

4. For a fuller description of the contents, see Ph. de Haas, "Beschreibung der Breslauer deutschen Machsor-Handschriften," *Soncino-Blätter* (Berlin, 1927), pp. 33-35. The manuscript was at the Exhibition of "Judaism in the History of Silesia," cf. catalogue by Erwin Hintze, No. 491 (Breslau, 1929), where fol. 221 V is reproduced.

human body and, on the other hand, the somewhat less advanced architecture, we would assign the manuscript to the first half of the fourteenth century. The white parchment binding blindtooled throughout is a remarkable piece of work of the Renaissance. The codex is lavishly ornamented and shows an extraordinary variety in the treatment of the lettering. There are only a few illustrations. Fol. 46 verso exhibits the "Sacrifice of Abraham," accompanying the concluding prayer for the Second Day of the New Year service. On fol. 89 verso, there is a portal enclosing a portion of the Morning Prayer for the service of the Day of Atonement; another portal, on fol. 221 verso, encloses the Concluding Prayer for the Day of Atonement. On fol. 264 recto, commence the signs of the Zodiac which usually accompany the poem introducing the Prayer for Rain. We pass on now to the portal on fol. 89 verso (Plate I). The text reads: "Blessed be the Lord our God, King of the Universe, who opens the gates of mercy and brightens the eyes of the devout waiting for his pardon."

What the text means to convey is the vision of an "Open Gate." It is to be noticed that the portal is not an ordinary framing, but a real gateway with open flung wings. It is apparently the "Gate of Mercy" referred to in the prayer and already envisioned in the Talmud in the saying, "The Gates of Repentance are always open" (Pesikta xxv 157 b). The vision of the worshipper imploring God to open the gate is to be traced to Psalm 118, verse 19: "Open to me the gates of righteousness: I will go into them, and I will praise the Lord." This invocation occurs also in the Christian liturgy of Palm Sunday. In the Old Syrian service there is the similar prayer: "O Lord, I pray thee to open unto me." Whereupon the curtain is drawn aside to reveal the altar according to Bridgeman,[5] a symbol of the Heavenly Banquet.

In our miniature, the text is skillfully arranged within the area of the portal. The word "Baruch" (Blessed), in black ink, is set against a background of red scrolls with blue dots, in the tympan of the arch, while the word "Sha'arei" (Gate), in burnished gold, is painted lower down on a blue ground brightened with red dotted rosettes. Three fabulous animals are arranged in the space between the gold letters: on the right, a tall, green dragon with pink wings, on the left, a pink lion, his tail and feet ending in flourishes. Both look jubilant. In the middle of the ornamental piece is to be seen a yellow animal, his

5. C. T. Bridgeman, *Jerusalem at Worship* (Jerusalem, 1932).

head uplifted toward the sky. Martin Plessner[6] believed it to be a squirrel or a fox.

Passing on to the round medallions which are substituted for keystone, capitals, and bases of the archway, they exhibit the following figures: an empty golden chair beneath a starred blue sky, an angel in pink and blue with a red halo, a pink eagle, a pink lion, and a pink ox. The angel and the animals all have yellow wings. The four figures known in Christian art as symbols of the four Evangelists retain in Jewish art their primary meaning. They are the four "living creatures" of the Temple Vision of the prophet Ezekiel, or the four Cherubim.

Similar figures enclosed in medallions (suggesting apparently the wheels of the Ezekiel vision) occur in a minature of the Mahzor in the Leipzig University Library (Cod. v 1102, vol. 1, f. 31 v.). These four figures are associated in this picture with the image of a pair of scales. There is no portal.[7] The symbolical image alludes to the temple tax weighed on the scales. The Cherubim point to the religious significance of the tax which, in the Middle Ages, was still being collected and used for the maintenance of the poor in Palestine. The Cherubim are to be considered here as a *pars pro toto* for the Temple. In the Breslau Mahzor they hint at the mystical significance of the "Open Gate" conceived as a gate of the heavenly abode of God, and, in typological correspondence, as the entrance to the Restored Temple of Jerusalem.

The image of the empty chair in the uppermost medallion is apparently associated with the "thrones" in Daniel 7:9 which, according to Rabbi Akiba,[8] are kept, one for God and one for David. This is the chair for the eschatological King David, the Messiah ben David, whose advent is anticipated in a world to come.

The image of the enigmatic animal, squirrel or fox, will now have to be explained in connection with the mystical gate, the four cherubim, the throne of the Messiah, and the rejoicing fabulous animals represented on the miniature.

There is a legend in the Babylonian Talmud (Makkoth, fol. 24 b),

6. "Eine illustrierte deutsche Machsorhandschrift in Breslau," *Menora* (Vienna, 1927).

7. Fig. 138 in R. Bruck, *Die Malereien in den Handschriften des Königreich Sachsen* (Dresden, 1906). The motif is interpreted in R. Wischnitzer-Bernstein, *Gestalten und Symbole der jüdischen Kunst* (Berlin, 1935), p. 141.

8. b. Chagiga 14 a, quoted by Paul Volz, *Die Eschatologie der Jüdischen Gemeinde im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter* (Tübingen, 1934), p. 215.

PLATE I

THE MESSIANIC FOX AND THE GATE OF MERCY

Hebrew Prayer Book (Breslau, State and University Library Cod. Or. 1 *1, f. 89 v.)*

THE MESSIANIC FOX AND THE GATE OF MERCY

Hebrew Prayer Book (Leipzig, University Library, Cod. v 1102, vol. II, f. 176 r.)

about a group of sages going to Jerusalem. The city has been destroyed by Titus. The rabbis arrive at Mount Scopus, and reach the place of the Temple. All of a sudden they see a fox running from the place where formerly stood the Holy of Holies. At this sight they rend their clothes and weep bitterly. Only one of them, Rabbi Akiba, is smiling. Asked why he smiles, he tells his companions two prophecies from which it is to be inferred that on the place where foxes have dwelt the Temple will be restored.

This exquisite legend is an example of how faith transfigures symbols of evil augury into the reverse. This process of mystical reversion is typical for the working of Jewish legend. In the Old Testament the fox is a symbol of desolation. Ezekiel (13:4) points to the "fox of the desert." The Lamentations of Jeremiah (5:18) associate the foxes with the destroyed Temple. "Because of the Mountain of Zion, which is desolate, the foxes walk upon it."

We have here the very image on which the legend is built up, in its primary inception. The sponsor of the struggle of Bar Kokhba for the freedom of the Jewish nation, Rabbi Akiba, who died as a martyr, is the popular hero to whom tradition attributes the mystical inversion of the symbol of desolation into an augury of bliss. The controversial animal in our miniature is the *Fox,* the herald of the restoration of the Temple; the jubilant grotesques complete the messianic allegory.

We turn now to the second representation of the fox, which occurs in the Mahzor of Leipzig mentioned above (vol. II, f. 176 r.). The setting in which we meet him (Plate II) is very similar to the composition in the Breslau Mahzor. It is a portal design. The text enclosed in the framing reads: "Hold open the Gate until it is to be closed, for the day is drawing to a close." It is a passage of the Ne'ilah, the Conclusion Prayer of the service of the Day of Atonement. The "Open Gate" again is invoked. The architecture of the gateway, with its trefoil and bracket arches, is more elaborate, and points at least to the end of the fourteenth century. In the windows of the pinnacles appear the sounders of the shofar, the horn blown at the close of the Ne'ilah. The men wear white pointed hats, the so called *Judenhüte.* The Talmud (Yerushalmi, R. H. 1 57 b) prescribes white for garments to wear on the Day of Atonement.

In the tympan of the arch is to be seen a running fox. In an attitude familiar to us from the Breslau Mahzor, he lifts up his head. It is the

fox of the prophecy of Rabbi Akiba, the pious fox, a vision of cheerfulness and comfort to the devout, exhausted by a day of prayer and fasting at the close of Yom Kippur. The Gate is the heavenly abode of God and, in typological correspondence, the portal of the restored Temple.[9]

It was mentioned that the Mahzor of Breslau is incomplete. During my studies in various libraries, I was fortunate enough to discover the missing first volume. When I saw the Breslau codex for the first time, I was struck by the close affinity of the color scheme displayed in this manuscript with the Mahzor of the Sächsische Landesbibliothek in Dresden (MS. A 46 a), which I had seen years before. The ornamental pieces on folio 89 verso of the Breslau volume (the second), and on folio 132 recto of the Dresden volume (the first), are almost identical in color and design. There is the same effect of black lettering set against a pattern of tiny red scrolls enlivened with blue dots and greenwinged yellow grotesques. Even the already familiar lion with flourishes is present. Numerous other instances point to the identity of the artist. Besides, the Dresden codex[10] numbers 293 leaves and measures 53 over 38 cm. The width is identical, and the slight difference in the height may be due to manipulations of the binder. The contents of the volume complete the Breslau Mahzor. We find there the missing service for Passover and Shabuot. The lavish ornamentation associated with the calligraphy is similarly a feature of the Dresden manuscript. It may be inferred from the close affinity of the ornamentation and the writing that the scribe and the illuminator were one person.

The few illustrations include (on folio 82 recto) "Haman and his sons hanging on a tree," (on folio 116 verso) a portal with the characteristic medallions, further on the signs of the Zodiac, this time accompanying the Prayer for Dew (they begin on folio 132 recto) and (on folio 202 verso) "Moses receiving the Law."

The manuscript includes, among other poetical pieces, an elegy by

9. The Leipzig Mahzor is described in Bruck (*op. cit.* No. 77) where the iconographical subjects are not identified. For identification of some of the images, see R. Wischnitzer-Bernstein, *Gestalten und Symbole*; *idem*, "Die Messianische Hütte," *idem*, "Der Streiter des Herrn," in Gaster Anniversary Volume (London, 1937); Zofja Ameisenowa, "Das Messianische Gastmahl der Gerechten in einer hebräischen Bibel aus dem 13. Jahrhundert" (MGWJ, 1935), p. 409.

10. Briefly described in Bruck, *op. cit.*, No. 63.

Meir of Rothenburg, whom the scribe calls his teacher, in the colophon in the second (Breslau) volume. We may assume that the "faithful" and modest disciple of Meir of Rothenburg not only compiled and copied the texts of the Prayer Book, but also illuminated the two volumes now in Dresden and Breslau. However faithful to the literary heritage of his teacher he has, apparently, ignored his attitude toward illustration which we happen to know. R. Meir of Rothenburg objected particularly to representations of animals and birds in Prayer Books. He expressed concern lest the pictures divert the worshipper.[11]

We are fortunate that, in the case of the Breslau Prayer Book, we are able to confront the theologian with the scribe and illuminator. It may be inferred from this example of prayer book illumination that the urge for pictorial representation was strong enough to overcome so serious an obstacle as the religious objections of a prominent rabbinical leader.

11. Tosaafoth to Joma, p. 54 a, quoted in B. Italiener, *Die Darmstädter Haggadah* (1927) p. 18.

THE DYING GOD IN THE MODERN THEATRE

By Winifred Smith

Professor of Comparative Dramatic Literature, Vassar College

"Must a Christ die in every generation? . . . How long, Oh Lord? How long?" This question, the theme of the epilogue of Shaw's *St. Joan,* has been asked again and again since 1914, especially by the generation of dramatists who fought the Great War or suffered acutely from some of its direct or indirect results. Older Christian writers glorified the martyr who died to make men free, and answered the first of Shaw's questions in the affirmative with "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church," or "it is expedient that one man die for the people." In the pre-Christian period the death of a god was arranged by priests in a rite believed to be essential to the life of the tribe or even to the earth itself. No question of the rite's validity was permitted; the sacrifice was the central element in the spring and autumn fertility festivals among primitive peoples[1] and long survived in more or less symbolic form the savage societies which invented it.

The Christian Passion Play, which seems to be a direct outgrowth of the earlier Mysteries,[2] includes, as most of them did, the resurrection as well as the death of the god, and eventually welded the inherited cult factors into a unity with a very human story of a prophet-reformer, far ahead of his age in his ethical system. Obviously there are few stories with such a universal appeal in the western world as that of the just man, unjustly persecuted and done to death, who by his brave dying creates faith, and whose spirit, refusing to die, inspires converts with his noble mission. In the traditional Christian form of the drama composed from this story, a drama preserved in the great cycles of medieval plays formerly given all over Europe, and still surviving at Oberammergau, Selzach, and elsewhere today, the sequence of incidents in the Passion includes the Last Supper, the Betrayal, the Trial and Torture, the Crucifixion, the Burial and the Resurrection. But it must not be forgotten that underlying this tragic action, which to Christian belief is the Divine Comedy of

1. J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough, passim.*
2. V. D. Macchioro, *From Orpheus to Paul* (New York, 1930).

salvation, can be found the remains of the much older cults, the Orphic, the Dionysiac Mysteries of the Greeks, the Hebrew ritual of the Day of Atonement, the Egyptian rite of Osiris. All these cults, centering on sacrifice and the ensuing purgation, seem to provide ever significant symbols for the expression of human guilt and its riddance; in other words they all surely do, to some degree, give the katharsis that Aristotle found the essential result of tragedy.

Just what are the reasons for the satisfactoriness of this long-lived cult and art form, anthropologists and psychologists have debated inconclusively for many years. They have turned up numerous evidences of its widespread use, a use which Frazer relates to the fertility worship among agricultural peoples; Jung, on the other hand, suggests a psychological rather than a social origin for sacrifice and finds it in the "collective unconscious," which exists beneath the thin surface of so-called civilized man's conscious intelligence, preserving from generation to generation old savage dreams and compulsions to action, which rise to demand expression in times of frustration and distress, in order to satisfy fundamental urges of various kinds. Notwithstanding these and many other ingenious theories, the origins of human ways of action, and among them of the ritual and theatrical representation of the dying and reviving god, are and will doubtless long remain obscure. What is not uncertain, however, is that the Passion Play formula has been revived today in numerous modern dramas which are in many particulars similar to the older rituals preserved by the Greek and Roman Churches and by other mystical organizations, such as the Anthroposophists. The theatre, with the rich sensational appeal which modern producers have developed, offers a fine opportunity to writers who wish either to communicate their inner conflicts to a wide audience, or to voice the hope that develops from some particular vision of the future. The curious fact which I wish to discuss here is that many of the younger dramatists have brought back to the stage, in their attempts to give meaning to the chaotic life of their generation, some of the oldest ritual forms that humanity has invented for this same purpose.

Because of these long roots it is almost impossible, in studying any one of the modern Passion Plays, to account exactly for its sources. In the case, for instance, of Franz Werfel's masterpiece, *Bocksgesang* (*Goat Song*, 1922), the magnificently integrated tragedy is composed

by an imagination fed from rich and varied learning, drawn in part out of Hebrew ritual, in part from the ancient cult of Dionysos, in part from the Greek Orthodox Mass, in part from the Black Mass of the Middle Ages, in all of which forms probably ancient fertility rites survive. Werfel also certainly knows Reitzenstein and Reinach and Frazer, and is familiar with the psychoanalysts' vocabulary of symbols and their theories about guilt feelings, repressions and divided personalities.

The monster around whose mystery the play centers, half animal, half human, perhaps wholly divine, is never seen by the audience except once as a huge shadow and never heard except once in an inarticulate cry; he has been concealed for years, a shameful secret, by his rich peasant parents. At the end of the first act, he escapes from confinement, because the Voltairean doctor who visits him carelessly leaves his stall unlocked. This strange creature is obviously a reincarnation of the goat god, Azazel, of the Hebrews, or of Dionysos, who among the Greeks died yearly to bring fertility to the land and renewal of life to his worshippers.[3] According to Jung's cryptic phrase, Dionysos is a symbol of "the depths of the passionate dissolution of all human particularity in the animal divinity of the aboriginal soul,—a blessed and terrible experience that a humanity strongly hedged within its culture believes it has escaped, till it succeeds once again in giving rein to a new orgy of blood."[4] Just so, he says, "the cult of Satan and the Black Mass" developed "when famines and plagues swept across the land" in the Middle Ages and "the disillusioned people," feeling themselves "God-forsaken," sought in a cruel ritual of blood and terror to propitiate the dark powers they believed were tormenting them. Werfel's monster, who flees from his stable to the altar on which the maiden, Stanja, dedicates herself in a sacrificial marriage to the perpetuation of the divine in man, is the hero of a drama of salvation through rebirth.

As in earlier cults, the stage setting for the scene before the culminating sacrifice, itself too sacred to be seen, is the doorway of a chapel; as Lord Raglan points out in his study of *The Hero*, such a place is most appropriate, for here at the entrance to a shrine, "sacred-

3. Cf. J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough, passim*, and for Azazel, H. P. Smith, *Religion of Israel* (New York, 1914) and J. H. Hooke, *Myth and Ritual* (London, 1933). L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, Vol. v (Oxford, 1909), pp. 173 ff., discusses Dionysos worship in detail.

4. C. Jung, *The Integration of the Personality* (New York, 1939), p. 125.

ness can be combined with visibility." While the kneeling multitude sing their litany, "Kyrie Eleison," in the effort to propitiate the strange creature who has taken refuge behind the closed doors, Stanja is inspired with the exalted consciousness of her redemptive mission; the doors are opened for her, and she disappears into a blaze of light, the divine fire from which a moment later the monster's unearthly cry is heard.

Only at the very end of the play, in her ruined farmyard, does Stanja announce, in reply to his mother's lament, that she is to bear the weird god's child; the renewal of life in her is the result of her sacrifice. He himself, the shameful, secret, hunted thing, has perished in the burning forest, as have also perished Mirko, Stanja's betrothed, and Juvan, the student whom she loved. All three are children of the same father, each symbolizing one element in mankind: Mirko, the settled habit; Juvan, the restless brain; the monster, the life force, or cosmic energy. All three die, but not before each has given the quiet, intense heroine something of himself to perpetuate, though she herself has as little individuality as the Earth Mother, Demeter, whose rites were celebrated in the Eleusinian Mysteries twenty-five hundred years ago.

There is significance in the period in which Werfel has set his play, the late eighteenth century, and in his introducing into it an American who has lived through the Revolution of 1776, a wandering Jew, symbol of the eternal sufferings of his scapegoat race, and the choric group of the "landless," whose hunger, exploited by the bold talk of Juvan and the American, is finally fired by fear of the escaped monster into the destructive revolutionary acts culminating in the penitential Black Mass, the sacrifice of Stanja, and later of Mirko, Juvan, and the beast-god himself. All the action and dialogue are full of relevance to our own times, so too is the curious threefold hero group, a kind of personification of the poet's own schizophrenic generation. The play shows clearly enough its author's belief that the spirit of life, kept down in vain by those who have not the strength to acknowledge and tame it, runs wild in the land, through flood and fire, producing a wave of revolution among the miserable, and ruin for their hard masters. When the wave subsides, only a faint faith is left that a child will bring back hope again, even as full spring follows the late storms of March which give the scenes their atmosphere.

This splendidly picturesque and poetic play is not, I think, a "call-

ing of humanity to judgment," as one German critic has labeled it, but fundamentally an affirmation of what was strongest in the young Werfel, his faith in humanity's will to live, especially in the creative mother force, and his determination to look beyond war's destruction to a brighter future. For Stanja, as for Werfel and for Nietzsche,[5] "the only happiness lies in creation." The only happiness and the only hope! As Eugene O'Neill commented after seeing *Bocksgesang*, "Goat Song is life, and is not afraid of its shadows."[6] This modern Passion Play, like its predecessors, is a hymn to life, not a definite sermon against or for revolution, nor an attack on peasant proprietors, as some critics have believed it to be; much less is it a mere tale of terror, trying to make its readers and spectators shudder by the evocation of a devilish Minotaurlike horror. The monstrous "shadow," shameful and terrible in the eyes of conventional people who strive to hide it from their neighbors, is discovered by the fearless heroine to be the very spirit of life itself.

O'Neill's recognition of Werfel's intention is undoubtedly due to his own preoccupation with similar philosophic ideas and his own attempts to find suitable forms for their expression, for O'Neill, too, is a poet who insists that he is principally interested in portraying "life in the terms of lives." He has celebrated the death and resurrection Mystery more than once, in his own way, though in his work it is usually complicated with other themes. In *The Great God Brown*, for instance, Dionysos is half St. Anthony, the mother figure is both the practical wife, Margaret, and the symbolic earth priestess-prostitute, Cybel, and Brown himself is a strangely confused and abortive God. The meaning of the play—the eternal return of life upon itself through the rhythm of birth and death, the search for unity through diversity—is expressed in one of its final sentences: "Out of Earth's transfigured birth pains the laughter of Man returns to bless and play again . . . upon the knees of God."

The rhetoric and the mixed metaphors of O'Neill's language when, as here, he tries to formulate universal truths, make his play much less directly poetic and unified than Werfel's, yet the intention of both poets is the same, to fuse "the color of the sunset" with "tomorrow's dawn"[7] into a hymn to the eternal energy of which

5. F. Nietzsche, *Nachgelassene Schriften*, XII. Cf. Werfel's *Realismus und Innerlichkeit* (Berlin, 1931).

6. In a letter to the New York *Times*, Feb. 25, 1926.

7. O'Neill, *The Fountain*, last scene.

man's joys and agonies are but a small part. The blindly groping search for the divine essence by the human being is a theme O'Neill returns to in *Dynamo*, a peculiarly confused and feeble attempt to symbolize today's God by a huge pulsating machine, and again more recently in the sentimental purgation play, *Days Without End*, where the hero, self-convicted of sin, is finally absolved and reconciled to the cross by his priestly uncle. Here the road to Calvary and to ascension is portrayed in Christian terms, whereas in *The Great God Brown* and in *Dynamo* the basis of the action is a more primitive ritual, in which, as earlier in *Desire Under the Elms*, the basic Life Force, eternally dying and reviving, is, though obscurely, equated with Nature and its half-understood energies.

"Life at the ebb" and "life at the flow," the concept of the cosmos formulated by Heraclitus in the sixth century B.C., has been restated again and again from his day till Bergson's, by philosophers and poets. The perception of the rhythm of life and death in the seasons, repeated in the race as in the individual, underlies, I suppose, all versions of the Passion Play, no matter how apparently diverse their details. Certainly this rhythmic theme is the chief leitmotiv of another beautiful modern tragedy which has been stangely misinterpreted and then neglected by critics, Sean O'Casey's *The Silver Tassie* (1928). Everyone who knows the play at all remembers how Yeats refused it for the Abbey Theatre in a letter[8] that shows his complete deafness to a poetic talent different from his own:

> You have no subject. You are not interested in the Great War. You never stood on its battlefields or walked its hospitals, and so write out of your opinions. You illustrate these opinions by a series of almost unrelated scenes. . . . There is no dominating character, neither psychological unity nor unity of action. . . . The mere greatness of the World War has thwarted you; it . . . obtrudes itself upon the stage as so much dead wood that will not burn with the dramatic fire. . . . I cannot advise you to amend the play. It is all too obstract, after the first act. The second act is an interesting technical experiment, but it is too long . . . and after that there is nothing. . . .

How much better Bernard Shaw understood the play, even though his understanding was conditioned by his *Heartbreak House* post-war mood, and did not completely grasp O'Casey's intention!

8. His letter, dated April 20, 1928, was communicated by O'Casey to The London *Observer* and printed there, June 3, 1928.

What a hell of a play! . . . a deliberately unrealistic, phantasmo-poetic first act, intensifying in exactly the same mode into a climax of war imagery in the second act, and then two acts of almost unbearable realism, bringing down all the voodoo war poetry with an ironic crash to earth in ruins. . . . There is no falling off, or loss of grip—the hitting gets harder and harder right through to the end.

Shaw understood the musical form of the drama and its thematic unity, but took O'Casey for more of a satirist and prophet than he is in this play, where he expresses in pictures and in powerful rhythms a spirit of the same generalizing and visionary kind as O'Neill's and Werfel's. Into his background are woven not only the sights and sounds of the poverty-stricken Dublin slums of his childhood,[9] but also an intimate acquaintance with Roman Catholic ritual and an understanding, extraordinary in a Protestant, of the nature of its symbolism and its ancient origins. Therefore, when he chose the Great War as his subject—the subject Yeats denied he had—he chose to clothe it in the form of the Passion Play, a mass passion, in which all humanity suffers, dies and lives again, though its agony is concentrated in the godlike young athlete, Harry, as protagonist.

The opening act, as Shaw observed, is far from realistic, though a first glance at the stage shows a recognizable Irish cottage room, whose homely life is centered around the hearth; a second glance is more revealing, for it falls on the object in the middle of the room, a table covered with a purple cloth, like an altar, on which are displayed various gold and silver medals won by Harry; behind it a window opens toward the sea, showing a mast in the form of a cross, with a starry light at its top. Susie, quoting Scripture—an Old Testament prophecy of doom—as she polishes Harry's arms, is obviously the priestess serving the altar; just as obviously the two old men by the fire, in their reminiscences of the young hero's prowess, are the chorus celebrating the divine superiority of the chosen youth. These three prepare the entrance of Harry, who is at last borne into the room on the shoulders of a Bacchanalian crowd, the girls with "their skirts kilted above their knees" in true Maenad fashion; he and his sweetheart, Jessie, drink from the Silver Tassie, the Grail, the cup of communion, that will soon be full of his blood as it is now full of

9. Cf. his early plays and his autobiography, *I Knock at the Door* (New York, 1939).

the wine of rejoicing. The prophecy of what is to come sounds out in the concluding song:

> The trumpets sound, the banners fly,
> The glittering spears are ranked and ready;
> The shouts of war are heard afar,
> The battle closes thick and bloody.

But in the magnificent second act, a "gunpowder sonata," as one critic rightly called it, there is no glitter of spears nor brilliant color of banners, only darkness and cold and filth and pain. In this reinterpretation of Calvary, the figure of the Prince of Peace on the cross is seen at one side of the stage in the shape of a partly fallen crucifix, broken and distorted,—the scene is a nearly ruined monastery, dominated by a huge gun; on the side opposite the crucifix is its living counterpart, a soldier with outstretched arms tied to a large wheel, enduring a penance for a minor infraction of army rules. Across the stage passes a procession of stretcherbearers carrying the ghastly forms of the wounded, and followed by other grotesque figures, as terrible and as ludicrous as the devils in Dante's *Inferno*, while around the little flickering fire on the forestage crouches the dim group of victims, the soldiers in this purgatory, among whom the once glorious Harry is only a nameless unit. They chant in stammering verse their impious litany to life and death, symbolized by the gun in their midst:

> Hedg'd in by wine, red, white and amber,
> Pour'd trembling into glasses gleaming,
> To drink deep to a heroes' vintage,
> Press'd out to yield a world's renewing . . .
> Hail, cool, hardened tower of steel emboss'd
> With the fever'd, figment thoughts of man, . . .
> We believe in God and we believe in thee . . .
> Dapple those who are shelter'd . . .
> With blood of youth expiring in its prime.

And to the sound of this hoarse chant, soon drowned in a heavy barrage, and to the flashing of red glares in the sky, the dreadful scene closes.

The hospital ward which fills the third act is as light in the September sun as the last was dark, though the symbolism still echoes that of the first half of the play. Not only are the colors, red and black, in evidence on the quilts, but the cross is still obvious, this time in the

wooden device at the head of each wounded man's bed, by which he helps himself to sit up. In the background, as before, songs are heard, this time the Latin chanting of the nuns to the Virgin Mother:

> Salve Regina, mater misericordiae, . . .
> O clemens, o pia, o dulcis Virgo Maria.

to which the undercurrent of crushed, broken-backed Harry's prayer sounds in bitter irony: "God of the miracles, give a poor devil a chance."

There are no more miracles, however, to restore the dying and the maimed, as life still surges over them, like the sea over half-buried wrecks. The last act is another bacchanal, more orgiastic than the first, in which those returned whole and sound from the inferno of the trenches, celebrate the peace in a tawdry dance hall, hung with crimson, green, and yellow curtains, green, the color of reviving life, predominating. The lanterns, with their "illuminated black cross" over "an inner one of gleaming red," keep the symbol of sacrifice still prominent and prepare the audience for the sight of the paralyzed Harry in his wheeled chair, with his blinded comrade, Teddy, at his side. The two, like ghosts, make the fully living shiver as they move fumblingly through the hall, crying out, to those who will not hear, their misery and despair. As Teddy says, the darkness for them, even in that garishly lighted hall, "stretches from the throne of God to the end of the hearth of hell."

But only for them. The Bacchants pause hardly a moment in their dance when Harry drinks the red wine—"red like the blood that was shed for . . . many"—and then crushes the Tassie till it is "mangled and bruised," even as he is "bruised and mangled," before he disappears from sight with his mother and Teddy:

> For he is a life on the ebb,
> We a full life on the flow,

sings Susie, the once ascetic priestess of the first act, who has become the heartless Life Force incarnate.

"The Lord hath given and man hath taken away," Harry's last words, remain in our ears, not quite drowned out by the cheap jazz band and Susie's cruel chant, but these words voice only part of the dominant meaning of the play. O'Casey, like Werfel, though less romantically, has expressed the feelings of many of his generation, that the cosmic rhythm of destruction and creation is not only eternal but

essentially amoral. Freud's analysis of *Civilization and Its Discontents* comes to the same tragic conclusion, though Freud does not stress as O'Casey's bitterness does, that with each repetition of the cycle humanity becomes a little more degraded than it was before.[10]

These two plays, one Austrian, one Irish, are the most original versions of the death and resurrection theme that the modern repertory provides, and by all odds the most imaginative. Yet the basic formula is to be found in many other dramas written since the Great War, not all of them so shatteringly pessimistic as *The Silver Tassie.* When Robert Nichols and Maurice Browne wrote *Wings Over Europe* in 1928 (printed 1929), they too, destroyed their young hero, godlike in his power and his love for humanity, but they gave a new turn to the resurrection theme.[11] Francis Lightfoot, the young scientist, inspired by Shelley to his vision of emancipating mankind from toil and pain by his discovery of the way to liberate the energy of the atom, is shot by the Judas of the piece, the British Secretary for War, because he will not let his discovery be used for the British Empire alone, and would rather destroy the world than have it survive under the selfish and incompetent guidance of the English Cabinet, which in the final act has shown itself almost subhuman in its meanness and viciousness. No sooner, however, is Francis dead than the sound of aeroplanes from Geneva is heard, and the message they bring tells that a new social order, a world order, is dawning; the scientists of the world, banded together as H. G. Wells has often prophesied they must and will be organized, to save man from his lower self, have made the same discovery that Francis made in his solitary laboratory, and intend, like him, to use it for the good of all humanity, not merely to preserve one predatory empire.

This play, almost classical in the severity of its concentration, has very little of the picturesque symbolism and none of the musical devices that heighten the emotional tension of *Bocksgesang* and *The Silver Tassie,* but it is tense, nevertheless, tense with a really twentieth-century appeal to the hope of human salvation through science and international good will. Shelley, Wells, Shaw, and Einstein are the inspirers of this drama, not Greek or Christian myth, or Frazer, or

10. O'Casey treated the theme of eternal return again in *Within the Gates,* in a somewhat happier mood, but without conviction or freshness of imagery.

11. I disagree with Mrs. Anita Block's classification of this play as primarily a protest against war. Cf. *The Changing World in Plays and Theatre* (Boston, 1939).

the psychonanalysts. The conclusion, however, appeals in both picture and mood to the religious traditions that underlie so much great art, for it is an annunciation as well as a resurrection scene. Francis, the young saint, lies dead on the huge table, which like an altar holds the central place in the room; the sun streams in on him from the open window, as the deepening sounds of the angelic messengers in their twentieth-century guise bring the promise of salvation and the triumph of hope in the world.

One more modernization of the Passion Play must bring this by no means complete list to a close. *Stevedore* (1934), by the young Americans, Paul Peters and George Sklar, seems at first sight as realistic and melodramatic a slice of life as an anecdote from the crime columns of today's newspaper, yet, when it is attentively read or seen in the theatre, its naturalistic details fall into place as only a new vesture for an ancient cult. The scene is a Southern city today, the hero, Lonnie, a poor negro stevedore distinguished from his fellows only by his courage, his vision and his unselfish wish to raise his race to a higher plane of living. Because the only way to accomplish his purpose seems to him to be through building a union of black and white dock workers, he is persecuted and fired by his employer, arrested on a framed charge of attacking a white woman, hounded, when he escapes the police, from one hideout to another, and finally shot in a riot of a white mob who surround the humble home in which he has taken refuge. He dies and is mourned by his sweetheart and the women around her, but he does not die in vain; even as the songs of lament fill the air, a counter chorus is heard, the marching song of the white workers who come to join their black comrades in their struggle for a living wage. Once again the immortality predicted is for the group, not for the individual; the hero leads his people to the threshold of a new life, suffers and dies for them, and leaves them to profit from his sacrifice.

Peters and Sklar, in their very up-to-date version of the old ritual, show their understanding of its picturesque, traditional, emotion-rousing features in their exploitation of color contrasts through their black and white actors, as well as in the light and shade of their scenes, and in their use of negro songs in chorus throughout the play, rising into the moving funeral chant at the end and answered by the, at first distant, then gradually nearing triumph song of the rescuers. Even the Last Supper is not forgotten, an element of the Passion cycle present in

both *Bocksgesang* and *The Silver Tassie,* though not in *Wings Over Europe.*

The note of hope for poor, suffering humanity which sounds out so clearly at the end of *Stevedore* and *Wings Over Europe,* and faintly but unmistakably in *Bocksgesang,* voices the meaning of the Christian Mass and of the Orphic Mysteries truly enough, whereas O'Casey leads up to a darker conclusion; for him life survives in the race after the destruction of its finest youth, but it survives in more vulgar, cruel, and debased forms than before. Other young dramatists, especially in Germany in the 1920's, who have used the Passion Play formula, have preferred the Werfel mood as satisfactory to their idealism, because it gives a meaning, though a somewhat vague one, to their sufferings. They all accept the idea that "Blood must flow," and all keep alive the idealization of sacrifice, which is one of the oldest and perhaps one of the most paralyzing interpretations of human experience which religious philosophy has invented. The deep need for sufferers to feel that they have not suffered in vain doubtless partly explains this ideal and the dogma of the atonement which is related to it, as it does the ritual of confession and penance and the Mystery Play's portrayal of resurrection after death. Thanks to Frazer and Freud and Jung we are beginning to understand why, as Shaw says at the end of *St. Joan,* most people still believe "A Christ must die in every generation"—millions of Christs today—but, like Shaw again, the more rational among us are beginning to question the necessity for the sacrifice, instead of, like the playwrights I have discussed and the masses generally, accepting it and finding in it vicarious satisfaction for deeply buried savage "death wishes" and feebly struggling impulses toward a better future.

THE RELIGION OF THE CH'UAN MIAO*

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I

INTRODUCTION

The Ch'uan Miao are an ethnic group of about one hundred and fifty thousand people living in West China, on the borderland of Szechwan, Kueichow, and Yunnan Provinces. Here the land is very rugged and mountainous, and rises to an altitude of from three to six thousand feet. According to the traditions of the Ch'uan Miao, they formerly lived in Kuangtung Province, and, after a war with the Chinese in which they were defeated, were brought, with their hands tied behind them, to their present abode.

All the Ch'uan Miao are farmers. Many are, when the occasions arise, priests or geomancers, others are carpenters or workers in brass, silver, or iron, but all are farmers and depend primarily on farming for a living. The family and not the individual is the social unit. Land, domestic animals, and tools are owned by the family. Filial piety is the cardinal virtue. All blood relatives, excepting married daughters and including wives of relatives, are members of the same family, and several generations often live in the same home. All who have the same surname are believed to be related and are not permitted to intermarry. In a still larger sense, there is a feeling of relatedness among all Ch'uan Miao which binds them together into one more or less harmonious group.

A comparison of the languages of the Ch'uan Miao, the Hua Miao, the Ch'in Maio, the Lolo, and the Chinese, and of their social and religious customs, makes it evident that the Ch'uan Miao are a branch of the Miao-yao group and of the Mon-khmer family.

There is no organized religion. One looks in vain for temples or

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In this paper the Wade system is used in the romanization of Chinese words. For Ch'uan Miao words, an approximate romanization is given in ordinary letters, and in parenthesis a careful romanization in the International Phonetic Script.

shrines, a separate cast of priests or priestesses, visible gods, or a religious organization that seeks adherents and labors to perpetuate itself. Yet the Ch'uan Miao are a very religious people. Fundamentals in their religion are belief in demons and ceremonies to exorcise them, and the ancestral cult, with its numerous ceremonies in which there is communication with the deceased ancestors to whom offerings are made. They have no written language or literature, but naturally absorb their religion by witnessing or participating in the ceremonies, and hearing or singing the legends and myths which have been handed down in poetic form by the musicians for many generations.

II

SOME PRIMITIVE PRACTICES

While charms are few, they are considered useful. Occasionally a charm written on paper is purchased from a Chinese priest and pasted above the front door or inside the house. Sometimes seven wooden swords or daggers are tied together, marked in parallel lines with charcoal, and hung above the front door or on the ends of the roof beams, in order to protect the home from demons. A hornet's nest is sometimes hung up over the front door or on a bed. One explanation is that the demon is afraid of being stung, and therefore goes in the opposite direction; another is that the demon stops to count the cells, which delays him until daylight when the crow of the cock frightens him away. A polished-stone axe, such as is occasionally found in this region, may be used as a charm. A *tuan kung* (shaman) can make a charm by striking a piece of paper with his fist or with a polished-stone axe.

Divination may be by means of dreams or omens. When go-betweens are arranging a betrothal, they kill a chicken to eat, and examine the tongue and the bones to divine whether or not the marriage will be lucky. During his ceremonies the *tuan kung* divines by means of pieces of bamboo to learn whether or not the gods are propitious. He sometimes receives messages from deceased ancestors and demons. The *mo*, who officiates at funerals and memorial ceremonies, often divines by means of two pieces of bamboo to learn wishes of the ancestors. Another diviner is the *so beo* (bʌu). *So* means previous and *beo* means know. The *so beo* often lives in a cave or in a house in the woods. It is claimed that his ancestors are in his home, and so other people are not

allowed to enter. Voices of several people are heard in the house or cave, talking, laughing, or weeping. If a person gives the *so beo* a present of meat, a chicken, biscuits, wine, money, etc., he will foretell the future.

Whatever is dreamed is believed to be true. If a person dreams that he is in paradise or elsewhere, he believes that his soul or life has actually been there, and that the things dreamed actually happened. Many things seen in dreams are thought to be signs that certain events will occur.

There are numerous lucky and unlucky omens. It is unlucky for a dog to howl mournfully, for it signifies that somebody is going to die. It is believed that when a rainbow appears over water it is drinking, and a person who drinks that water will surely become ill. It is unlucky for a hen to crow like a rooster, for a cat, dog, or pig belonging to another family to enter one's house, for a large old snake to enter one's home, or for a bird flying overhead to drop offal on one's head. Some days are lucky and others are unlucky. In determining what days are or are not propitious for various undertakings, many Ch'uan Miao use the Chinese almanac.

A very important matter is to have a lucky spot for the grave of an ancestor, for in that case the descendants will prosper. There are persons who are especially efficient in locating these lucky places for graves, and sometimes a Chinese *tuan kung* is called upon.

Incantations are frequently used, especially by the priests and exorcists, and by their means wonderful things are accomplished. There are incantations to help in divining, to make water holy so that it can be used in worship, to prevent the flowing of blood from wounds, to remove bones or metal objects that have been swallowed, to exorcise demons that cause pain in the nipples, and boils, to purify a house after a death, to drive away colds, to help in childbirth, to secure the help of deities, and for many other purposes.

III

DEMONS AND CEREMONIES OF EXORCISM

After death the deceased ancestors need the same things that are necessary in this world—food, clothing, etc., and these are furnished by the living descendants. If there are no descendants, or if the descendants are unfilial, and neglect the ancestors, then, because they

suffer want, the souls of the deceased become angry demons who inflict injury on living people, causing diseases and other calamities. Besides the souls of human beings, demons include the souls of various animals, such as dogs, cattle and other living creatures, and even of inanimate things such as mountains and stones. Demons that are the souls of human beings are called *glang*, and those that are the souls of cattle, water-buffalo, sheep, goats, pigs, cats, dogs, chickens, and ducks are called *ts'ao*. A demon which comes from caves is called *bo tsao*. It can change into a creature that eats people or causes pain or sickness. Mountain demons are called *glang do* (glaŋTo.) or *glang bi*, and sometimes cause death. What the Chinese call *yao ch'i* or *chin ch'i* are the demons of snakes, frogs, and toads.

Naturally the way to heal diseases and to avoid calamities is to get rid of the demons that cause them. This is the work of the *tuan kung*, called in the Ch'uan Miao language *do nun* (To NAn). He knows how to find out what demon is causing the trouble, and by means of charms, incantations, and ceremonies to exorcise him. He is paid for his services. The *do nun* has elaborate ceremonies for exorcism, some of which the writer has witnessed. In some of the ceremonies he uses an assistant called in Chinese a *ma chio*, or horse's foot. This person is put under a spell by the *do nun*, after which he leaps about very vigorously, striking the ground with an axe. If after a time he kills a snake, a frog, an angle worm, or some other creature, it is believed that he has killed the demon.

The implements used by the *do nun* are as follows:

1. A knife.

2. A small hollow brass circle, with small metal objects inside which cause it to jingle when shaken.

3. An iron circle with an iron handle, with several small iron circles around the larger one. This is also used by the Chinese *tuan kung*.

4. A flat, tongue-shaped wooden object with charms carved on both sides, called in Chinese a *lin p'ai*, also used by the Chinese *tuan kung* and by Buddhist and Taoist priests.

5. An iron seal with Chinese characters, also used by the Chinese *tuan kung* and by Buddhist and Taoist priests.

6. A neolithic stone axe, such as is occasionally found in the Ch'uan Miao region.

7. A pair of divining-sticks made of two halves of a bamboo root.

8. A pair of scissors for cutting spirit money, etc.
9. Three sticks of incense and two candles.
10. A wooden quart measure full of rice or corn.
11. A bowl of water.
12. A bowl of wine.

The following are some of the things performed by the *do nun* during ceremonies of exorcism:

1. Charms are drawn by moving the fingers above the water in a porcelain bowl.
2. The hands are twisted about in various ways.
3. A tube is made of paper and set upright in a bowl of water, after which it is burnt down to the water.
4. The *do nun* calls his gods to come and assist him in his ceremonies of exorcism.
5. The divining sticks are thrown as a means of consulting the gods.
6. The *do nun* ceremonially rides horses into Hades.
7. The demons are called, and enticed into a large flat winnowing basket.
8. Spirit money is burnt as an offering to gods and demons.
9. The *do nun* spurts water out of his mouth as a means of exorcising demons.
10. The demons are exorcised or driven away.
11. The assistant is put under a spell, after which he kills the demon causing the disease. Then he is released from the spell.

IV

MEMORIAL CEREMONIES

Among the Ch'uan Miao the family includes not only the living, but also the souls of the deceased ancestors for at least three generations. The deceased ancestors need the same things that they used in this world, such as food, clothing, money, and cattle, water-buffalo, pigs and chickens. These are provided in the memorial and other ceremonies by the living descendents, and the deceased ancestors reciprocate by protecting their descendants from disease, and helping them to prosper and multiply. Offerings or sacrifices consist of food, clothing, money, wine, etc. given to the ancestors. The *mo*, or priest, seldom fails to remind the deceased of their duty to help their living descendants.

At every gathering where there is a feast, the deceased ancestors are formally invited, and are offered food and wine before the living descendants partake of the feast. There is such a ceremony at the time when the bride is sent away by her parents, and another when she arrives in the home of the groom and is married. At all the calendar festivals, which correspond closely to those of the Chinese, the same procedure is followed. These calendar festivals are new year's day, the second day of the first moon, the third day of the first moon, the fifteenth day of the first moon, the third day of the third moon, the fifth day of the fifth moon, the ceremony of eating new grain, the thirteenth day of the seventh moon, the fifteenth day of the eighth moon, the ninth day of the ninth moon, the first day of the tenth moon, and the thirtieth day of the twelfth moon.

In the memorial ceremonies two important musical instruments are used. One is a six-tubed wind instrument with six notes called a *gaign* or *gun*, which is played by a man who dances as he plays. This is generally accompanied by a ceremonial drum, which is sacred and is used only during solemn memorial ceremonies.

Soon after a person dies the *mo* begins the ceremony. He makes a bow of bamboo and from three to six arrows of peach branches. Wearing a sword at his belt, he takes the bow and arrows in his hands, and and holds a cock under his armpit. In his hands are also two pieces of bamboo which are used for divination or conversation with the dead. Three times the *mo* takes the dead person by the hand, saying, "I am helping you arise." He then takes the two pieces of bamboo, places them on the body of the corpse, and says, "Three times I have called you, and three times I took you by the hand, but you would not get up. You are truly dead. Now I will send a rooster to lead you, and a bow and arrows to accompany you. If you hear another cock crow and yours replies, then that person is your ancestor. If your cock does not reply, that is not your ancestor and you must not go. When you meet your ancestors, report that you were born at a certain place at a certain time, lived in such and such places, and died at this place. Then the ancestors will take you to Ntsï's level place and you will meet your male and female ancestors for three generations." The priest then chokes the cock to death, and the soul of the cock leads the soul of the dead to the level land of Ntsï.

Some time after this there is a procession. In front marches a man

whirling a stick. Then follow two men playing the *liu sheng*,[1] two more blowing buffalo horns, then two carrying green bamboo twigs, and two carrying guns. This ceremony symbolizes the fact that in former times the Ch'uan Miao lived in the forests surrounded by wild beasts. The bamboo twigs symbolize the forests, and the two horns recall those which were blown to frighten away the tigers and wolves.

Later an animal is sacrificed. It is generally a bull, but may be a male water-buffalo, a pig, a sheep, or a chicken. It must not be a duck. The animal is led to the front door. The rope which is tied to the nose of the bull is passed through the door, over the ceremonial drum which is hanging outside, up to the coffin, and put into the hand of the deceased. Then the priest says, "Your descendants are giving you this cow. Take it to Ntsï's level place. There visit your ancestors for three generations." This is followed by weeping on the part of the descendants. The bull is then killed, skinned, cut up into nine, or thirty-six pieces, boiled a short time, and then offered to the ancestors. After that the meat is well boiled, and a feast is enjoyed by the friends and relatives. The sons and daughters of the deceased do not eat any of the meat at this time. Generally the night after the bull is killed there is a ceremony of dancing and pushing. It is performed near the coffin, inside the house, by the strongest young men. Sometimes the furniture is smashed and the walls of the living-room broken.

Twelve days after the funeral there is a memorial festival called in Chinese *sao ch'ieh*, and in Ch'uan Miao *shi* (ʂi) or *si* (si). The ceremonial drum is not used, and the bull is not sacrificed. There is no music of the *liu sheng*, no beating of the drum, nor singing of songs. At this time the spirit comes back and visits his former home. Ashes are sprinkled outside the front door, and friends and relatives later look in the ashes for footprints, in order to learn whether the person is now a grown human being, or a child, or has been transformed into a fowl, a horse, a dog, or some other creature. A cock is killed and offered raw to the spirit. Then it is cooked, other food is added, and the relatives and friends have a feast. This ceremony is observed for parents and for brothers or sisters over three years of age.

Not less than a year after this ceremony there is a memorial service called in Chinese *tso chai*, and in Ch'uan Miao *vang*. Friends and

1. A small hand organ composed of bamboo pipes with free reeds.

relatives generally march to the grave, beating gongs and drums and playing the *liu sheng*. The soul of the dead is enticed back home. A cow or a water-buffalo, or merely a pig, is killed and offered to the ancestor; then it is cooked, other food is added, and it is eaten by the relatives and friends. This ceremony is performed for older brothers and sisters and for ancestors for three generations. The ceremonial drum and the *liu sheng* are used in this ceremony. It is believed that, after death, a woman carries on her back a grass mat, and a man carries fastened to his back a large winnowing basket. These are burdensome because they make it impossible for the souls to enter the palace in the level land of Ntsï. At this ceremony the ancestors are relieved of these burdens, so that they may go happily to God's flat land where they can enter the palace and visit their ancestors.

Later there is a ceremony called in Chinese *ch'ao chien*, and in Ch'uan Miao *tsa mong*. The custom is to dig up the corpse, throw away or burn up the old coffin, carefully wash the bones, place a new coffin in the old or in a new grave, and new garments in the coffin, arrange the bones in their natural order on top of the clothes, carefully fold the edges of the clothing over the bones, put the lid on the coffin, and cover the coffin with dirt. It is thought that, because the dead person cannot turn over in his grave, he becomes very tired and uncomfortable. After this ceremony, which takes place between three and ten years after the burial, the deceased ancestor is comfortable and the descendants have less illness and more prosperity. During this ceremony the drum is used, the *liu sheng* is played, songs are sung, a cow or a pig is killed, and there are offerings to the deceased ancestor and a feast.[2]

Another memorial ceremony is called *hua t'an* in Chinese and *gi bang* or *gei bang* in Ch'uan Miao. It is performed in one of the homes and is participated in by friends and relatives having the same surname. It takes place about once in three years, and lasts from one day and night to three days and three nights. A bull is killed, and the meat of the bull, rice, corn, wine, and other edibles are offered to the ancestors after which there is the usual feast. The drum is hung up on a wooden

2. This custom was formerly practiced by Chinese of Fukien and Kuangtung provinces. According to the Ch'uan Miao tradition their former home was in Kuangtung province.

beam along with a gourd. People of the same surname beat the drum, play the *liu sheng*, and sing songs. Several men put on women's clothes and impersonate women. Twelve men impersonate cows, six arranged on each side. Six cows are herded to the left and six to the right, then while the *liu sheng* is played the twelve cows fight. Some of the cows are supposed to be killed, and these cows are offered to the ancestors and then eaten. One woman carries an imitation baby and pretends to suckle it and to bestow affection on it. Women rub soot on the faces of the men until their faces are black. About daybreak the dummy baby is beaten to pieces and the ceremony ends.

There is a special ceremony to make offerings to the souls of domestic animals. It occurs on the third day of the third lunar month, or on a cow day in the first few days of the eleventh moon. It is generally performed on the tops of hills or mountains, or in mountain passes. A level place is prepared for the ceremony, which occurs once in three years and continues from three to eight days. The purpose is to secure sons and daughters, to cause crops to prosper, to protect the domestic animals from wild beasts and pestilences, and to cause them to multiply.

V

SPIRITUAL BEINGS

In spite of the fact that the Ch'uan Miao and the Chinese have lived side by side for centuries, the Ch'uan Miao do not worship in Chinese temples and do not worship Chinese gods. Among the Ch'uan Miao there are benevolent deities who are believed in and honored, but not worshipped. Because they are kind and good their assistance can be depended upon without worship and offerings. The greatest of these is Ntsï who controls heaven and earth and lives in the sky. He is righteous, merciful, and very powerful, and is the highest or supreme deity. He is sometimes called Ntsï Nyong Leo (ntsə njoŋ lʌu), which means god, foundation, old. One can easily imagine that it means Ntsï, the foundation of the universe. Ntsï has a daughter whom he sometimes sends to earth to succor some poor, unfortunate man. Sometimes she becomes, at least temporarily, the poor man's wife. This has also been noted by Savina in his book on the Miao of Tonkin.

Another deity is Yei Seo (jei ʌu, or ʒei seo). He is sometimes seen among the clouds, and easily makes himself visible or invisible. He is very intelligent, kindly, merciful, and just. He induces people to

do good, and aids those who are in trouble, especially the poor. People often go to him for advice.

Among the Ch'iang there is a mediator between the priest and Aba-Ch'i, the Father in Heaven, who is called Nyei Dsu or Nyei Su. This name is somewhat similar to the Nestorian name for Jesus. I have been told that among the Tibetans there is a similar name for a similar being. The Ch'uan Miao name is not very different from the Chinese name for Jesus, Yei Su, as pronounced in Szechwan, and it is almost exactly like the name for Jesus as pronounced by the Chinese in southeast China. It is not impossible that the Nyei Su or Nyei Dsu of the Ch'iang, and the Yei Seo of the Ch'uan Miao, may both be a dim tradition of Jesus that has come down from the Nestorians, Manichaeans, or the early Roman Catholics. Yet the Ch'uan Miao had no idea of connecting this tradition with Jesus until I suggested it to them.

There is a female deity who lives in the sky and is called Ts'ï Ma Niang Tsai. She is very compassionate and is especially merciful and helpful to unfortunate children.

There is a warty toad called in Chinese Lai Ke Pao, who causes hailstorms. During these storms guns are fired off to frighten the toad and cause him to desist, and this of course stops the hailstorms.

In some homes there is a family god which symbolizes the ancestors. It is represented by some spirit money which the *do nun* pastes up in the center at the rear of the main room, sprinkling some chicken blood upon it. It is apparently an imitation of the Chinese housegod on which are written characters meaning "the throne of heaven, earth, rulers, relatives, and scholars."

Certain trees are worshipped on the thirteenth day of the twelfth moon. The tree is generally on a hill or mountain, and is always an old tree that does not shed its leaves in winter and remains green, such as the *nan muh*. It must not be a fir or a pine. A cock is offered in the worship of the tree, which is a local deity such as the Chinese local god called *t'u ti*. Worship of this deity causes the crops to prosper, the domestic animals to grow and increase, and hunters to be successful in killing wild animals. It is believed that the tree can and will heal sickness, if a vow is made to offer a chicken and other things to it in case the person is healed.

Like the Hua Miao, the Ch'uan Miao have a cult of worshipping the door. At the bottom of the door is a thick wide board or sill which

one must step over in order to enter the house. It is this sill and the door, which often has two wings, that are worshipped. The ceremony is performed during the tenth moon, and with the utmost secrecy. Inside the house a pig is killed and offered to the door. The hair is removed, then the pig is cut into nine pieces and offered raw with wine and rice. Then the meat is cooked. Before the people can eat, some soup must be dipped out with a gourd and offered to the door. The blood must be boiled and eaten.

The offering is made by the head of the family who says, "Door, I am making an offering to you. Help us to have a good crop and to prosper financially, and the domestic animals to grow and increase. If people come, permit them, but if demons come, do not let them enter." There is no bowing or kowtowing, no incense or candles are lighted, and no spirit money is burnt. During the ceremony the pig is killed, and the whole ceremony is performed inside. The offal and the hair must be buried in a hole in the floor of the kitchen. If one word of Chinese is accidentally used, the whole ceremony must be repeated.

There is a dragon king who lives in a palace which is reached by going down through a pool of water. He causes it to rain. He often sends his daughter to assist an unfortunate man, especially an orphan, and she becomes his wife, at least temporarily.

There are two or three great demons or devils. One is Glang gü (glaŋ dʒy), who often drowns people in creeks or rivers. Glang da lo (glaŋ Ta· lo·), the demon who can step to the sky, is so large that he can step from one mountain-top to another. He can reach heaven at one step. He is so strong that if he strikes a person on the chest with the palm of his hand the person soon dies, and the marks of the demon's palm can be seen on his chest. He can kill a person with one blow of his thumb. Ndo glang (nTo glaŋ) is a sky demon. There is an elaborate ceremony in which he is worshipped, in which a sow is offered. After the ceremony and the offering the demon is escorted away with polite words, and it is hoped that he will not return and do harm.

VI

THE WORLD VIEW

The Ch'uan Miao do not consider the world to be flat. They live in a mountainous region where there are many precipices and steep and

rugged cliffs. In the myths disapproval is often expressed for parents who marry their daughters into families that live on high mountains. The Ch'uan Miao do not live in this mountainous region, as is generally supposed, because they prefer to do so, but because they have not been permitted to live anywhere else. Their name for heaven or paradise is *ntsï ni leo geo bi*, or the ancient level land of Ntsï. It is a place where the souls of the departed ancestors live together in peace, and where there are no more steep hills and mountains to climb. Formerly a ladder connected earth and heaven, but now the ladder is broken so that there is no connection.

Beneath the earth is a land of dwarfs who are called in Chinese *sao pa ren*, or broom people, because they are only as tall as a short broom, or about two feet high. Once a Miao boy was in the palace of the Emperor where he was being married to the Emperor's daughter. He became intoxicated and fell through a hole in the floor, landing in the country of the dwarfs. Later there was a drought on the earth which caused the earth to crack. Through one of these cracks the Miao boy crawled back onto the earth. Later the rains caused the earth to swell and the cracks to disappear.

The Ch'uan Miao believe that people can easily change into tigers, cows, fish, flowers, foxes, monkeys, snakes, rats, crabs, frogs, banana trees, and vines, and from these back into human beings. There is a story of a poor orphan who picked a beautiful flower and took it home. Later it turned into a beautiful woman who became his wife. A carpenter was sleeping in a hut in a forest, and a strange man came to spend the night with him. The carpenter became suspicious and hacked the stranger with an axe, after which the stranger ran into the forest. Next morning the carpenter, following the blood on the ground, traced the stranger into the woods where he found a large vine with a fresh scar on it. Then he knew that the visitor was a vine who had changed into a man. People most commonly turn into tigers. Those whose names in Chinese are Wang, T'ao, and Chang frequently change into tigers and back again, but it is not usual for other people to do so, unless bewitched by a *bo ntsong*, or witch. A tiger often changes into a good person.

The Ch'uan Miao, like the Karens of Burma, distinguish between lives and souls.[3] In so far as they understand and accept the belief in

3. Harry Marshall, "The Karen People of Burma," *Ohio State University Bulletin*, 1922, p. 218.

souls, their conception is similar to that of the Chinese from whom they probably learned it. They believe that the soul and the shadow are the same thing, so that it is more dangerous for a mad dog to bite one's shadow than his leg. It is easier for the Ch'uan Miao to affirm that people and inanimate objects have "lives." A life is intelligent and has eyes, and when it permanently leaves the body the person dies. When a bull is sacrificed to a dead person at a funeral the essential thing is that a life must be offered, and the life becomes an actual bull in the ancient level land of Ntsï.

All inanimate things are believed to be sensitive and alive. The sun, the moon, the stars, rivers, mountains, rocks, trees, thunder, the echo, the rainbow, homes, fields, crops, plains, recompense or *yin kuo* beds, marriages, swords, the year, the *liu sheng*, the ceremonial drum, even the sound of the *liu sheng* and the ceremonial drum—all these and many other things are considered to be living and intelligent creatures.

A year is believed to be a living thing with a head like that of a human being. The *liu sheng* is alive, and when it is played it is actually speaking. Mountains have heads, feet, hands, eyes, noses, ears, hearts, breasts, veins, and arteries. A plain is male or female and has a mouth, heart, arteries, veins, and sinews. The sun and the moon are alive and have parents. Stones are male and female, grow, have offspring, and can speak. The echo is a living being who can speak. He has a definite character, and his words are generally deceptive. Thunder is a living creature, in size and shape like a rooster. It is small, but very powerful. It has a knife of fire which it throws, and this is lightning. It is this knife which causes the damage when lightning strikes.

To the Ch'uan Miao all nature is surcharged with a mysterious potency which permeates all strange, striking, and powerful things, and which affects human welfare for good or evil. Its power is manifest in charms, amulets, incantations, and ceremonies. It is possessed by unusual human beings such as Ha Ta Wa, who was even able to fly, the *tuan kung*, the *mo*, the *so beo*, the *bo ntsong*, Ntsï, Yei Seo, the dragon king, the sky demon, and the warty toad, and is present in the ceremonial drum, in a fan by means of which one can fan another up onto a cliff, in a sword, a crossbow, and the *lin p'ai* which is used by the *do nun*.

This short article, which is much abbreviated, is the result of first-hand study of the Ch'uan Miao for nearly twenty years. There have been no other books and articles to read, for none have been written about the Ch'uan Miao in any language.[4] The people are very intelligent, but in many ways their religion and psychology are primitive. Their art, music, myths, customs, language, history, and religion are very interesting, and it is to be hoped that in the future more information about them can be made available through publications.

4. A number of the gazeteers of southwest China mention wars with the Miao of this region, but none of them describes the customs of the Ch'uan Miao, so far as the author has been able to discover.

ON THE FUNCTION OF RELIGION IN CULTURE

By Henry M. Rosenthal

(Continued from the January number.)

PART II

APPLICATIONS

In the Definitions we have incidentally indicated some problems to which the hypothesis applies. In the following we suggest further uses.

1. *The relation of religion to things of the metaphysical order*—for instance, religion and reality, or nature, or truth, or God. (These terms are not meant as necessarily interchangeable.)

Our hypothesis shifts the incidence of these things to the area of cultural life as a whole. It is cultural life as a whole which reflects and represents nature or reality, distorts or emphasizes truth, etc.

In the traditional language: God does not relate to life through religion merely, but through everything. Everything touches the knowable and the unknown. Religion does not touch them any closer, nor on the other hand any the less close. But it touches them primarily from the point of their incidence upon emotional life and it follows the clues of the latter into nature and the cosmos.

From this point of view, the Book of Genesis is a metaphysical book, and the modernism which attempts to apologize for its metaphysical character is non-philosophical, however well-intentioned.[44] This scripture, like most if not all sacred writing, is self-evidently "poetic" or "mythical"[45] in language; but these qualifications only represent prob-

44. The metaphysical character of the Book of Genesis is warmly defended in Duncan Black Macdonald's, *The Hebrew Literary Genius* (Princeton, 1933) and *The Hebrew Philosophical Genius* (Princeton, 1936). The uses to which it may be put for modern theology are illustrated in, e.g., some characteristic insights of Reinhold Niebuhr's *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York, 1935), and *Reflections on the End of an Era* (New York, 1934); and in Professor M. M. Kaplan's *The Meaning of God in Modern Jewish Religion* (New York, 1937).

45. ". . . By a myth or symbol we, as the scientists are doing throughout, can clarify our experiences to ourselves and convey them to each other in a way otherwise impossible." E. R. Goodenough, *Religious Tradition and Myth* (New Haven, 1937), p. 93. Perhaps one should insert before the last two words of the quotation, the words "which for certain purposes is . . ."

Santayana discusses the difference between scientific and religious "myth" in *Reason in Science* (New York, 1906), pp. 12 ff. The difference has, among other things, to do with what we have called the "indirectness" of religion; with disinterestedness; and with ultimacy.

lems of literary criticism and of the proper training of the imagination.[46]

The question of the *origin* of specific versions and interpretations of nature, whether or not for instance, the idea of force is of "religious" origin (Durkheim),[47] is secondary—assuming it is meaningful. What is important, as most writers point out, is the cultural inter-relation of the various versions and interpretations.

These considerations apply also to the form of religion known as the mystical experience. Human life and nature, the waters below and the heavens above, are the field and opportunity of the mystical experience. It is notorious, even, that a church is on the whole contra-indicated.

An alternative statement of this is: the mystical experience is an experience of the cultural life. It may transcend the latter; that is, it may have reference to things before and beyond any given form of cultural life; but this is cultural experience "transcending itself."

The mystical experience is specifically religious, according to our hypothesis, where the centripetal tendencies of cultural experience are at work (centrality, synthesis, unity), and where the tone of the experience is dominantly emotional.

If it is held, for instance,[48] that (all) experience is essentially emotional, then the larger inference does not pertain so much to religion as to life and nature. The inference is a metaphysical one proper: that the cosmic process has the quality of "emotionality"; in the classical language shows Will at work; in conventional theology and homiletics, shows evidence of Personality; in the subtler forms of metaphysical statement, shows *élan vital*, etc.

Thus, all synthesizing[49] categories, whether of philosophy, unified

46. Cf. Santayana's essay on "Understanding, Imagination and Mysticism," in *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion* (New York, 1900).

47. *Op. cit.*, pp. 26, 204; cf. pp. 367 ff. on the religious origin of the idea of causality.

48. As by Emerson, when he was proclaiming in his "speeches and essays the doctrine which, according to William James, has marked all the periods of revival, the early Christian age and Luther's age, Rousseau's, Kant's and Goethe's, namely that the innermost nature of things is congenial to the powers that men possess." Van Wyck Brooks, *The Flowering of New England* (New York, 1936), p. 207.

Or as by Freud, when he states: "The ego-feeling we are aware of now is thus only a shrunken vestige of a far more extensive feeling—a feeling which embraced the universe and expressed an [actually?] inseparable connection of the ego with the external world." *Civilization and Its Discontents*, p. 13.

49. In religion "synthesizing" sometimes means "confusing." (Cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 322, "Religious thought alone has a marked leaning toward these sorts of

science, or simple reflection, have a religious quality,[50] in this sense. But they differ from religion in their different relation to emotionality, as also in their different relation to the category art. It may, therefore, be preferable to speak of these other forms of human activity as sharing, in common with religion, a spiritual reference,[51] and to restrict the word religion accordingly.

The matter is nothing new, as can be made clear by reverting again to the traditional language: the investigation of God has never been carried on solely in terms of the study of church systems and usages and of the private disciplines associated therewith, though that investigation may start from there (as from anywhere else). Our hypothesis, therefore, separates religion from the metaphysical, but at the same time, we believe, implies the true relation between the two.

We may state that relation summarily and in theological language as that relation which is discoverably obtaining between any central art in culture for the control of the emotional system, and God, who is the God of all arts, as of all cultural life and the universe;[52] or, in non-theological and analytic language, as that which obtains between the category art, the category centrality, etc., and other categories of reality.[53]

This does not absolve the knowing mind from further inquiry as to the nature of God, or the nature of reality; but religion does not grant such absolution in any case.

The classic form of the impingement of the religious question on the more than sociological is in the matter of religion's relation to science and to morals. We specify this further, below.

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confusions.") "Confusion" and "synthesis" are related—e.g., as chaos and creation—but are not identical.

50. Cf. Santayana, *Reason in Religion*, pp. 6 ff. on religion's specially intimate—if somewhat paradoxical—relation to the Life of Reason.

51. This implies a definition of "spiritual" as "the metaphysically oriented aspect of any activity." Complete metaphysical orientation would, however, imply orientation toward emotionality, as well as toward other things. It would, accordingly, be necessary to speak more precisely of "religious spirituality," "scientific spirituality," etc.

Cf. Santayana's use of the term in *Reason in Religion*. ". . . Spirituality, or life in the ideal, must be regarded as the fundamental and native type of all life" (p. 195). We might revise Santayana to read: "Spirituality must be regarded as the fundamental and cultural function of all art."

52. The relation may also be stated with reference to other metaphysical entities, e.g., the Demonic. Cf. Paul Tillich, *The Interpretation of History* (New York, 1936), Part Two, "The Demonic."

53. "For us," says Durkheim (*op. cit.*, footnote to p. 19), "they [the categories] are in a sense a work of art, but of an art which imitates nature with a perfection capable of increasing unlimitedly."

2. *The hypothesis helps clarify the relation of religion to morals.*

A familiar statement of that relation is Matthew Arnold's "religion is morality touched by emotion." We believe this statement to be essentially correct, and F. H. Bradley's reduction of it to a tautology to be inattentive, though no doubt not intentionally so.[54] Perhaps Arnold was somewhat inattentive to his own necessary meaning in allowing so much to hinge upon the word "touch," which is the hinge that Bradley's analysis is assumed to have broken. Religion is morality "touched" *systematically* and *centrally* and *at the level of an art*, by emotion.

This, as we have already suggested above, not only does not exclude but partly implies the metaphysical and theological fulfilment which it demands; though whether the fulfilment is along Bradley's lines is another question, approachable without prejudice.

Again, the relation of religion and morals is sometimes dramatically rendered as the relation of prophetic religion to priestly or ecclesiastical religion. These were, in the classic instance, in genuine conflict; but the significance of that conflict is obscured, if it is taken as one between (mere) prophetic ethics on the one hand, and priestly (plus popular) cult on the other.

Prophetic religion was, on the negative side, a criticism of the whole of the current cultural life in general, and of the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of the current cult in particular.[55] In terms of our hypothesis, it was a radical criticism of current religion with respect to its centrality, and with respect to the emotional system, or the type of human nature, which current religion had construed. It was the most conceivably radical and direct approach to the problem of morality through the problem of human nature.[56]

54. See the interesting and pointed analysis of the whole question of Arnold's idea of religion in Professor Lionel Trilling's *Matthew Arnold* (New York, 1939), especially pp. 338 ff., to which I am indebted for the account of Bradley vs. Arnold.

55. In this respect, the traditional Jewish view is correct which maintains, in contrast to the traditional Christian view, that rabbinic Judaism was "in the direct line" or was a fulfilment of prophetic Judaism: it supplied the new (re-synthesized) cultic fulfilment of prophetic Judaism, and was in the direct line of the implied prophetic call for a new synthesis of theory and practice in religion, or the re-vitalization of religion as an art.

56. But as the tradition of political economy, or the history of industry, makes clear, it is possible to approach the problem of morality indirectly, through technology, economics, etc. There is, thus, a certain paradoxical aspect to religion's essential indirectness. Religion is radically *direct* with respect to human nature; it is *in*direct with respect to everything else. The contrary would seem to be true of other arts of human culture.

In sum:

Religion has a specially significant function to discharge with respect to the moral side of cultural life, but it by no means exhausts, or entirely contains, this side of culture. In the traditional language: God does not relate to life only through religion, but all phases of life are avenues to the moral ideal.

On the other hand, the formula, morality becomes visible in the measure that cult becomes invisible—a formula which expresses the traditional moral criticism of religion—implies somewhat more and something deeper than the conventional rationalistic antithesis between morality and religion; it implies the equation, visible morality *is* cult invisible.

Religion as an art of cultural life deals in a systematic, and potentially rational, way with the emotional basis of the moral life. Through cult, religion aims to translate morality into effective style of life.[57] Since cultural life is, formally considered, essentially a problem of such a style and its value, this is no small matter.

3. *The hypothesis helps clarify the relation of religion to science.*

The hypothesis suggests that when religion and science come into conflict, as, for instance, in the controversies of the late nineteenth century, the issue involved is deeper than the apparent one of specific questions of fact.

Religion always seems to yield, sooner or later, to the scientific and philosophic adjudication of such questions, sometimes with distressing and costly reluctance, but sometimes in too great a hurry, as when it draws hasty theological inferences from an unripe or transitional physical generalization. The contrary may also be true—though the matter has been little studied from that point of view, and is further obscured by the conventional unclarity of the terms "religion," "magic," and "science" themselves; but it is probable that the re-assertion of the metaphysical insights of religion has more than once prepared the way for scientific self-liberation from irrelevant, or from "magical" and "superstitious" pre-occupations, and thus for scientific revival in the stricter sense.

The real issue in such conflicts seems to be emotional and moral.

57. The meaning of this does not change when we put it in normative language: rational religion *should* aim to translate rational morality into, etc. Cf. Rabbi Eleazar, the son of Azariah, "Where there is no Torah, there are no manners; where there are no manners, there is no Torah. . . ." *Ethics of the Fathers*, Ch. III, 21.

A rising science generally predicates new emotional habits and corresponding moral values, for instance, the empirical outlook, scepticism, and what Santayana calls "charity," or open-mindedness about other people's spiritualities.

In our opinion, the real struggle has had to do with these things, and never with such trifles as chronological tables and philological miscarriages, except in the sense that these latter were deeply intrenched in the former and could be conveniently taken as their symbols (or even to disguise the real issues). The issue of one system, or process, of feelings and usages as against another is, culturally, of crucial importance.

In the further development of a continuingly vital religion, the struggle apparently ends by religion's assimilating what it was formerly fighting against—that is to say, the new system of feelings and usages; *or it may rather be* that what is really assimilated is the set of symbols with which the new system of feelings and usages were originally connected, and that, underneath this new set of symbols, religion has really retained many, if not all, of the old set of feelings and usages (values).[58] This is apparently one of the ways by which religion fulfils the conservative aspect of its function, that is, its function of maintaining the continuity of the emotional system.

In sum: the conflict between science and religion, like many another cultural conflict, is really a symptom of a crisis in human nature; and when the latter is not truly resolved, then merely formal adjustments in vocabulary are of secondary importance, though such adjustments may be truly useful in raising the conflict to its necessary higher level.

Thus, it is illusory to take symbolic forms as decisive in religion, unless they are interpreted with respect to the contents of the emotional system, in connection with which the symbolic forms must function, at least so far as religion is concerned, which suggests this generalization: the symbolic forms of religion are not peculiar to religion as such, but to its cultural context.[59] Religion takes its symbolic

58. This may be why one gets the impression from a book like E. E. Aubrey's *Present Theological Tendencies* (New York, 1936), which records how contentedly science and religion are feeding together today, that nothing at all has been settled.

59. Professor H. W. Schneider's Dudleian Lecture on "Natural Religion" (published in the *Harvard Divinity School Bulletin*, XXXVI, no. 14), in its exposition of how "natural theology" relied for its method and content on the more fundamental and widespread intellectual currents of the age, seems to me to illustrate this point, so far as purely intellectual and theoretical symbols are concerned. The point has

forms from those prevailing in the latter. At the same time, of course, it does not merely appropriate, but does something to these symbols, and with them; and, indeed, contributes its own creations to cultural life as a whole. In the course of sufficient development, religion, in obedience to its own centrality, will generally take the culturally *most favored* symbolic forms. (Syncretism; the political aspect of this is also significant.) The investigation of religious symbolism is, (a) on the formal side a phase of the investigation of religion's centrality in culture; and (b) on the content side, leads to the investigation of the proteanism of the emotional system, and the limits, if any, of this proteanism.

4. *The hypothesis emphasizes the functional unity of religion.*

One aspect of the apparent disunity of religion is its containing contradictory ideas, e.g., divine omnipotence and goodness, creation and free-will, etc., as noted by Santayana,[60] Lovejoy, etc. This logical disunity is of the essence of religion's functional integrity. The logical "incompatibles" are faithful renderings of the contents of the emotional system, in their complexity and ambivalence.[61] Such renderings belong, in the first instance, to religion's function of control, for it celebrates what it cannot reconcile, thus achieving cultural and moral control without or beyond scientific understanding. That they have become attached to nature or the divine nature may or may not be "projection," etc. They may at the same time be insights into the nature of reality. Such insights need not be self-authenticating in order to be of interest and value.

To entertain such insights into the nature of reality may not be religion's "primary business." Nevertheless, religion seems to have anticipated in its own domain some insights, later rationalized in the findings of physics, psychoanalysis,[62] etc. Durkheim claims, indeed,

somewhat different implications, but is perhaps even more obvious in connection with object-symbols, such as those used in ritual.

60. This is the chief burden of Santayana's chapter on "The Christian Compromise," in *Reason in Religion*, see especially pp. 159 ff.; cf. A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, 1936), Ch. III, on ". . . Some Internal Conflicts in Medieval Thought."

61. Cf. Professor John H. Randall, Jr. in *The Review of Religion* for March, 1938, II, pp. 352 f.

62. Cf., for instance, the religious insights, "retribution" and "the two impulses," with the physical and psychological insights, "action and reaction" and "ambivalence," respectively.

a religious origin for scientific insights[63] in general. Our hypothesis says, rather, that their origin is in the cultural process as a whole, which reflects natural process; and our hypothesis makes any special prominence which these and other ideas may have in religion an aspect of centrality.

There are also "contradictory" forces in the cultural process as a whole which get rendered in religion, by virtue of its own centrality in culture. Variety and contrariety in religious ideas are a reflection of centrality and of the nature of the emotional system.

Another aspect of religion's functional unity is closely related to the preceding. It has to do with the relation of the theoretical phases of religion (beliefs, ideas) to the practical phases (rites and ceremonies, and religious conduct in the wider, ethical, sense). A certain mutual irrelevance sometimes seems to characterize these two phases, from which some writers tend to argue a lack of necessary connection or even disjunction (Santayana). Such a point of view makes a real problem of the matter.

There is no problem, however, from the functional point of view. "The religious representation," says Bergson, "is above all an occasion for . . . religious acts. They doubtless emanate from belief, but they at once react on it and strengthen it; if gods exist, they must have their worship; but since there is worship, then there must be gods. This solidarity of the god with the homage paid him makes of religious truth a thing apart . . . depending, up to a certain point, on man. . . . It is precisely towards the tightening up of this solidarity that rites and ceremonies tend" (*Two Sources*, p. 190).[64]

Our hypothesis implies that religious "representations" are the theory of religious practice, in the same sense as Bergson's. For instance, the slogans used at a political demonstration are the "occasion" or the "theory" for the activity in question. Sacred histories and their calendars are the "theory" (handbook, guide, stimulus) for religious practices. Sacred cosmography (theory) is *for* diurnal prayer (practice), etc.

63. *Op. cit.*, p. 26; cf. pp. 204 and 238 f. But Durkheim's points about "origin" relate to a kind of society in which religion and cultural life are practically coextensive with one another.

64. Cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 82. "If the myth were withdrawn from religion, it would be necessary to withdraw the rite also. . . . Very frequently the rite is nothing more than the myth put in action. . . ." Also p. 296.

There is often real enough moral disjunction here. But the aesthetic or logical disjunction is not so significant as the moral one. There are individuals for whom, as there are phases of cultural development when, the former has the effect of the latter.

5. *The hypothesis emphasizes the element of continuity in religion.* This continuity is that of the emotional system, and also of its symbolism, if we attend rather to the content of the latter than to its forms and idioms.[65] This continuity has not merely historical but also metaphysical significance, for what it implies, or rests upon, is the metaphysical unity of human nature.

But there is also functional continuity. Religion, as a developed art of culture, always attempts to perform the function of the control of the emotional system. The nature of that system makes the need for "control" perennial.[66] By the same token, the hypothesis emphasizes

65. The essential continuity of the emotional system, besides being the psychological basis of such theological doctrines as that of original sin, is affirmed by such writers as Ernest Crawley, *The Mystic Rose*, pp. 3 f., 81, 87, 451; Henri Bergson, *Two Sources*, pp. 116 f., 124; R. Money-Kyrle, *The Meaning of Sacrifice* (New York, 1930), p. 35; and by Freud, Jung, and other writers of this tradition in a variety of ways, concepts and places.

66. From Otto Rank's *Truth and Reality* (pp. 72 f.), we cite the following about the nature of the emotional system as illuminating and suggestive: "The area in which . . . will and consciousness phenomena take place perceived in sense terms as pleasure and pain, or spiritually as happiness and sorrow, is the emotional sphere standing equally close to will and consciousness, where all these activities come together and flow into one another. The emotional life represents accordingly the strongest inner force. It is even stronger than the sexual instinct, which is always capable of being controlled and satisfied somehow. Not so the emotional life, which is uncontrollable and insatiable, yes, whose very essence consists of its inability to be controlled or satisfied."

Cf. Santayana, *Reason in Religion*, p. 182, on the "want of rationality and measure in the human will." And Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis*, p. 9: "One of the chief emotional differences [between man and other animals] is that some human desires, unlike those of animals, are essentially boundless and incapable of complete satisfaction."

Cf. the "discovery" by an eighteenth century critic, mentioned by Lovejoy, *op. cit.*, p. 205, of man's "*essential* discontentedness."

Guilt may also be insatiable. (Cf. Freud's *Moses and Monotheism*, pp. 212 f.)

Or we may express this "insatiability" of the emotional life in other terms as the fundamental *insolubility* of emotional problems, in which case the following observation of Jung's becomes apropos: "I had learned to see [in the course of therapeutic experience] that the greatest and most important problems of life are all fundamentally insoluble. They must be so, because they express the necessary polarity inherent in every self-regulating system. They can never be solved, but only outgrown." *The Secret of the Golden Flower: A Chinese Book of Life* (New York, 1935), p. 89. (This idea is, incidentally, the basic theme of Sheldon's *Psychology and the Promethean Will.*)

that aspect of religion which makes it a practically universal phase of culture.[67]

But, from an ideal point of view, it raises the problem as to how and what particular religions, in view of their association with specific cultural contexts and traditions, may contribute to universalistic programs.[68] The hypothesis suggests that the answer to such a question is to be found along the lines of search for the true universalities in different and differing types of cultural life.

Discontinuity or novelty and variety in religion are, on the one hand, a reflection of the variety of cultural context in which religion operates as an art, and on the other, a reflection of the shifting aspects of religion's centrality within the same culture, or within different ones.

6. *The bearing of the hypothesis on the question of the relation of individual religion*[69] *to public religion.*

It is this insatiability, or irrationality, and the need for its moral, cultural and rational control which, among other things, would seem to guarantee the "future of religion." A search would surely reveal that this insight as to the insatiability of the emotional life, is basic to a great part of traditional morality, theology and religion.

67. Cf. Bergson, *Two Sources*, p. 166. "The truth is that religion, being co-extensive with our species, must pertain to our structure."

Cf. Malinowski, article on "Culture," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IV, p. 627.

68. Cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 141. "To a greater or less extent, all known religions have been systems of ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things, and to give us a complete representation of the world." And p. 288, "So it is far from true that religious internationalism is a peculiarity of the most recent and advanced religions. From the dawn of history, religious beliefs have manifested a tendency to overflow out of one strictly limited political society; it is as though they had a natural aptitude for crossing frontiers, and for diffusing and internationalizing themselves." Cf. pp. 294 f., for "international tendencies" in totemic religion.

Cf., on this question, Professor H. L. Friess, "The Dimension of Universality in Religion," in *Essays in Honor of John Dewey*, p. 147. "By defining religious universality through certain dimensions of historic religious activity, in which we take a continuing interest, we are prepared to see both old and new achievements having such dimensions embodied in the texture of future religious life. . . . As to the source of such future syntheses, our viewpoint implies that, if they come to pass, they will result more as the cumulative product of distinct achievements within various spheres of religious interest than from any single direct drive toward some all-embracing hidden unity. It also indicates some of the ways wherein the religious life of man may attain universal range without the existence of such syntheses. For not by possessing the one faith in which all may be led to entire good, but by the character of the spheres of his interest and activity does man manifest the universality of his religion."

69. The category of "religious experience," if a valid one, applies to both individual and public religion. It is experience relevant to religion as the central art, etc. For a critique of the term, see John Morrison Moore's *Theories of Religious Experience; with Special Reference to James, Otto and Bergson* (New York, 1938).

The relation is fairly clear, in, for instance, the case of the classic mystics; their individual visions usually employed, refined and adapted the symbols and other forms of the public religion. It is more obscure today, as in the case of the numerological visions reported by Jung,[70] or the more special of the conversions reported by William James. Such a-typical cases present the problem of the diffusion of cultural symbols, forms, etc., and their re-crystallization in individual experience. The problem is one of social and individual psychology in dynamic inter-relation. This is a major problem in culture analysis.

We do not know, for instance, how to correlate psychologically a man's public character with his private and domestic character. The correlation is especially difficult when it appears to be inverse, ruthless and aggressive in business, for instance, and kind and indulgent at home. Yet it is inconceivable that no correlation exists. It must exist on exceedingly complex levels.[71]

The matter is both simpler and more difficult in the case of religion. It is simpler when, as often necessarily happens, the line between the public and private phases of a person's religion is continuous; the problem then is one of character, and would be further illuminated by a true psychology of sincerity and hypocrisy, such as Spinoza's. But the problem is more complex when, in certain cultural situations, public religion ceases to occupy people, but they retain, in one way or another, the notion of being privately and individually religious.

The chances are that, in most cases, they mean ethical and spiritual, in the senses we have referred to above, and that the plus consists in the implicit acknowledgment of the need for a synthetic principle and style, which shall visibly reflect their ethical and spiritual motivations. They may or may not suffer from the lack of this, but there is probably some implicit sense of the difference that the cultic makes, even

70. In his recent *Psychology and Religion* (New Haven, 1938), pp. 41 ff.

71. The general psychoanalytic attempt to subsume conventional opposites (such as love and hate, pleasure and pain, etc.) under inclusive categories such as instinct-theories, symptom-formation, substitution, compensation, and energy-concepts is, of course, an attempt to render such relations of apparent inversion, intelligible.

The relation between individual and group psychology is considered by Freud, in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (London, 1922), and some further suggestive analogies are thrown out in *Moses and Monotheism*. The problem is dealt with by Durkheim in *Elementary Forms*, pp. 270 f., 280, where the distinction is drawn between "individuation" and "personalization."

A. Kardiner's distinction, in the previously cited *The Individual and his Society*, between the social "basic personality pattern" and the individual "character" is illuminating (pp. 131 ff.).

for ethics and spirituality. It may not in all cultural situations be a difference for the better.

In any case, there does appear to be a tendency[72] in cultural life, (a) for the emotional life to become a system (e.g., in the form of the "repetition compulsion"), and (b) for it to be controlled, if at all, by synthesis and centralized focus. Thus: a man's business becomes his "religion"; or a person makes a "religion" of sport.

We do not enter into the whole significance of such usages. But the usages suggest the following: that in "simple" or "closed" societies a man's religion is simple and entirely "enclosed"—within a single system. His business is carried on either within the precincts of the temple, or by the invocation of its usages and formulas, as well as the aid of its functionaries (scribes, etc.) outside. He gets his exercise, in a still simpler and more "closed" society, from the ritual dance. But in other cultural developments, there is a great increase in the autonomous forms of activity. The Temple of Religion was relatively inconspicuous at the World's Fair.[73]

In the multiplication of autonomous activities, it may happen that one of them actually comes to serve for an individual the same func-

72. This is the irreducible minimum of teleology in cultural life. It is, at least in this minimal teleological sense, if in none greater, more explicit, and more exigent, that religion must be spoken of as an art *for* the control, etc.

To speak of a tendency toward religious crystallization in culture may suggest the question, sometimes asked, whether religion functions in despite of people's intentions and awareness. No dogmatic answer is, of course, to be given to this question, and it is possible that the problem as thus stated is a fundamentally ambiguous one, since it hinges on the meaning of "intention" and "awareness." In any case, Durkheim's observation (*op. cit.*, p. 172) is to the point: "Religions are too complex, and answer to needs that are too many and too obscure, to have their origin in a premeditated act of the will."

Another form of the problem is the relation of religion, whether public or private, to the unconscious. The centrality of the latter concept for psychoanalysis is, of course, well-known. At the same time, the concept has not escaped criticism in some further reaches of psychoanalytic thought, as, e.g., in Rank (*Truth and Reality*, pp. 13 ff., 50; *Art and Artist*, p. xxv). Especially apropos, and judicious, is the following observation of W. H. R. Rivers, in *Medicine, Magic and Religion* (New York, 1924), p. 126: "One of the most important aspects of Freud's work was that the role he assigned to the unconscious enabled him to adopt in the most complete manner the principle of determinism within the mental sphere which had been of such value in the progress of physical science."

A philosophical examination of the problem of the "unconscious" is to be found in Bergson's *Matter and Memory* (New York, 1912), especially pp. 182 ff., and in Santayana's *The Realm of Matter* (New York, 1930), pp. 181 ff. "Good religions," says Santayana, "are . . . the product of unconscious rationality." *Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 109.

73. And certainly autonomous.

tion served by the traditional and forsaken cult for his ancestors. Business, or sport, may serve as the central discipline in a person's life, determining the form and function of his character and relations with others. It is when it distorts a person's life that we generally and popularly say it has become his "religion." We mean that so highly special a discipline as business or sport (or even art) cannot adequately serve, even for an individual, the cultural function of central control of the emotional system—perhaps the more narrowly specialized, the less capable of carrying the required weight of ethical and spiritual references.

We testify thereby to the enormous complication introduced into the problem of synthesis and centrality, both for individual and society, by the higher forms of cultural development. We do not hesitate to call them the higher;[74] the higher forms of development are often the more subject to certain types of strain.

7. *Our hypothesis emphasizes the need for establishing the cultural context of a given religion before the latter can be evaluated, or even properly identified.*[75]

When we speak of religion in a universalistic sense, we inevitably make certain implications about a universalized culture. The point is implicit in many writers. Our hypothesis renders it explicit and generalizes it.

Our hypothesis says, in effect, that the phenomenon of "adaptation" or "adjustment" of the traditional religions in their new environment of the modern world involves the phenomenon otherwise known as "syncretism";[76] and that such a process is really essential to the sur-

74. With Bergson, whose distinction between "closed" and "open" societies, and the moralities respectively appropriate thereto, is a distinction to this effect.

75. This phase of the hypothesis is exemplified in the treatment of religion in *Religion in Various Cultures* (New York, 1932), by H. L. Friess and H. W. Schneider. Cf. for the question of the Jewish religion specifically, M. M. Kaplan's *Judaism as a Civilization* (New York, 1934).

For a closely analyzed sociological application to a contemporary situation, cf. the chapter on "Religion" in Caroline F. Ware's *Greenwich Village* (Boston, 1935), especially the section on "Italian Catholic Adaptation," pp. 311 ff.

76. "Syncretism" is generally used to signify the mere fusing of cults, as e.g., when applied to the religious tendencies of the Hellenistic world. Our hypothesis implies, however, that such syncretism can only take place on the basis of fusion of other cultural elements, including technological and emotional ones. This does not mean that transplantation of religion can take place only on the basis of complete cultural transplantation, but it does mean that transplantation of religion *merely* is, theoretically and practically, impossible.

vival of traditional religions, or inevitable in their migration from one cultural context to another. On this level the hypothesis is a principle for the correct description and evaluation of how religion is functioning in particular cases.

If religions are described according to this principle a great improvement should result in their self-awareness. It should also help to forestall some cases of pained surprise. For instance, the situation of "syncretism" is sometimes fruitful of distress for members of a particular religion, especially when the syncretistic tendency involves much conflict on the ethical or ideological level—that is, conflict between the values of the traditional religion and the values of the political environment in which the religion is trying to function. From the moral point of view there is every reason for such distress. But, from the standpoint of the nature and function of religion, there is no paradox in the situation. God and Caesar have no absolutely distinguishable habitats. The other will take what the one surrenders.[77]

The hypothesis applied to the conflict today between certain political tendencies and certain religions, thus serves to throw into relief the essentially moral nature of that conflict. This is obscured on both sides. The impression is created that all religion wants is to be let alone "just to worship God," and, on the other hand, the political movements create the impression that this is all they want of religion. If this is so, then both are agreed, and what is all the shouting for?

But God is, among other things, a moral ideal in the traditional religions, and the conflict is a genuine one; it is about moral values. If the conflict has forced the traditional religions, in some degree and in despite of themselves, to clarify their own moral values and to become aware of the further incidence of these, then the ill wind has blown some good for religion.

Cf. Alfred Bertholet, article on "Religion," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, XIII, p. 233. "In all cases the process of transplanting a religion to an alien environment brings into sharp relief the dependence of religion on culture."

Cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 316 ". . . religious interests are only the symbolic form of social and moral interests." Too much significance should not be attached to the word "only" in this observation of Durkheim's.

77. Any voluntary rendering to Caesar is an acknowledgment of Caesarism, i.e., of the state. The dilemma of moral religion is that it can neither escape nor accept this. It has been correctly pointed out that when Caesar wants everything, the only place for moral religion is in the catacombs.

8. *By the same token, our hypothesis serves as a principle of identification for new religious tendencies.*

For instance, it clarifies that aspect of the new political movements which is really of religious significance or implication. The matter is sometimes expressed by calling them "political religions."[78]

Our hypothesis suggests, with respect to these political movements, that their moral conflict with the traditional religions can be understood dynamically and functionally. In other words, that in the social contexts in which these movements have arisen and to which they are respectively addressed, they are attempts at replacing the traditionally central arts for the control of the emotional system with new ones. It is in this functional sense that they constitute new or rival religions.[79]

Electrification and re-armament are not in themselves religious. But the systematic attempt to remold ("control") human nature to serve purposes predicated by electrification or re-armament, this is a religious function, good or bad. When carried on with sufficient method (art) and comprehensiveness (centrality), the attempt becomes a new religious tendency.

As new religions, the current political ones may be called undeveloped religions. There may, indeed, be certain traits in them which will preclude the fuller development which we have been able to observe in the history of the traditional religions. In that case, one might speak of the new tendencies as being rudimentary or abortive religions, rather than undeveloped.

The new religions are syncretistic enough, as the old ones were (e.g., Christianity); but being new they are considerably rawer as well as different in other respects. (They are also "universalistic" or internationalistic in their tendency.)

But with respect to the ostensibly anti-religious character of such tendencies, it must be observed that their anti-religiousness means essentially anti-traditional, and perhaps anti-moral. This does not mean anti-dogmatic, or anti-metaphysical or anti-"mythological." Be-

78. But cf. Santayana: "True religion is entirely human and political . . ." *Reason in Religion*, p. 276.

79. Cf. H. W. Schneider, *Making the Fascist State* (New York, 1928), especially Ch. v, pp. 215 ff.; and also H. W. Schneider and S. B. Clough, *Making Fascists* (Chicago, 1929), especially pp. 73 f.

cause it is obvious that, in rejecting or discarding the metaphysical assumptions of the old religions, they invariably replace them with new assumptions that are quite mythical, if quite un-poetic, in character. These may be the atavistic myths of "neo-paganism" and "blood and soil" ideology, or they may be the sophisticated metaphysics of dogmatic materialism; or something else.[80]

Nor does the "anti-religious" character of the new tendencies mean anti-cultic. But the nature and significance of the cultic aspects of the new tendencies, aspects which they undoubtedly wear, present difficult problems for analysis. For instance, in respect to the artificial deliberateness with which they have been brought into being, the parallel is rather with the short-lived "Cult of Reason" of the French Revolution. But this is a purely formal and structural parallel. The real parallel in content and function is rather to be found in the cults of essential cruelty which historical cultures of a certain peculiarly high inner morbidity, such as possibly the Aztec, have notoriously developed. Again, the new cults seem to have as their aim the reassertion of a state of "closed" society which has been previously broken through; they raise, again, the problem of "coextensiveness," etc.

In sum: the new secular or political religions differ from the traditional ones, from a purely functional or dynamic point of view, not so much in kind as in degree of development as an art. (*They also differ in moral content. But they can discover this difference, which would seem to be the most important one, only after they have discovered their functional identity.*) Primarily this has reference to the degree of conscious development given to the metaphysical basis, or the "mythology," of the new tendencies as compared with the traditional religions. From our perspective, such mythological development has obviously reached fuller flower in the latter.

But mythology will inevitably be involved in any art aiming at centrality in cultural life and functioning as an art for the control of the emotional system. Mythological features may be involved in a strictly implicit way, but it is unlikely that they will long remain merely implicit. As the religious phase of the cultural process under-

80. The relation between the terms "mythical" and "metaphysical" is a question that can be approached from various points of view. Our assumption here is that a myth, as well as a metaphysic, implies cosmological and ontological ideas, true or false. Karl Mannheim's discussion in *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1936), pp. 71, 78 f., is relevant to the question.

goes development, the mythological assumptions would seem to move into the foreground. Development of the religious phase means increasing organization and refinement of the inner structure and technique of the same, which is development as an "art" of culture. One may speak of this as accentuation of the cultic tendency. It also means movement or struggle toward increased centrality in culture. Finally, it means more deliberate and effective exercise of control of the emotional system, and increasingly comprehensive application to it.

The mythological features would seem to move to the foreground by virtue of development in each one of these senses. As religion develops as a conscious art, its mythological language becomes more prominent. Religions win adherents with promises of immediate (practical) redemption—to take slaves out of their misery, Egyptian or otherwise; or peace, bread and land; or racial purification of the labor market. But in the course of further development, other, more metaphysical, issues are stressed.

As it moves toward cultural centrality, its basic assumptions tend to assert the claim of being basic to every other aspect of culture. "Class science" and "Aryan science" have their precedent in earlier ideological fundamentalisms. The element of truth in such pretensions is in the intersection of cultural centralities, which merely raises the question of the genuineness of centralities; and the test of this genuineness is metaphysical, among other things.

The claim of absolute centrality never goes without challenge, whether from culture-processes which, like the arts and sciences, are undergoing independent development and seeking to assert their own autonomy, or whether from culture-processes like political movements and state-education, which assert a rival claim to centrality and challenge the traditional religion's authority over the emotional system.

Finally, it is in the course of emotional life itself that the mythological assumptions become further emphasized, in the same way that practice comes to emphasize the theory with which it is connected.

The application of our hypothesis to new social and political tendencies, with respect to the potentially religious aspect which the latter may have, can be made clear by putting the formulation conversely, thus: any system of pervasive but organized emotionality in a given cultural situation or process can be functionally characterized as religious.

9. *The hypothesis as a principle of criticism.*

As such, our hypothesis is a statement about ideal religion, and implies:

(a) That the evaluation of a religion, whether from the apologetic or polemical or re-interpretational point of view, necessarily contains an implicit set of assumptions about what cultural life ought to be. (Perhaps "how" it ought to be rather than "what.")

Our hypothesis implies the need for making such *values* explicit. What kind of culture is it in which religion is serving its function of being a central art for the control of the emotional system? What kind of cultural life is considered desirable? For instance, what are the implications of ideal religion for the "culture of cities,"[81] and vice versa?

In other words, our hypothesis implies that the criticism of religion is prolegomenon to theological formulations.[82] Such criticism, as well as the theological formulations in which it logically issues, has reference to the ritual and otherwise practical phases of a religion, as well as to its doctrinal phases.

On the other hand, the nature of the emotional system, among other things, sounds an emphatic caution against making the values too rigid, or "systematic." Theological metaphysics legitimately follows the clues of "voluntarism," etc., into the cosmos—but it should beware of reversing the procedure and reading the apparent regularity of the latter into the former, and its institutional, ecclesiastical and social, concomitants.

(b) Occasionally the criticism of religion is uttered in such a way as to imply that, from a rational point of view, or from a moral one, the trouble with religion is its intrenchment in emotionality.

Our hypothesis suggests that such an implication really misses the point about the nature and function of religion (as also about the cultural process). Religion is "founded" in emotionality, and functions in respect to this basic side of life. But it can discharge this function in a rational way, can bring emotionality into the service of rational

81. Cf. Lewis Mumford's fine observations on this subject in *The Culture of Cities* (New York, 1938).

82. The kind of theology here predicated is one whose incidence is upon the whole of cultural life. Its essential meaning will be no different from the positive conclusions of a true sociology.

ideals, though perhaps not all of emotionality. But a moral religion should "control" emotionality, in the sense of *askesis*, too.[83]

Our hypothesis suggests that the relation of reason and emotion in religion is that of ends and means.

The conception of cultural life as an art-process intimates, psychologically, the ideal possibility of the union of reason and emotion.[84]

(c) In its emphasis on the cultural context of religion, and in its emphasis on that aspect of religion's position in culture which we have called its centrality, our hypothesis calls attention to certain problems which are sometimes ignored in the criticism of religion from a strictly "within" point of view. These are in the main of two sorts: (i) problems of the relations between religions proper; (ii) problems of the relations, both positive and negative, between religion and other cultural activities which also serve, in some degree, a "religious" or, more strictly, a spiritual function.

With respect to both kinds of problems our hypothesis raises questions as to the applicability of the traditional kind of centrality (in its meaning of synthesizing, as well as other meanings) to present-day cultural life and to ideal cultural life.

With respect to the second kind of problem, specifically, the operation of the diffused types of spiritualizing tendencies—popular education, art, etc.—does not seem in all cases to obviate the need for synthesis. In crucial situations, given the weakening of the traditional kind of synthesis, new and drastic forms arise, e.g., nationalisms.[85]

With respect to the first, specifically, our hypothesis suggests that in cultures which are, in fact or in ideal, pluralistic to any degree at all (cf. Bergson's "open" and "closed" societies), the problems of the relations between religions, sometimes summed up in the notion of "tolerance," are not merely incidental—a kind of question of "public relations" for religions, or of its manners toward strangers and passing acquaintances—but are really essential to the very nature of a true religion and its functioning in such cultures.

83. Cf. Durkheim, *op. cit.*, p. 316: ". . . There is an asceticism which, being inherent in all social life, is destined to survive all the mythologies and all the dogmas; it is an integral part of all human culture."

Cf. Freud on "instinctual renunciation" as the basis of cultural advance.

84. The term spirituality might comprehend the idea of such a union.

85. The main secular inferences would seem to be twofold: (a) the centrality of the problem of character in cultural life; (b) in education, the need for education of the emotional life.

A religion approaches its ideal functioning, in one respect among others, the more nearly it approaches centrality. Centrality in pluralistic cultures would be a very interesting sort of thing, if you could get it. Perhaps it would mean, or involve, a certain inconspicuousness. But the forms of such inconspicuousness, like the forms of cult invisible, as well as their variation in cultural and moral effectiveness, must be infinite. One historical, though not determining, example would be the practical mystics of the fourteenth century.[86] But the idea may be more essentially illustrated in I Kings 19: 9-13;[87] especially if the figure there elaborated be understood, neither in the oblique and rather paltry sense which connects it somehow with the softness of an answer that "turneth away wrath," nor even in the modern Protestant sense of the voice of conscience, but rather, as it is surely intended, in the sense of a metaphor having to do with the sociological effectiveness and metaphysical significance of the enigmatic, or the disinterested, the indirect and the ultimate.

The institutional forms, and those of behavior, corresponding to and expressive of a "hidden" or "secret" centrality of religious power in culture are things to give one pause, but before the problem of the new, the untried, and the higher a certain pause is in order. The sociology of cultural pluralism is a problem for the future. There arise the further problems: (a) of the relation of cultural pluralism to the increase of mystery religion or private religion as against public religion, or of multiple "sacred communities" as against uniform and syncretistic public cult (or the pretension of the same); (b) of the future of human nature under the need of accommodation to a complexity, multiplicity, and universalism of synthesis for which little in its institutional (if not its intellectual) history has prepared it; and (c) of whether it is more or less of a visible art that man will need for cultural control under new and desiderated circumstances. A certain linguistic effectiveness resides in alluding to these contingencies under the rubric of "mysticism," as does Bergson. But it would seem that the requirements of the case are more pointedly met by thinking of the unsolved problems in terms of the future of art, of human nature, and of culture.

86. See Anna G. Seesholtz, *Friends of God* (New York, 1934).

87. Concluding, ". . . but the Eternal was not in the fire; after the fire the breath of a light whisper" (Moffat translation).

The Elizabeth Day McCormick Apocalypse. Vol. I, *A Greek Corpus of Revelation Iconography.* By HAROLD WILLOUGHBY. xxxviii + 602 pp. and 72 plates. Vol. II, *History and Text.* By ERNEST CADMAN COLWELL, with an English version of prefaces of three early Greek translations by J. MERLE RIFE. xiv + 172 pp. and 5 plates. Vols. I and II, $25.00, vol. II, $7.00. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1940.

As the only illustrated Greek manuscript of the Apocalypse, the Chicago University MS. 931 has an exceptional interest to students of Christian art. In the West, the Apocalypse was frequently illustrated and played an important part in religious fantasy, whereas, in the Greek Orthodox church, the Apocalypse was for a long time excluded from the canonical books of the New Testament because of its early association with heretical groups. In the fourteenth century, however, when the Greeks were under Turkish domination, the Apocalypse became a more congenial book, and its visions of an all-powerful deity, its prophecies of struggles with the enemies of God and of ultimate victory, were regarded more sympathetically, just as, in the West, the great religious crises called into being new interpretations and illustrations of the Apocalypse. In the sixteenth century, scenes from the Apocalypse were painted on the walls of the monasteries of Mount Athos by artists who copied Western engravings derived from the images of Cranach and Dürer, as shown by Mademoiselle Renaud in an introductory essay in the present work. But although so many of the Greek manuscripts of the Apocalypse belong to this period after 1300, an illustrated copy was unknown before the discovery of the Chicago codex. It is a vernacular translation by Maximos the Peloponnesian and includes sixty-nine miniatures, forming a rich cycle of Apocalyptic scenes, iconographically distinct from the wall-paintings of Mount Athos and the various Western cycles. Dr. Willoughby dates the manuscript in the first half of the seventeenth century, not long after the original translation by Maximos around 1600. The style of the miniatures is evidently provincial and indicates a provenance in some North Greek or Balkan monastery.

The illustration is literal, but adapted to contemporary life in the costumes and buildings and ethnic types. In order to demonstrate the

uniqueness of the cycle, Dr. Willoughby compares it with the various medieval versions. He is able to find significant resemblances only in the late Russian Apocalypses, which show a corresponding selection and number of scenes; but the compositions and the style are different. He regards the Chicago miniatures as a freshly invented series, depending on Byzantine tradition in the attributes of particular religious figures, on Islam for details of ornament and for types of weapons, instruments, animals and demons, and on Western art for the conception of the Woman in the Sun, who is the Virgin Queen of Heaven of German fifteenth and sixteenth century art, and for such details as the bannered Lamb of God, the pennant of the Resurrection, the horned serpent, etc. But these are incidental to the genuine novelty of the cycle as a whole.

If the latter is indeed an invention of the seventeenth century, it has a real importance for our understanding of the processes of formation of religious imagery. But although Dr. Willoughby has studied each miniature and compared it with corresponding medieval versions, I am not convinced that the Chicago cycle is an invention of the artist. For one thing, I do not share his high estimate of the quality of the leading artist, who seems to me a copyist rather than an original creator. Even the model of the present work may well be a conflation of earlier cycles. In my judgment, the study has not been carried far enough to justify Dr. Willoughby's conclusion. He is very minute in describing some details and repeats various facts and deductions in an exceedingly garrulous manner, but he does not provide the reader with the means of controlling his theory, namely comparative tables showing the selection and composition of the other Apocalyptic cycles and also reproductions of works referred to in the text. Certain errors and oversights also compel me to suspend judgment. In the first place, he has not exhausted all the known Apocalypse imagery in the West. He disregards especially the isolated scenes, like the apocalyptic pages in the Carolingian Bibles of the School of Tours. In the second place, he neglects specifically Western details in the Chicago manuscript which are unmotivated by the text, and are therefore unusually valuable indications of borrowing and tradition; for example, in the illustration of the vision of Christ and the four beasts with the twenty-four elders (as well as in the paintings of the four riders), the beasts are not only equipped with books, as in the West, but their postures

are identical with the Carolingian and Romanesque types in illustrations of the same scene. Yet he speaks of this miniature as independent of other cycles. Finally, his reference to the Beatus manuscripts as Catalonian works is not reassuring; the Beatus commentary is of Asturian origin, and only one of the twenty odd surviving copies was written in Catalonia. Perhaps he has been misled by the fact that Professor Neuss has treated the whole group in a book on the Catalonian Bible manuscripts.

The second volume is devoted mainly to the text, but includes a chapter on the miniatures and the binding by Dr. Willoughby summarizing his chapters in the first volume. Dean Colwell writes on the life of the translator, Maximos the Peloponnesian, who played an important part in the movement to diffuse knowledge of the main works of the Greek church through vernacular Greek versions. He believes that the translator of the Apocalypse may be the same person as Maximos the Gallipolite, who produced the first translation of the New Testament into modern Greek, a work promoted by Dutch and Swiss Protestants and printed in Geneva as part of a program of Protestant activity in the Greek East. The Apocalypse translation of the Chicago manuscript is reprinted in full, with its commentary; the relation to the families of Greek Apocalypse texts and commentaries is established with the aid of Professor Josef Schmid. An appendix by Dr. Rife contains English versions of the prefaces of three Greek translators of the Scriptures, including Maximos the Peloponnesian and the Gallipolite.

The two volumes are handsomely printed and the reproductions are of excellent quality.

MEYER SCHAPIRO

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The Search for the Real Jesus. By CHESTER CHARLTON MCCOWN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. xviii + 338 pp. $2.50.

The most significant aspect of this contribution to modern scholarship is its correlation of historical method and philosophy of history. Throughout the story of the last century of research into the life of Jesus, this interrelationship is made clear and explicit, and thus the reader can anticipate the conclusions of many of the approaches to these problems on philosophical as well as on historical grounds. This

correlation is consistently developed in summarizing most of the important advances in New Testament criticism, and when the author comes to his own contributions the same emphases are kept in mind, and his own distinctively American and empirical approach to philosophy of religion indicates the results which may be expected.

The author feels that England and America, on the whole, have retarded the advance of scholarship, and the story centers primarily in German thought. The book begins with Strauss and ends with suggestions of the essential elements in the solution to the problem. It is not strictly a chronological development, and the author has divided the material into five major sections: I, "The Search for the Historical Point of View"; II, "A False Start, Led by Philosophy Instead of Science"; III, "The Search for Critical Methods of Historical Study"; IV, "The Search for Trustworthy Sources"; V, "The Search for an Historical Interpretation.

Strauss's *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined* created a furor, cost the writer his job, and "inaugurated a new period of critical, scientific study of the records of Jesus' life" (p. 17). To understand it fully, one must have some comprehension of the age out of which it came. The combination of pietism and rationalism, the rapid developments in various sciences, and the rise of an enlarged cultural horizon made possible modern biblical research. Strauss's work must be measured against this background. He reacted against the insights of Schleiermacher because they "seemed to smack of both pietism and rationalism." His acceptance of Hegelian philosophy determined "the direction which the search for the real Jesus should take. The direction was totally wrong" (p. 51).

The results of Strauss's work were philosophical rather than historical. He actually left a good deal of the historical Jesus: his "home in Nazareth, his baptism by John, his mission in Galilee, his claim to messiahship, his rejection at Nazareth and his cleansing of the Temple as narrated by Mark, his trial and crucifixion" (p. 65). When he was through, three paths stood open: (1) Some followed the destructive, mythical approach of Strauss to its bitter end (Bruno Bauer, the Dutch radicals, Arthur Drews, Paul Couchoud, and others); (2) others worked within the Hegelian dialectic, but made better use of the tools of criticism (Bauer and the Tübingen school)—their contribution could not be permanent, chiefly because of faulty criticism of

the Gospels as historical sources and lack of knowledge of the historical setting; (3) Niebuhr, Ranke, and others were trying to apply the type of criticism used with other historical documents, without being limited by peculiar historical and theological presuppositions.

Before any real advance could be made, the concept of history itself had to be clarified. Scholars had to reach conclusions concerning the nature of religion, the nature of history, the proper critical method, the rules of interpretation, and the methods of reconstruction. Many men made contributions to these fields. Many sciences contributed to the "milieu" against which all portraits of Jesus must be painted.

The next problem was the search for trustworthy sources. The fourth Gospel caused untold trouble, because it colored most of the pictures, and until about 1865 it was generally accepted. Probably the outstanding man in reaching a solution to this problem was Benjamin W. Bacon. The majority of critics agree that the discourses, at least, are not historical. It is interesting to note that almost all the evidence propounded to doubt the sanity of Jesus are drawn from this Gospel. "For those who wish to know how Jesus lived and what he taught it has no value," although it offers "a type of religion which is indispensable to a small minority of people" (p. 169).

The two-document theory and the priority of Mark are generally accepted, although Burton, Streeter, Meyer, and Bussmann have suggested multiple-document theories which may change the direction of thought. No matter how this particular problem may be decided, the real Jesus can only be discovered through analysis of the synoptic Gospels.

The rise of *Formgeschichte* has *promised* further clarification. It "has rightly insisted on the social, or folk, element in the Gospels. It has laid needed emphasis upon criticism by social environment, or socio-historical criticism. It is now more clearly recognized that very considerable portions of the Gospels have been shaped, if not produced, by the needs and interests of the early Christians" (p. 202). This has led, however, to an undermining of the sources by emphasizing the fact that early Christians were not interested in biography. It turns out to be more negative and more deadly than Strauss's position! It does not provide objective historical criteria. It works in a circle, and its presuppositions determine the results. It still must be remembered that the synoptic Gospels were written before all the eyewitnesses had passed away.

Finally, there is the problem of historical interpretation. As theological presuppositions were destroyed, more scientific views of Jesus developed. A number of notable scholars contributed noteworthy efforts. The most influential "liberal" product was Harnack's *What Is Christianity?* (1900). It was a simplified view, which omitted many items as later accretions. His position was viciously attacked by Loisy, and this marked the end of an era.

The eschatological controversy and the destruction of the liberal Jesus followed rapidly. The question was narrowed down to the purpose and achievement of Jesus' ministry, and the answers came from Johannes Weiss, Loisy, and, most impressively, from Schweitzer. Brilliant as Schweitzer's work was, however, it suffered from one fundamental defect. As he evaluated the work of more than seven hundred writers, he changed the question from the authors' estimates of Jesus' purpose to their attitudes toward "consistent eschatology." Opinion on this question has taken four directions: "(1) thoroughgoing denial (Wrede); (2) thoroughgoing affirmation of transcendent eschatology (Schweitzer, Warschauer, Burkitt); (3) a mediating concept, radical in one direction, a compromise in the other, which presents Jesus as a preacher of the coming kingdom but not himself a messianic claimant (Case); and (4) thoroughgoing apocalypticism which defines Jesus' eschatology in a different way from Schweitzer (Von Dobschütz, McCown, Otto)" (p. 243).

The "social Jesus" has been in and out of favor with scholars. Concerning the social gospel, we may accept the following: "Jesus left no commands which are to be literally obeyed." He was wrong on some counts. He does not dictate the methods to be used today. It is the *ideal* which *remains the same.* The Christian today will be a follower of Jesus by accepting "the same unwavering faith in righteousness, the same absolute devotion, the same unlimited selflessness, and the same thoroughly revolutionary temper. No Christian can be satisfied with things as they are" (p. 273). Eschatology demands a revolutionary spirit, and this pervades society as well as the individual. This is McCown's solution to this problem, but the two crucial problems of eschatology and the social gospel remain unsettled in the minds of many.

Both the orthodox and the liberal Jesus have been destroyed. No acceptable view has taken their place. Yet there is some hope, for most scholars believe there is a substratum of historical material concerning

both the deeds and teachings of Jesus. There are new tools with which to work and new philosophical formulations which provide background. McCown believes there is hope.

The basic difficulty is to discover an adequate philosophy of history. This philosophy of history must be christological. The old drama was not historical; it was theological. "It must be rewritten, not as a multitude have done, with the principal scene and the title rôle omitted, but with a new conception of both the historical drama of human life and of the one unique Life, the truly significant Event which occurred in Palestine nineteen hundred years ago" (pp. 290 f.). Many unsatisfactory solutions are still at hand, suggested by tradition, by the old supernaturalism, by Barthianism, and by the idea of inevitable progress.

A satisfactory solution to the problem of history must "face the problem of the irrational in nature, in history, and in individual experience. . . . But the irrational must not be allowed to eclipse the rational" (p. 299). It must come to terms with naturalistic empiricism. We live in an organically related world, and we learn from experience. We have no final truths, not even in Jesus. But Jesus maintains his incomparable position because his basic qualities are timeless. "There is still enough of the historical Jesus to stir the conscience and challenge the world" (p. 305). We cannot predict the direction the search will take. The picture which historical research draws will always be obscure. But Jesus is better understood than ever before, and in the future he will mean more than ever in the life of mankind.

Of all books attempting to summarize the work of modern scholarship in this field, Professor McCown's volume is the most readable, balanced, and definitive. The treatment is logical rather than chronological, and yet the reader never loses the sense of development. It is remarkably condensed, and the vividness of the story gains rather than loses from the elimination of further details. The bibliography is helpful and suggestive. There are some errors, mostly typographical.

Many scholars will claim that McCown's estimate of *Formgeschichte* is too negative, and that positive results are being obtained. There are two answers: (1) Where positive results occur, it is not due to the method of form history, but to theological presuppositions which are used in the reconstruction, and which are not consistent with the original method (Dibelius and Bultmann use semi-Barthian principles, and, as Strauss before them, allow their philosophical and theological pre-

mises to dictate their conclusions. Grant's recent *Gospel of the Kingdom* uses American liberalism in the same way); (2) positive results can be obtained when form history is put in its proper place as one tool among many.

Some scholars and many preachers will not be satisfied with a Jesus who gave no literal commands. Present-day practices of the churches concerning marriage and war are evidence of that. It is necessary, therefore, to point out the significance of McCown's conclusions concerning the authority of Jesus. It is the *ideal* which stands out as an eternal challenge and authority, rather than the specific teachings. The purpose of Christian ethics today must be that of reinterpreting this ideal so that it may be relevant to modern times and conditions.

McCown's conclusions concerning eschatology and social responsibilities deserve widespread publicity. In a day when the social implications of Christianity are being eliminated from some theologies, because of mistaken understandings of eschatology and the otherness of God, we need to remember that Jesus' eschatology is revolutionary in its demand "that society as well as the individual shall embody the spirit of universal good will" (p. 274).

It is McCown's emphasis on philosophy for which we are most thankful. As he has shown, many of the scholars of yesterday and today have had either a bad philosophy or an unconscious one, or both. It is impossible to avoid philosophical presuppositions, and therefore it is necessary to have the best philosophy possible. McCown's suggestions point the way for American scholarship at least, although they provide only a hint of what is in his mind. He sees the world and history from the standpoint of the philosophy of organism, which is combined with empirical naturalism. In man's attempt to understand his world, Jesus stands supreme. The danger of this approach is two-fold: (1) Unless one understands the limits of empiricism and the ways in which it can be extended to include metaphysical knowledge, it may lead to a theological positivism which lacks pragmatic value for man's religious needs; (2) while the historical Jesus may be resurrected sufficiently to stir the world, the available Gospel evidence provides only a starting point for an adequate Christology. Christology must not determine the nature of the historical Jesus, but, in the experience of men, the Christ of the Christian church transcends the man, Jesus, who lived in Palestine some nineteen hundred years ago.

Historical study will always be the handmaid of theology, and while some will be disappointed at the meagerness and confused nature of the evidence concerning the real Jesus, the conclusions of this book are positive and hopeful. As the historical Jesus is better understood, the theology of the churches will be clarified and knowledge will be increased among us.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER
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Father Huntington, Founder of the Order of the Holy Cross. By VIDA DUTTON SCUDDER. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 1940. 375 pp. $3.50.

It is very hard to write a review of this book, and it is very hard to write a review of any book which contains a cool and penetrating self-criticism in itself. That is especially true in this case, for the preface by Father Whittemore, present Superior of the Order, contains in clear and definite language a picture of the virtues and defects of the work. All Americans know Miss Scudder for her vivid and fearless hold on "social justice" and the Catholic Faith, for her understanding of St. Francis of Assisi, and for many other works. Her difficulties are a result of her virtues.

Father Huntington was an outstanding priest of the Episcopal Church. He was the Father Founder of a striking American religious order, and he was of Puritan descent. He was a great radical and a great traditionalist. He was not a liberal in any sense. Perhaps it would be fairer to call him a great reactionary, for he realized sincerely and constantly that the Son of God, the Incarnate Second Person of the Trinity, was also the Carpenter of Nazareth, and that ranks and classes and masses were all of them ancient and modern perversions of the truth that was once shown forth in all its glory and power.

We are told, again and again, that the social views of Father Huntington dated. This book also dates, for it is the work of a sincere Christian who dreamed of a United Front (p. 283), and today the United Front has been achieved in the union of Hitler and Stalin against democracy, or, shall we say, against the dignity of the individual for which Father Huntington, as a reactionary Christian, always contended. This may seem a play on words, but language itself, in the present hour, is helpless to explain its own meaning, and Father Hun-

tington, whether preaching at Trinity Church on the day of America's entrance into the World War, or at any other time or place, always realized the eternal verities.

There was probably more (or at least as much) of Calvin Coolidge than of St. Francis in Father Huntington, just as no Anglo-Saxon mystic of the Middle Ages ever could have had the gaiety and the ardor of a Latin mystic such as St. Theresa or St. John of the Cross. But there was always a sense of humor, a reverent sense of irreverence about him (if we may so speak), and it was this, with his deep spiritual insight and his utter self-sacrifice, that made him a timeless figure, and a true reviver of the fundamental spirit of monasticism in American life.

Several times Miss Scudder speaks of Tolstoy, but a Tolstoy could never have gone out on a farm to work as an ordinary laborer. The late Professor Jules Legras (*La Litterature en Russie,* p. 156) notes that even a French bourgeois lawyer could give unselfish service better than Tolstoy, despite his reputation. Father Huntington could never have come so near to suicide as did Tolstoy, as seen in his description of Levin in Anna Karenina, and in his account of his life in the *Confession.* The strength of Father Huntington lay in his humility, in his abiding within the spirit and tradition of the Anglican Communion, and in his ability to put first things first. The human man enjoyed the Single Tax and various other reforms, but the consecrated monk, as Father Whittemore observes, saw that that field was too narrow and too easy. Dostoyevsky and Hawthorne were both nearer to this inspired and consecrated man of God than were the reformers whom he apparently did not bother to meet.

The charm of Miss Scudder's book lies in her ability to picture Father Huntington in his spiritual and intellectual growth, and to show the distinguishing spirit of the man and the priest. Even that scrapbook from which she quotes so charmingly was so "New England" in the best sense. She has given us Father Huntington as he was; she has given a lifelike devout picture of an American saint; more than that, she has revealed herself in the work, and we can feel the spiritual conflict that has been raging in her in a civilization that is rapidly passing into barbarism and chaos. If Father Huntington had had less faith, less conscience, less sense of duty, he would have been a master demagogue. Instead, he realized the sanctity and obligation of his vows;

he realized the problems of democracy and of freedom; he realized the old republican ideals of the founders of this country, and the true essence of the meaning of the Counsels. He became the universally beloved, universally admired Father Founder of the Order of the Holy Cross, and, at his grave, "At the appointed times, gather the Fathers of the Holy Cross, and there, trusting the last promise of his loving heart, they invoke the intercessions of the Father Founder" (p. 368). And with them in spirit are the multitudes whom Father Huntington helped and guided and scolded and prayed for during his long life.

Clarence A. Manning

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Jewish Survival. By Abraham Mayer Heller, New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1939. ix + 271 pp. $2.50.

Living as a Jew Today. By Simon Greenberg, New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1940. 117 pp. $1.25.

These volumes contain sermons and addresses delivered by two American rabbis during the last two decades. There is no rigid conformity here—no standardization, uniformity, or prescribed pattern. Here is eloquent witness to the democratic ideal. Here is an organized religion that is not organized so thoroughly that the creative spirit and conscience of the individual are inhibited. Popular misconception to the contrary notwithstanding, the Jews present no solid phalanx; their culture is variegated; differences within the ranks are regarded as legitimate.

Rabbi Heller's sermons exhort, Rabbi Greenberg's analyse. The first stir the feelings of those who are already steeped in Jewish lore. The second stimulate the mind and motivate the action of those who are in quest of truth and loyalty.

Most of the religious discourses arranged under the title, *Jewish Survival,* were given at holyday services. Their object is to discourage assimilation. The preacher is fervently devoted to "the awakening of Jewish consciousness" and a return to the traditions of the ancient faith. Adherence to the old customs and beliefs, knowledge of the literature and history of Israel, and ardent support of Zionism, are the leading themes.

The method used consistently throughout these addresses is exe-

getical. Texts from biblical or rabbinical literature are used with skill and ingenuity. Phrases and dicta from rabbinic commentaries on the Bible are employed both as proof and illustration. Double meaning of words, play on words, allegorical interpretation—these are the regular formulae of presentation and exhortation. This is the authoritarian approach *par excellence*. Little time or effort is expended in careful, comprehensive discussion. All points are "clinched" by citation of biblical or rabbinic verses. The beauty and picturesqueness of the ancient literary imagery and folkways are deftly utilized. This method is still appropriate in those comparatively few Jewish congregations where the Hebrew language and literature and the classical allusions are understood. It brings joy to the hearts and peace to the souls of some Jews, who find it inspiring, and for whom it represents part of the compensation for the time spent on traditional study. The youth in most congregations of this kind, however, are conspicuous by their absence. For them, citations such as these are largely meaningless. Moreover, the whole procedure of sweeping glorification and idealization of the past, of constant quotation of sacred texts and of assigning esoteric meaning to them, of emotional appeals to loyalty, is likely to seem irrelevant and unconvincing. Those Jews who have been trained in general culture and scientific thought remain indifferent, or are further estranged. They will probably make no complaints. There will be no loud protests. They will simply stay away from the synagogues where this type of sermon is given. When the old Jewish way of thought and living comes in contact with the new political, economic, and scientific developments of recent times, educated Jewish youth require a well-reasoned analysis of the perplexing problems of religious adjustment.

Once upon a time this preaching via quotation and homiletic ingenuity was effective with the "Jewish masses." It is not easy to discover just who *are* the "Jewish masses" today. Most Jews in the United States understand neither Hebrew nor Yiddish. Most of them have been through the public schools. Many of them have had scientific training in the colleges. Some of them have genuine intellectual interests and social idealism which cannot be waved lightly aside. More sympathy for these interests and ideals must be forthcoming, if Jews such as these are to be reclaimed for Judaism. They demand an integrated pattern for living. Even though, as Rabbi Heller sug-

gests on page 180, they be a minority, and small in number, they are not unimportant. They are often the most ethically and spiritually sensitive young Jews. Some cognizance must be taken of their needs.

This recognition of the need for a rational approach to Judaism is found in Rabbi Greenberg's *Living as a Jew Today*. These five stimulating addresses include an evaluation of "the Jewish religious and cultural tradition," a plea for the study and practice of Judaism, and an exposition of the relation of Jewish life to the problems of our day. The very first sentence in the first address announces the goal of "an honest analysis of our attitude towards the basic problems which confront us." Thenceforth, there is no evasion of difficult questions. Sincerity and ability arrest attention and evoke further consideration, even if the conclusions are not always acceptable.

The methods employed in these addresses show fine psychological insight. They start with the Deweyan "felt need." They proceed from the known to the unknown. They tackle real problems. They take up themes because they are relevant and important, not because they are suggested by a word or a verse in a ritually-designated scriptural passage. Texts from the Bible or from rabbinic literature are made use of, but only as a point of departure, or as illustration. Occasionally there is employment of passages from the literature of other peoples in a similarly apt and effective manner. Sanction, authority, and persuasiveness, however, are to be found in the cogency of the reasoning and in the appeal to history. It is in the handling of the historic experiences of the Jews that Rabbi Greenberg shows consummate skill and superb mastery. Movingly and accurately, he marshalls his material and uses it to throw light on the perplexities of these troubled times. Simple and lucid throughout, this historical exposition rises, at times, to dramatic intensity.

In these addresses there is a frank understanding of the fact that the fate of the Jews is intimately associated with the universal problems of mankind. Thus, on page 107, we read:

> We cannot enjoy even a modest prosperity for any length of time in a society, in which there is a large group of economically disinherited. Before the average ruling and possessing class will part with any substantial part of its wealth, it will be sure to see to it that we should first be completely despoiled of our possessions.
>
> Here, then, is the difficult role we must play, and here the dilemma we must face. We must be among the most ardent, most intelligent and most

unwavering advocates of every measure which makes for a more equitable distribution of a country's wealth. In doing that we are bound to rouse the ire of the possessing classes against us. We will be decried as revolutionaries and destroyers of the peace. If, on the other hand, we acquiesce and participate in the progressive concentration of the country's wealth in one group and the progressive impoverishment of the majority, we cannot possibly avoid becoming the scapegoat in the inevitably resulting social instability. The ruling class will confiscate our wealth under the pretense of saving the country, and perhaps reward with it some of the more ruthless and aggressive elements among the dissatisfied, and the masses will justify them in their thievery.

Which one of the two horns of this dilemma should we then grasp? There seems to be little room for doubt. We must, in as energetic a manner as possible, side with the forces that make for the orderly and equitable distribution of the country's economic resources. We dare not deceive ourselves by seeking safety through membership in the ruling class. Some of our German brethren fell into that trap.

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The Social Function of Religion. By E. O. JAMES, Nashville: The Cokesbury Press, 1940. xi + 311 pp. $2.50.

Critical scholarship and constructive theology seldom appear together. In certain academic circles, to be critical means necessarily to be niggardly of positive interpretation, whereas many churchmen, fearing the negativity characteristic of so-called scholarliness, have been afraid resolutely to face the facts which undergird theory. This book gives little new knowledge to the scholar, nor is it theologically creative; yet it is of utmost importance for scholars and churchmen alike, in that it combines exceptionally well valid and adequate interpretation. The reason for this is, doubtless, that Professor James, because he teaches the philosophy of religion at Leeds and natural religion at Oxford, because he is a critical specialist in anthropology and yet profoundly concerned with the general meaning and application of religion, is peculiarly fitted to combine historical research with theological interpretation.

With ample reason for so doing, Professor James considers the social function of religion with respect to its three basic foundations: the theological, the ethical, and the social. The theological basis of all socially adequate religion is belief in Providence. Religion, unless

it be itself guaranteed by the cosmic order, cannot function effectively as the guarantor of the social order. That is why explanations of religion in terms of the divinization of the social consciousness and all similar interpretations are insufficient. All religions from the primitive to the most sophisticated—so long as they remain religions at all—witness to the fact that religion is centrally concerned with community. Whitehead may define religion as "what an individual does with his own solitariness," but in the same book he must also stress the social nature of religion. Buddha, alone, becomes enlightened under the Bo-tree, but refuses Nirvana in order to save mankind. Paul, alone, finds his religion in the Arabian desert only to return as one of the world's great missionaries. Jesus, alone, dies on the Cross but as the founder of a new fellowship among men. Yet no mere social theories are enough to explain religion. It has a cosmic foundation. Religion is a matter of the superhuman conditions which affect man's social life. It has to do with the reality of the ideal to sustain, protect, and transform man's actual fellowship. This truth Professor James has seen clearly, ably demonstrated, and rightly made the very basis of the social function of religion.

The treatment of myth and revelation is simple. Groups unconsciously invest the beliefs which give social cohesion and stability with the sacredness pertaining to the transcendent realm. "The struggle for existence demands co-ordination of purpose and activities, and the sanctions of religion supply the consolidating force." From this statement it must not be gathered, however, that religious knowledge is a conventional creation lacking in objective cosmic Reality. Emergent evolution cannot explain by any theory of a nisus the dynamic, transforming power of religion. Only an adequate doctrine of creation as man's sense of dependence upon a greater and prior power can do that. Revelation is thus a matter of real truth breaking through inadequate approximations of it in myths or traditions. The function of theology is to appraise the truth or Reality-claim of myths and traditions. The irrational theories of myth which explain it as man's wishful subconscious inventions to protect him from the disillusionment and disquietude of reason, in short, the "escape" theories of myth, prominent in much of recent European thought, are not discussed. Nor are the neo-orthodox interpretations as indicated, for insance, in discussions in recent numbers of *The Review of Religion.*

It is, however, characteristic of the book, perhaps wisely, to give positive conclusions after a direct discussion of evidence, rather than to roam around in the realms of conflicting explanations.

The second foundation of an adequate social religion is ethical. Not that this is separate from the first, being itself built on the theological. In the long run, belief determines conduct. Conduct unless it is to degenerate, must be anchored in adequate belief. Only when it is grounded in belief in Providence can religion have an effective social function. The kind of effectiveness, however, depends upon man's idea of Providence. Christianity is ethically ultimate because it believes in a God who demands universal righteousness. Yet He does not demand it without supplying the needed dynamic. Since He is Himself love, He made possible through Christ a new community which does possess in its fellowship the necessary empowerment of grace. In this way Christian ethics can function in society built on a Reality which cares for righteousness and makes available, in the new humanity in Christ, the light and power to effect it.

The third foundation of religion is the social. This rests inseparably upon the two previous foundations: the intrinsic nature of Providence and of ethics. It is, however, their concrete embodiment in basic social structures, particularly the family and the State. The family is an innate social unit. Anthropology and sociology, according to experts like Westermarck, deny the thesis of primitive promiscuity. Evidence for this promiscuity is totally lacking. With all peoples, to be sure, sexual habits may have varied, but they have still contained a basic pattern of family life and loyalty. These patterns need the supernatural sanctions of religion to provide stability of social function. True marriages, at least in the deep and general sense, are always made in heaven.

The community to be strong must have the nature of a Church, a closely knit fellowship under divine ordering. The liberal capitalistic State, representing a secularization of society which involves its doom, is a denial of the church-community. Totalitarian States, which Professor James describes at length, are a return from an irresponsible individualism to a Church type of State, but they possess only inadequate humanistic foundations. They suppress the freedom of the church-community. This freedom can be found only by a return to the true totalitarianism of God.

In general, religion to serve its social function effectively must be a natural part of culture. In the modern world, Professor James complains, religion has become a separate entity singled out either by the anti-religious reformers as an unfounded superstition impeding social advance, or by the religious reformers as the vanguard of righteousness, condemning the general present attainment of society. The social function of religion, however, is to go neither behind nor before the general social stream, but to sanctify and enhance all social values. While, on the one hand, religious prophets have given new and better social norms, religious institutions, on the other, have been a drag on progress; but neither phenomenon is indicative of the normal social function of religion. Social reform must come as gradual religious growth; it cannot "be taken by the force of legislation."

One must be thankful to Professor James for his basic treatment of the social function of religion from within cultural change. He has no false dichotomy between metaphysical source, standard, and dynamic and historical origin, development, and differentiation. The book may seem challengeable on the point of its highly selective evidence, but this is due to the very nature of the work. The principle of selection is obviously support of liberal-orthodox Christianity. But, as far as the reviewer is competent to judge, the evidence is substantial and illuminating. The reviewer regrets, however, that many of our present problems as to the social function of religion are not included. What, for instance, is the relation between pedagogical and consuetudinary norms of social behavior? To what extent are such norms valid, and how are they established? How are religious standards and sanctions themselves related to psychological, social, and economic motivation? Can religion be both "a principle of novelty" and "a conservation of values"? If so, what is the principle of integration? To the constructive approach of this book might well be added the stimulus of the patient analysis of conflicting interpretations.

Nels F. S. Ferré

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Christianity and Power Politics. By Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. xi + 226 pp. $2.00.

There is probably no thinker of our day better qualified to reveal clearly the inadequacies of contemporary life than Professor Reinhold Niebuhr. A long historical perspective, a deep understanding of the

Hebrew-Christian tradition, and a sympathy that permits him to identify himself with the world's tragedy, all combine to make him a significant prophetic figure. This, his latest book, is a series of occasional essays on political and theological subjects. It is, at times, difficult to know which essays are political and which theological. This is as it should be. Dr. Niebuhr sees very clearly that there is always causal relationship between ideas and events.

The common thesis which underlies these sixteen essays and binds them together is a devastating attack upon pacifism. Niebuhr sets out to prove that "modern Christian and secular perfectionism, which places a premium upon the non-participation in conflict, is a very sentimentalized version of the Christian Faith, and is at variance with the profoundest insights of the Christian religion." Pacifism is seen to be a result of confusing supra-historic ideals with historic possibilities. Because liberal perfectionism thinks in terms of moral absolutes, it has become incapable of making moral distinctions, and thus has distorted the highest wisdom of the Christian tradition, and is heretical when judged by the standards of the total gospel. Modern Christians have made the mistake of equating the Gospel with the "law of love," and have sometimes forgotten that Christianity is a religion that measures the total dimensions of human existence, not only as it relates to human conduct as expressed in the law of love, but also in terms of the fact of sin. The good news of the Gospel is not primarily a call to live by love, but is an assurance of the grace of God which is able to overcome a contradiction within our own souls. Christianity is something more than the law of love, for it constantly deals with the fact that all men everywhere violate the law of love.

Professor Niebuhr sees pacifism as simply a version of Christian perfectionism which has not sufficiently taken into account the fact of sin. With their thinking colored by the optimism of the nineteenth century, the pacifists still hold their belief that man is essentially good, and that he can be redeemed by love and understanding. Such a view of human nature conforms neither to the New Testament nor to the facts of human experience, and no religion can maintain itself in defiance of the experience which it supposedly interprets. The pacifists are also inclined to forget that the injunction, "resist not evil," is only part and parcel of a total ethic which we violate not only in wartime, but every day of our lives.

One leaves this book with the feeling that Reinhold Niebuhr has

committed the unpardonable sin of distorting his thought to fit his thesis, rather than drawing his conclusions from his thinking. He either consciously or unconsciously refuses to understand the position of those with whom he disagrees. Here is an example drawn from the opening paragraph of the essay on "The War and American Churches": "The Christian Church of America has never been upon a lower level of spiritual insight and moral sensitivity than in this tragic age of conflict. Living in a suffering world, with its ears assailed by the cries of the miserable victims of tyranny and conflict, it has chosen to identify the slogan 'Keep America out of the War' with the Christian Gospel." Such a statement is neither true nor fair. It would be just as fair and just as true to say that Dr. Niebuhr has identified the Gospel with the aims of the William Allen White Committee. Perhaps Niebuhr should listen to the National Vespers, or read some of the recent volumes of sermons, to discover what is being said from our American pulpits. Because we recognize that we are sinners standing under the judgment of God, and because we see all too clearly that we are partly responsible for the tragedy that stalks the world, it does not necessarily follow that we can win the forgiveness of God by going to war with Germany. There is a genuine Christian pacifism that can make moral distinctions, recognize the evil in individuals and society, see clearly the necessity for coercion in our common life, and still feel that the witness of love is more important than taking part in a debacle of hate. Dr. Niebuhr evidently knows nothing of such a pacifism as this.

The book has one other major defect, and that is its unrelieved dogmatism. The indictments of contemporary civilization are searching and vivid. Why are they spoiled by an almost bitter denounciation of those who do not see eye to eye with Professor Niebuhr? He gives the impression that the major sin of modern culture is that it does not agree with him, "This culture does not understand historical reality clearly enough to deserve to survive" (p. 168). Is is such a horrible sin to lack in understanding? I know that he does not intend to give that impression, but one is left with the feeling that there are two kinds of people—the contemptible and the admirable—and their status is judged by whether or not they agree with Dr. Niebuhr. Three different times he pays tribute to the "common people" for their ability to discern the facts in the problems of the day, yet he has nothing but contempt for their judgment in most other matters. I

doubt if Niebuhr's dialectic is equal to resolving the conflict between the inadequacies of modern culture and the amazing insights of the common people. All who agree are capable of profound understanding, and all who disagree are superficial. It might not be out of place to suggest that for one who accuses others of lack of humility there is a strange deficiency here.

In spite of these defects, this is a great book. The analysis of modern culture is penetrating and true. The essay on "Germany and the Western World" is a magnificent study of the relationship of ideas and events. The author shows very clearly that the diverging trends of thought and action which separate Germany from the democracies are corruptions of Christianity. Germany followed the pathway of a false pessimism, while the western world followed an equally false optimism. Today Germany represents one extreme and America, the other. The pessimism of Germany and the utopianism of America are the two aberrations of modern culture, and they are equally inept at dealing with the complexities of the modern problem. One is realism without idealism, and the other is idealism without realism. In Germany the task of achieving justice was prematurely given up, while in America it has been underestimated.

The two essays on "Optimism, Pessimism and Religious Faith" are by far the finest in the book. Here we find Niebuhr at his best, revealing his capacity for clear thought and profound religious insight. He reveals the superficiality of any religion that fails to sound the depth of human tragedy and shows that an adequate religion must find meaning in the face of evil. In the Jewish-Christian tradition, the problem of pessimism and optimism is solved by faith in a transcendent God who is the source of meaning. Such a faith enables one to affirm confidence in a meaningful existence, even though the world be full of sorrow and evil. Existence in this world is meaningful because the center of meaning transcends the world. Profound religion can be neither pessimistic nor utopian. Religion must be realistic enough to recognize perplexity, tragedy, and evil, and yet never give way to despair. To be true to its genesis, Christianity must affirm its faith that the world is intensely meaningful, even though that meaning transcends human comprehension. If this is paradoxical, it is because any adequate religion must solve its problems in paradoxes rather than by schemes of consistency.

All readers, whether or not they are in accord with his central thesis, will agree that Reinhold Niebuhr has produced a significant book. The clarity of his thought and presentation leave all who are seeking answers to the confusing problems of this age in his debt.

WILFRED I. ORR

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Can Religious Education Be Christian? By HARRISON S. ELLIOTT. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940. xi + 338 pp. $2.50.

No one can read the engaging title of this book without being moved to guess the answer to the question it propounds. One might even go so far as to restate the question for the millions of religious people both B.C. and A.D., who by fate or choice have remained outside the Christian fold, by substituting a "should" or "must" for the "can" of the title. Suffice it to say, however, that the author remains strictly within his self-imposed limits, finding enough to occupy him in seeking to harmonize the conflicting views he finds in the interpretation of the terms, "education" and "Christian."

Since the volume was clearly written as a guide to the understanding of those engaged in educational work within the body of the Christian church, and particularly its Protestant arm, the questions it raises and the advice and counsel it offers should be evaluated in the light of that fact. As the author sees it, the basic problem in the field of religious education arises from the conflict of two views. The one is the belief of church leaders that education is a technique or methodology for the transmission of Biblical and doctrinal teachings; with this interpretation, religious education can be Christian, using the latter term to mean doctrinally correct. The other view is that held by many leaders in the field of religious education itself, that education is more than a methodology: it is the task of helping in the development of all —children, young people, and adults, and with all the aid that modern social science has to offer. This, the doctrinaire group contends, is not necessarily Christian, nor even essentially religious.

It is this conflict which Dr. Elliott examines in detail. He traces the Protestant influence historically, reviewing material familiar to the seminary graduate, but vague or lacking in the background of the average church school teacher. Similarly he traces the development of psychological and educational theory, well known to Ph.D.'s in Edu-

cation but perhaps not so familiar to B.D.'s, and marks its impact on such groups as the Committees of the Council of Religious Education and the Federal Council of Churches. The views of both sides are fairly and sympathetically presented, quotations from the Bower report, from Coe, Vieth, Weigle, and others being set over against those of Homrighausen, Brunner and Barth. The place of the Bible in a religious education program is discussed, as are the origins of the books of the New Testament in the formative first two centuries of the Christian era, the problem of sin and guilt, and the place of prayer and worship. In a chapter entitled "A Social Strategy of Religious Education," the author brings forward the two chief criticisms of liberal education, namely, that it is overintellectual and individualistic, and urges the need for "enlisting individuals in coöperative endeavors in negotiating and doing something about the social situations of which they are a part." A seven-point platform is put forward, on the principle ennunciated by Coe and by Tillich, though in quite different terminology, "That God becomes apprehended and experienced only in concrete situations of life where he is realized in the crucial act of decision. . . . A socialized form of religious education would seem to be of fundamental importance if God is to be dynamically and creatively experienced in human life."

Thus the basic conflict is resolved by the author through a program acceptable to those Protestant denominations which may be loosely classified as liberal. His intellectual and scholarly approach to the problem will be enlightening and helpful to clergymen and church school teachers alike, both in helping them to understand each other, and in carrying on their respective duties. It will probably not be acceptable to those in the more "orthodox" and fundamentalist categories, who hold to a "revealed" religion. However, the successive "revelations," to confine oneself to the Hebraic-Greco-Roman tradition, give sufficient evidence of doctrinal reinterpretation in the light of parallel social change to make even the steadfast falter on the path of blind adherence, even if the same processes were not evident in recent times. The sovereign authority of God according to Barth and Brunner, rebellion against which is sin, paralleling a similar state of affairs politically, and the Pietistic and Wesleyan preachment against various forms of corruption, "licentiousness and lewd practices," in eighteenth century England, giving a moral tinge to religious ethics

in America, are cases in point. Whether an unchanging God is being variously discovered by the different generations of man in terms of their own experience, or whether man through his hopes and frustrations is continuously endeavoring to create an ideal which he can call God, the experiential basis is apparently the same, the doctrine being the record of a struggle of a former day. It is to be feared that to the young people of the present, whom the churches are trying hopefully to reach through their religious education programs, and who are themselves seeking vainly for what the church might give, the many voices, each insisting that it proclaims the only true doctrine, sound like the rustling of dry leaves in the wind.

Even the social program offered by Dr. Elliott may fail in its appeal to these young people, if they are not already fully committed to their own traditional liberal religion. The reasons for this are many, owing in part to the complexity of what is termed religious experience. But perhaps one reason, which is more important than is commonly supposed, one which can bear a great deal of investigation, is a linguistic or more precisely, a semantic one: Barth, following the Scottish confession, frowning on man and woman who are "in the position of 'conspyring against the Soveraigne Majestie of God,' " Homrighausen clarifying the need of religious education as "a genuine return to, or progress toward, a religion of definite divine content," a committee of the Federal Council of Churches pontificating on the way pedagogy will "fulfill its true function as the handmaid, not the mistress, of God's revelation in Jesus Christ,"—what do such words as these mean today? And the author himself concludes: "It is only as individuals and groups have been captured by the possibilities of love made manifest in Christ, as the goal of the Kingdom of God has become the dominating purpose in their lives, and as fellowship with God has become an actual experience, that the educational process can be trusted."

These quaint and picturesque phrases, and others like them, will be translated into something as meaningful in the experiences of people today as they were when they came into religious dialectic, or ecclasiastical groups by a process of verbalized instruction, ritualism, and group pressure will continue to try to bring about the conversion phenomenon. People may be converted to many doctrines, not only religious, but political and economic. Charism is not peculiar to re-

ligious leadership and has its dangers as well as its advantages. Meanwhile archaic abstractions form a wall around one of man's greatest needs, and when he raises his hand for help, he grasps only words.

In times past, as Dr. Elliott points out, "The general community sentiment was on the side of religion, and the 'sinners' in the community were on the defensive." If Brunner's view of the church as a "community of the redeemed," is generally accepted, and the progress toward exclusiveness and cultism continue to parallel the course of secularization, there will be little doubt that it will be "the churches rather than the 'sinners' who are on the defensive." The conclusion seems to be that the churches can advantageously make their religious education more vitally religious, and in so doing they may become less like a secret society and more truly Christian.

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The Christian Fellowship. By NELS F. S. FERRÉ. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1940. xi + 236 pp. $2.00.

Ecumenical unity can be called the theme of this book only by indirection. The discussion is on an altogether different plane from that on which the proposals of ecclesiastical statemen are made. Mr. Ferré comes to grips with a problem which is both prior to and of more general importance than the practical problem of how to get the denominations together. His problem is, What is Christianity?

This problem has been more urgent, not to say more distressing, for liberal Protestants than for any other group. Unlike many modern liberals, their circumlocutions to the contrary notwithstanding, Mr. Ferré is not content to regard Christianity as *a* faith. It is *the* faith. The title of one of his chapters, "Liberal Thought and the Religious Absolute," indicates the setting in which his problem is attacked. There is, of course, a widespread resurgent tendency to emphasize the absoluteness of Christianity; not so often is this emphasis made within a framework which, on the whole, is that of liberal Protestantism.

I shall attempt to summarize the argument of the book before adding some critical remarks.

Religious knowledge may most fruitfully be regarded as a social act, as an attempt to use our social heritage of ideas and beliefs to find

guidance in the human and social realm. Into this realm the formal validity of logic and the factual validity of science do not seem to extend in any adequate way. Both social and religious theories therefore "must leave the still waters of intellectual validity and venture out into the cross-currents of social conflict, to direct them, not so much by the certainties of existence as by the challenge of the ideal" (p. 24). The test for philosophic truth here is "appropriate effectiveness, or, in a most guarded sense, workability" (p. 16). Since social meaning is most adequately conveyed by symbols whose historical associations have charged them with emotional meaning, it is the primary task of philosophy and theology to adapt old symbols to changes of social structure. The foundation for theology thus lies in the historical content which is demanded for adequate reasoning in the field of religious guidance.

In attempting to define the historical content of Christian faith Mr. Ferré follows the Swedish theologian, Anders Nygren[1] in focussing in the motif of *agape*, or love, as the distinctive factor in Christianity. The historical basis of this motif is the revelation in Jesus Christ of the love of God which "freely gives itself regardless of the merit of its object" (p. 49). While God is thus the source and standard of *agape*, this conception of love is also the Christian ideal of human fellowship, normative for the life of the Christian community. Christianity so understood can be shown to be man's highest ideal, fulfilling his deepest desires and needs, and also to be the ultimate principle of explanation in history. For Christianity provides that intensive form of fellowship, that "positive disposition creative of good will," which our historical progress in extensive forms of fellowship demands, if these latter forms are not to be negated. This motif of *agape* constitutes the unity and continuity of the Christian faith.

Mr. Ferré does not, however, accept Nygren's exposition of *agape* without qualification. It seems to him that there are more humanistic elements in the teaching of Jesus, counsels of worldly wisdom for instance, than Nygren is willing to recognize. He also objects to Nygren's refusal to subject theological theory to the test of consistency, and he urges that "*agape* must in some way be organically related to the whole of man, the whole of history, and the whole of nature" (p.

1. Cf. *Agape and Eros: The History of the Christian Idea of Love* (London, 1938).

102). On such grounds he defends Augustine's synthesis of *agape* and *eros* into *caritas*, against Nygren's criticism of it.

In his chapters on the Church and on sacramental theory, Mr. Ferré deals with the problem of ecumenical unity more directly. The High Churchman will find little encouragement here. From the Kingdom of God, which transcends history as God's eternal purpose, are derived two historic aspects of the Church, neither of which is to be identified with the Kingdom. The Christian Church Catholic is "the ideal embodiment in human history of the Kingdom of God." It is the invisible Church, the fellowship of all Christians. The Christian Church Corporate, on the other hand, is "the fallible expression of the Church within the relativities of history's dynamic advance" (p. 143). That is to say, we may suppose, the "visible" organized communions. Mr. Ferré's suggestion seems to be that the hope for church union lies in the possibility of the inner unity of the Churstian Church Catholic, rather than in external conformity. The sacraments are interpreted as "effective symbols." But they are said to be effective only in the way in which symbolic reference is effective in all high grades of experience.

The author's conviction that the Christian idea of love "is wide enough to include all forms of fellowship" leads him to compare Christianity with other religious and social theories. The theme of his chapter on "Christianity and Karma" is that "Hinduism has certain insights which, hidden beneath conflicting notions, nevertheless witness to the Christian gospel and can themselves be better understood when seen in the light of Christian truth. Christianity likewise has something to learn from Hinduism, by which to gain a more realistic appreciation of its full faith" (p. 176). The *bhakti* elements in Hinduism may be better understood in the light of the Christian doctrines of grace and forgiveness, and Christianity might learn from Hinduism a more realistic recognition of the cosmic regularity expressed by *karma*. As a social theory Christianity is found to be more adequate because more inclusive than the "partial truths" of fascism, Marxism, and Freudianism.

The general spirit of the book is in harmony with its interpretation of Christianity. It is positive, but persuasive rather than dogmatic in temper, and is written with vigor and conviction and a high

sense of the importance of its task. It indicates a fertile and catholic mind. Here is liberalism in an affirmative and expansive mood, in contrast to those contractive and negative phases through which liberalism has so often passed. In this respect there is affinity with Schleiermacher and Ritschl rather than with the Deists, with Channing rather than with the antiseptic sterility of much of twentieth century liberalism. There is, further, a breadth of interest and a sense of historical perspective which will keep the author from premature hardening of his intellectual arteries.

It seems to this reviewer that the book suffers somewhat from the fact that it is a series of papers written for various groups at different times. Though as it stands it is a well-ordered series, had it been conceived and written from the first as an organic development of its theme, it would have gained in clarity. Again, the profusion of thought with which we are presented sometimes makes it difficult to follow the trend of the argument. Perhaps a more careful use of theological language would be helpful to the reader. It is the author's conviction, heartily to be commended, that theology cannot be kept isolated from philosophy. But in the present state of religious thought it seems important also not to confuse the two types of language.

Two general questions may be raised about Mr. Ferré's thesis. First, as to his method: it is not entirely clear how his theory of religious knowledge as a social act, to be tested in terms of appropriate effectiveness, would permit any universal content for "revelation." In view of his emphasis on the use of emotionally meaningful symbols, it might seem that revelation would have different contents in different cultures. For each culture those theological symbols would be most adequate which were most emotionally meaningful for it. But he clearly repudiates the view that religious truth is conventional, or merely relative to culture. Christianity, he says, has "a historic basis which is at the same time universal and ultimate in nature" (p. 29). "Social adequacy" seems then to have some universal meaning, as in fact he indicates by his discussion of progress and by his valuational comparison of Christianity with other forms of religious and social theory. If this is so, then the test of "workability" must be taken in an extremely general sense. Can the notion of workability be extended as far as it needs to be, in order to fulfill the function assigned to it here? Or does it implicitly contain a reference to some

criterion which would ordinarily be regarded as on a different level from that of "workability"?

It is to be noted that his definition of the distinctive element in Christianity as *agape* is not to be taken as a simple description. "That *agape* is the determinative and distinctive motif of Christianity . . . does not mean, of course, that it is either the most common idea in Christian doctrine or the most usual motive of Christian action" (p. 78). "This determinative motif is thus normative for Christianity, but Christians have failed to understand, to believe in and effectively to incarnate normative Christianity" (p. 53). On what ground then, if the definition is not a simple description, does one choose one motif rather than another as the distinctive motif of Christianity?

It seems that one can define a normative motif by abstraction from a historical event or epoch, *or* one can accept the event or epoch in its full concreteness as a complex normative motif. In the latter case one would simply atempt to discover the full historical "character" of the event or epoch. Mr. Ferré seems, on the whole, to reject this latter alternative, which would be the procedure of literalism, although it seems to be on this ground that he criticizes Nygren's interpretation of *agape* as being exclusively God's way to man. This interpretation, he says, "does not square easily with the New Testament" (p. 91).

If, on the other hand, an abstraction is made from the event or epoch, and if this abstraction is taken to be normative, there must be some prior principle or ground on which this and no other motif is taken as "basic" or "essential" in the normative sense. Therefore Mr. Ferré is quite right in pointing out that, in as far as Nygren takes the former alternative, he is not in fact confining himself to historical description, as Nygren seems to profess. If Mr. Ferré also takes the former alternative, and makes an abstraction from the full concreteness of the event or epoch, then what is the controlling principle in terms of which he makes the abstraction? Is it "social adequacy"? Then it seems that prior to the abstraction one has made the assumption (of faith?) that Christianity is universally adequate and applicable. In this case, Christianity can be further defined only in terms which are consistent with such adequacy and applicability.

The second general question is concerned with content rather than with method. Mr. Ferré points out rightly, it seems, that if Nygren maintains that the basic motif of Christianity is *agape,* then it is incon-

sistent for him to retain, also, all the ideas of traditional theology, for instance the idea of eternal hell. Our author goes further and adds, "the traditional view of God is also anything but that of God as *agape;* whatever love it has is buried under doctrines and beliefs which smother it by their very contradictions of it" (p. 94).

Now only a little later, Mr. Ferré calls for forthright decision between belief in an omnipotent Creator and belief in a limited God. He declares for the former, and seems to hold that it is a belief more in harmony with the conception of God as *agape* than is the latter. I wish to question only this last assumption. It is not clear to me that omnipotence follows more readily from the conception of God as *agape* than does limitation of power. It seems to me that if one accepts the belief in an omnipotent God, one does so under the control of motifs which are more readily to be distinguished from *agape* (in as far as I understand the present use of the term) than they are to be identified with it.

One might go further and suggest that if we begin with the motif of *agape,* and if we introduce no other motifs into the discussion, then the choice opposite to Mr. Ferré's might, from one point of view, seem to be more consistent with our first premise. As he recognizes freely, the belief that God is both *agape* and omnipotent "cannot be arrived at through a rational interpretation of actuality" (p. 96). The idea that God is *agape,* if *agape* means anything like goodness as we know it, and the idea that all that occurs in the world as we know it is due to the action of God, do indeed seem to "clash with all violence." Is it possible to escape this antinomy except by procedures similar to those which, at other points, Mr. Ferré objects to in Nygren? "Philosophical and theological criticism cannot permanently be evaded merely by calling the content of faith alogical, paradoxical, or religion's own answer to its own questions" (p. 94).

This is not a book to be tossed off at a sitting, not even at a very long sitting. It is both too solid and too provocative to be taken lightly. For some readers it will mean a struggle. Perhaps that is all to the good. For them it may indicate what seems to one reader to be true, that we have here a new line of attack, sincerely and profoundly conceived, and carried out with unusual resourcefulness, upon a very live and very urgent question.

William A. Christian, Jr.

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Living Religions and a World Faith. By WILLIAM E. HOCKING. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1940. 291 pp. $2.50.

This volume contains Professor Hocking's recent Hibbert Lectures in which, at the request of the Trustees, he discussed the inter-relations of the great religions and the possibility and promise of a world faith. It would have been difficult to find a writer better equipped to deal with these questions; for Professor Hocking had been intimately connected with the great Jerusalem missionary conference of 1928, and Chairman of the Commission of Appraisal which devoted the year 1931-32 to the direct study of the native religions of Japan, China, Burma, and India and the Christian missionary activity in those lands. What is more to the point, he has devoted his entire life to the deeper problems of philosophy and religion. The Hibbert Lectures now given us in the volume under review thus present the mature conclusions of an unusually well-trained and well-furnished mind upon problems of far-reaching importance.

The book is divided rather sharply into two distinct parts, Lectures I and II being devoted to a discussion of religion in general and Oriental religions in particular; while Lectures III and IV deal specifically with the problem of Christian missions and a world faith. This division is not wholly fortunate; it presents us with something very like two books bound up together in one volume. The two books, moreover, differ not only in subject matter but in interest and value. Lectures I and II might be classified under the very questionable title "Comparative Religion." The lectures are interesting, but it was impossible even for Professor Hocking to prevent their descending at times into more or less obvious generalizations. They contain many valuable comments; but Lectures III and IV are not dependent upon them and really contain most of what is notable in the volume.

These two concluding lectures—"Ways to a World Faith," and "The Present Stage and the Next"—the mature product of the author's wide reading, personal observation, and prolonged meditation—are full of wisdom, and should be read by everyone intelligent enough to be interested in one of the great movements of the immediate past and future.

There are three possible attitudes toward the non-Christian religions: the "Way of Radical Displacement," the "Way of Synthesis," the "Way of Reconception"; with each of them Professor Hocking deals at some length. The first presents the attitude of the older mis-

sionaries and of the Christian communities of the last century which sent them out. This is based upon the conviction that the Christian way is "the only way." This expression used to mean that Christian belief and practice is the only way to avoid hell-fire and eternal damnation. The non-Christian religions, it was admitted, may have contained a certain amount of worldly-wisdom, even of lofty moral teaching; but there is only one way by which man can be saved. Advocates of conservative orthodoxy, such as Dr. Kraemer, still deny religious value to the non-Christian faiths, still consider Christianity the "only way." But, as Professor Hocking adroitly points out, they are remarkably careful not to specify what Christianity is the only way to. Most of them have been sufficiently touched by modern thought to be unwilling to preach eternal damnation. The insistence, moreover, of the Barthians that the Christian revelation is superior to the teachings of other religions not because its intrinsic quality commends itself to the mind, but because it alone is revelation, and that an impassible gulf is fixed between the one revealed religion and all others—this, in Hocking's opinion, is quite as impossible for the open mind as is the old belief in hell-fire. In short, this "only way" doctrine is "a perverse and injurious instrument for guiding the contact of religions, inflicting pain beyond the meaning of the occasion, intolerable in its intolerance. It is increasingly ineffective in winning souls who have learned that religion cannot be based on fear; but it is chiefly obnoxious to the ultimate sense of truth in the hearts of those who try to believe it."

The "Way of Synthesis," the mutual influence of one religion by another until a world-faith is attained by combination of what is best in many faiths—this is a more promising and admirable way. But it runs the great danger that tolerance always runs—the loss of earnestness, devotion, and efficiency. It is the separate, historical, in a sense local religions that have nourished the spiritual life of mankind, not such a religion-in-general that the "Way of Synthesis" might be expected to lead to.

Finally there is the "Way of Reconception." This means the persistent effort to think out and grasp the "essence" of the several religions, "the substance of the matter underlying all the profusion of religious expression . . . the generating principle of religious life and of each particular form of it." It is sometimes a little difficult to know exactly what Professor Hocking means by this, to see how the "World

Faith" to which it seems to point is to be distinguished from a religion-in-general, and how it is to retain, or attain, the efficiency and the drive of the historical religions. If I understand him correctly, Professor Hocking does not look forward to a time when there will be no more separate religions. Certainly he does not think that any religion in its present form, not even Christianity, could qualify as a "World Faith," or should oust all its historical rivals. Rather he seems to hold up as the goal a group of steadily approximating, and no longer hostile, religions, each persistently purifying itself and each co-operating with the others in a common task. These religions will retain their local qualities and their resulting local appeals, but the central philosophical content of each will be increasingly illuminated; and, as this takes place, the difference between the world's great faiths will be seen to have a relatively minor importance.

JAMES BISSETT PRATT

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What Is Christianity? By Charles Clayton Morrison. Chicago: Willett Clark & Company, 1940. ix + 324 pp. $3.00.

I

In 1939 Dr. Morrison, for years the editor of the *Christian Century*, delivered the Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale. These lectures, in slightly expanded form, he has now published under the title *What Is Christianity?* It must have been an exciting experience to hear the original presentation of them, for even in reading the book in the quiet of one's study, one is carried along at a delightful rate by the flow of thought, the challenge to conventional views, the clarity of style, and the courage displayed in the startling positions defended. But the business of a reviewer is not primarily to praise but to present; and the reader of this review will want, as quickly as possible, to get at the central thought of Dr. Morrison's book, and to learn what Christianity is.

Christianity, according to our author, is essentially a historical religion. This does not mean merely that it has had a history, nor even that it lays more stress upon the events of history than other religions. History is not an account of history: it is the actual flow of human social life that "histories" are *about*. And Christianity is the Christian

part of human history. That is to say (and this is fundamental) Christianity is the Christian community. If we take the word as it should be taken, Christianity is the Christian Church. The cultus of the Church, "its experience and its ideology belong, of course, to the integral life of the community, which cannot exist without an ideology and a cultus and an experience; but Christianity cannot be defined in terms of any of them, or of all of them together. The reason is that Christianity is a historical phenomenon. It is not made of the stuff of ideas, nor of the stuff of personal experience, nor of the stuff of cultic institution. It is made of the stuff of history. It *is* history, and as such can be defined and identified only in the concrete terms in which history itself is defined and identified, which, as we have seen, are the terms of the ongoing human community."

It is especially important to realize that Christianity is not to be identified with any ideology or philosophy. It is not any creed, it is not even the teachings of Christ nor the ethical ideals he set up. To be sure, Christianity is a faith; but we should define and identify the Christian faith by the Christian community, not the Christian community by the Christian faith. There are, indeed, two especially characteristic Christian convictions which are unique; namely, first, "that the living God has revealed himself to man" and, second, "that God's self-revelation has been made in history." It is because of God's unique revelation that Christianity is unique among all religions. To be sure, God is *present* in them also—as He is in everything; but He has revealed Himself in Christianity alone. "We should expect that if God has revealed himself in history we shall find his self-revelation in one of the major orders of the human community of which history as a whole is composed [such, for example, as the leading religions]. It will not be difficult for us to identify the particular historical community which carries the divine revelation, and this because we ourselves stand within it." Other religions "can all be defined in terms of their several ideologies, and can be compared with one another on the basis of their ideologies, so that we can say of this religion that it is better than or inferior to that religion. But Christianity cannot be compared in this fashion with them, for it is incommensurable with them all. It moves in a different dimension. They are ideology. Christianity is history."

The divine revelation which Christianity alone "carries" is not any-

thing that can be put into words. The beliefs of the church, "even its doctrines about the nature and character of God, and about Christ, cannot qualify as the defining subject matter of the historical revelation of God." The revelation of God is just the Christian community itself. "If we are to understand Christianity as an historical religion, it is necessary to keep in mind that the divine revelation is not primarily a disclosure of cognitive truth to man's intellect, but an activity of God manifesting itself in events of history through the medium of an historical community whose corporate life is oriented toward Him. . . . Revelation is not a truth uttered, but a deed done. . . . God's revelation does not consist of any absolute deposit of divine truth of which the community bearing the divine revelation is the custodian. The *community* is the divine revelation."

It is the first duty of a reviewer, as I have said, to *present*. I have tried to present Dr. Morrison's central thought, his fundamental position. I have tried to do this, and I fear the reader will conclude that I have failed. I shall agree with the reader. To repeat, I must confess to being not only puzzled but baffled. Dr. Morrison's position seems to be this: that Christianity is the Christian community; that it differs from all other religious communities because it alone "carries the divine revelation." But this revelation does not reveal anything. The revelation *is* the community which carries the revelation. Whatever that may mean.

This is certainly a serious situation. We very much want to know the answer to the question, What is Christianity? Dr. Morrison assures us that it is not to be defined by any creed, philosophy, or faith, not by any moral devotion, not by any cultus, nor by any form or intensity of religious experience or of consciousness of God's presence. It is one special historical community. But how are we to tell that community from others? By the revelation of God. "But the revelation of God is not a creed nor a system of church order, nor a holy tradition, nor the Bible, nor a body of ethical teaching, nor a private experience. It is the objective self-disclosure of God in that living historical community which is informed by the living presence and spirit of Jesus Christ." And which community is this? Can we answer until we know what is the living presence and spirit of Christ? And if no test is to be found in faith, ideal, teaching, or experience, how are we to answer? It might, of course, be suggested (though I do not understand Dr.

Morrison to make this suggestion) that we can identify the Christian community by tracing it back historically to the man Jesus of Nazareth. But would this merely historical fact give Christianity any claim over us or over anyone? Would it in any way indicate that Christianity is the bearer of the revelation of God? If Jesus be not distinguished from other men by his moral teachings, the ideals of his life, or his experience of God, why should we regard the community which derives from him as uniquely God's revelation? If, on the other hand, we do accept these teachings, ideals, and experiences, as "the defining subject matter" which distinguishes Christ and the Christian community, we must reject the central thesis of Dr. Morrison's book. Once more the question presses: if neither teachings, ideals, loyalties, nor religious experience distinguish or define the Christian community, how shall we distinguish it? Is it possible that the answer to our question leaks out in the sentence quoted a little way back: "It will not be difficult for us to identify the particular community which carries the divine revelation, and this *because we ourselves stand within it.*"

Incredible as it may appear, this seems to be Dr. Morrison's answer. The central position of his entire book is emphasis upon the objective rather than the subjective. Faith, teaching, theology, though important are secondary matters; moral ideals are doubtless excellent, but they are not peculiarly Christian; mysticism and religious experience become in several passages almost objects of contempt; the Protestant notion that salvation consists in a new relation between the individual soul and God is considered a great heresy; salvation, instead, is said to consist in the incorporation of the individual in the community; and the supremely important task of Christians appears to be the objective and external union of the various "sects" into a really ecumenical and catholic church. This universal Christian church is the community made up of Christians, and Christians appear to be those who have been baptized. The only clear-cut indication of just how the Christian community shall be distinguished is this: that it is the community within which we ourselves stand.

The conclusion set down in the preceding paragraph appears, as I have said, almost incredible. I read over page after page of Dr. Morrison's book and rub my eyes. Have I misinterpreted his position? Perhaps. But there are his explicit statements in passage after passage. I can conceive of only three possibilities: either Dr. Morrison was car-

ried away by the delight of attacking certain positions to which he has an antipathy and, as a consequence, didn't say what he meant and didn't mean what he said; or he conceives of Christianity in a sense so entirely objective and external as to make it a merely historical and (from the religious point of view) relatively unimportant phenomenon; or else his book completely fails to answer the question: "What is Christianity?"

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II

These Lyman Beecher lectures defend the thesis that Christianity is the Church. "The Christian Church is the Revelation of God in history." The "continuing community *is* Christianity." The community starts with the beginnings of the Hebrew people, is continued in Christ's Church of the Remnant and in the Body of Christ of Christian history. Both Catholicism and Protestantism have fallen into apostasy: the former by vesting "the divine revelation and grace in a part of the community" (i.e., the hierarchy), the latter by placing "the locus of revelation" in the Bible and individual faith. The Body of Christ, that is the incarnation of Christ in the community, needs to be restored through the ecumenical movement. God's revelation in history is "the organic unity of those who love and honor Jesus Christ as Lord." This is primary in Christianity. "Ideology" (Christian doctrine) is secondary. The question to be answered by the ecumenical Church is not "What must one believe to be a member of the Body of Christ? but, What do Christians who constitute the Body of Christ throughout the world actually believe?"

This is in some ways a very salutory book for modern Protestants to read. Dr. Morrison, with understanding and keenness, puts his finger on many of the failures of Protestantism and traces them to its lack of a churchly consciousness. Nevertheless, the author raises many more problems than he solves.

His thesis, indeed, is remarkable more for the vigor and clarity of its presentation than for the accuracy of its scholarship, or the cogency of its reasoning. The apocalyptic element in the teaching of Jesus and, above all, in the Last Supper, is completely dismissed. Paul is conceived as identifying Christ and the Church and abandoning his belief

in the Advent. The Reformation doctrine of the Church is equated with its emasculated form in much modern Protestantism. Above all, Protestantism is charged with Gnosticism and with presenting a docetic Christ, because it failed to identify the Lord with the historic Church.

If this last claim were true, then the whole Christian tradition has been Gnostic until the coming of Dr. Morrison. For the distinction between the Ascended Lord and the Church is as clear in Catholicism as in Protestantism. Where they differ is in their conception of the mode of His operation in the world. For the Catholic, Christ manifests Himself primarily in the sacramental and legal institution of the Church. For the Protestant, the mode of His operation is in one sense wider and in another narrower. He is at work wherever the Word of God is rightly preached (which is wider), and in the community of *true* believers (which is narrower). It is just a confusion of thought to imagine that Protestantism has a docetic Christ because it refuses to equate a nominally Christian community with the risen Christ Himself. Protestantism believes that the incarnate Christ works through history wherever His Word is preached and His sacraments administered. Not even the most extreme revivalism is liable to Dr. Morrison's charge, for this same Christ is often working through the historical medium of preacher and penitent.

At first sight, it might seem that Dr. Morrison's view of the church involves a Catholicism to outdo Romanism. Yet the basic patterns of his thought are derived from the most liberal and romantic form of Protestantism. Having abandoned the Christian tradition which believes that the Lord ascended into heaven and will reveal the completion of His kingdom at the end of history, Dr. Morrison equates the ascended Lord with a community of nominal Christians. Here is the final deification of the sociological process. Instead of the ascended Christ who is working through the community He founded (either as a sacramental system or a fellowship of true believers), Dr. Morrison has only a historical community in which to believe.

This leads him to his greatest difficulty. Though he shows some feeling for the Catholic sense of the Church, he reveals no understanding of its doctrine of authority. Indeed, he can establish no such doctrine in his Church precisely because the "continuum" of the Church is its own authority. This Church composed of nominal Christians has no norm of faith, for it is itself the revelation of God and the

primary object of faith.[1] Thus we are told, in effect, that the pertinent ecumenical question on doctrine is not What ought we to believe? but What, as a matter of fact, do we believe? (p. 315). The faith of the Church is here resolved into a questionnaire. Dr. Morrison does not even attempt to develop the *consensus fidelium* as the final authority in the Church. Contradictory religious beliefs on fundamental issues here dwell together in superficial unity. Christianity, for Dr. Morrison, may be love, but it certainly is not truth.

The only pertinent question to ask of Dr. Morrison is how on earth there can be a Romanist heresy or a Protestant apostasy. For he provides us with no norm by which to establish any religious truth at all. Moreover, Catholics and Protestants alike are presumably baptized Christians who love and honor the Lord Jesus. As such, they belong to this revelation of the Church, and there is no way by which we can know whether their several religious views are true or false.

For all this, there is a great deal that is incisive and valuable in Dr. Morrison's book. He has a feeling for the Catholic sense of the Church and its relation to history, which has not been appreciated in much modern Protestantism. He shows with great clarity how the lack of a churchly mind in Liberal Protestantism has often had tragic consequences for its life and worship. Yet, had Dr. Morrison paid more careful attention to the classical forms of the Doctrine of the Church in the great reformers, he might have been saved from many historical errors. Luther and Calvin certainly never spoke of the Church in the sense Dr. Morrison attributes to Protestantism. Nor was their conception of the invisible Church as other-worldly or as removed from history as he imagines. Moreover, their denunciations of a hierarchical institution which claimed to be the sole medium of Christ's activity in the world might have awakened him to the explicit danger in his own thesis—that of deifying an ecclesiastical development.

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1. Belief in the Holy Catholic Church, as an article of faith in the creed, is an entirely different matter. This involves belief in the fact that Christ founded the Church, endowed it with certain spiritual powers and made it the medium of His operation in the world. Precisely what and where this Church is, what are its powers, and where the center of its authority, on these questions Catholics and Protestants are divided. But both can truly affirm faith in the article as they interpret it.

What We Mean by Religion. By Willard L. Sperry. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940. vii + 177 pp. $1.75.

This stimulating little book by the Dean of the Harvard Divinity School contains a series of lectures given before the student body and the public at Florida Southern College, in March, 1940. It deals in turn with "five familiar words": religion, faith, prayer, morals, and God. The method adopted in each case is not to define the concept, but to describe the living phenomenon from various perspectives. In the course of the process, various difficulties are raised and treated with sympathetic understanding. In short, the book is that of an honest liberal facing problems raised by modern men and coming out with a chastened but firm faith.

In the chapter on religion, Dean Sperry argues that religion is an experience of *belonging* to something or someone greater, stronger, and, at least in mature religion, better than oneself. The main problem for religious men today is whether that to which they belong and are willing to give themselves is to be interpreted in humanistic or theistic terms. In his treatment of this problem, Dean Sperry shows real understanding of the appeal of the Social Gospel to activistic Americans who have a feeling for the whole of humanity. He realizes also that Humanism often forms the basis for noble lives devoted to science, medicine, and the like. However, he takes his stand squarely on the side of those who believe that a cosmic as well as a social reference is necessary in mature religion, and that the cosmic is prior to the social. His argument for this is rather suggested than fully developed. Practically, if man can find nothing corresponding with and friendly to himself and his higher life in the scheme of things, but is a mere cosmic accident doomed to ultimate extinction, his life loses its meaning. Philosophically, it is more probable that there is a continuity between man and the world that has produced him than that he is a mere "sport."

The further development of this position in the last chapter, on God, is suggestive, but not very rigorous philosophically. Appealing to "natural religion" to establish a basis for argument upon which believers and unbelievers can agree, he dismisses the cosmological and teleological arguments much too lightly, in the opinion of the reviewer. Not only does he apparently overlook the attempts of recent thinkers such as Tennant to restate the teleological argument, but his own very

brief statement of it is rather loose and misleading. It is the moral rather than the teleological argument, surely, which stresses "the need of demonstrating a *moral* purpose in the world, and some point of *ethical* arrival at history's end" (p. 144). The statement of the ontological argument, which Dean Sperry accepts in a modified form, is also loose. It "says that the very fact that we have the idea of God suggests that there must be a reality which corresponds to that idea, otherwise how did we get the idea?" (p. 144). This implies (incorrectly) that the argument starts from a *psychological fact* and seeks an adequate cause of it; in reality, it starts from the *logical content* of the idea and asks what is involved in it. Many will wonder, too, whether the argument as restated by the Dean will bear as much weight as he puts upon it. Mainly on the ground that human thought in science finds a cosmic rationality answering to it, he argues that "there is some permanent part and place in the totality of things for what we know as human thought, with all the affections and the purposes which it embraces" (p. 151). If this argument were supported by evidence of various kinds that man and his mind are "organic" to nature, it might be made a strong one. But it is suggested rather than supported.

But it would be a mistake to judge the book by this defect, as if it claimed to be a careful statement of the author's philosophy of religion. It represents, rather, the attempt of a wise scholar and preacher to bring to bear upon religious problems all the resources of a well-read and well-stored mind. Philosophical arguments are used in essentially the same way as the many literary allusions of the book, not to demonstrate conclusions logically, but to indicate the general direction in which truth lies. Thus, in the chapter on God, Dean Sperry points out that though nature may seem to science to be careless of the individual, and history may seem to be ruthless in its treatment of him, the artist's vision of nature always individualizes its object, and a closer view of man shows pity alongside of his cruelty. Again, he realizes that there is no simple solution of the problem of evil, but argues that it is mitigated when once we have learned to accept death as a natural condition of life, and freedom as a necessary condition of moral goodness. And his defense of the symbol, "Father," as the most adequate way of conceiving God is most illuminating.

But the author's balance between tentativeness and conviction is best illustrated by the three central chapters, which are the best in the book.

In the second chapter, the naturalness and necessity of faith as an adventure of the spirit in vindicating hypotheses concerning cosmic mysteries and ultimate values is eloquently defended. Faith goes beyond knowledge, but it is not irrational. Even its beginning is far from arbitrary; rather, like Columbus' belief in land to the west, it is based upon hints and evidences such as the "wanton and prodigal beauty of nature." In the third chapter, prayer is defined as "trying to think God's thoughts" after Him and with Him, and the "mystical" conception of it as trying to find and unite oneself with God's will is opposed to the inferior "magical" conception of using God to serve one's own will. The "problem" of prayer arises when prayers of confession, praise, and thanksgiving are neglected, and prayers of petition are pressed without real submission to God's will. In the chapter on morals, the radical character of Christian ethics is contrasted with the mere "mean" required by conventional morals, and the necessity of its perfectionism is shown by the way in which hate ultimately destroys itself. All in all, this is a thoughtful book that should help students and laymen find their way to a modest but tested faith.

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Our Knowledge of God. By John Baillie. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939. ix + 263 pp. $2.50.

In the course of his book, Professor Baillie tells of an eminent theologian who recently said that he had made a vow with himself never to read another page on the theistic proofs. The writer of this review has, for some time, felt the same way regarding the problem of religious knowledge in general. It is, perhaps, sufficient praise of Professor Baillie's book that it has made him change his mind.

There are a number of reasons why the present writer is glad to have read the book. For one thing, the main views on this question—the Kantian, the neo-Thomistic, and the Barthian are subjected to an analysis both searching and sympathetic; rarely have the issues between them been presented in a clearer and more incisive way. But that for which he is chiefly grateful is that Dr. Baillie has presented, with unusual persuasiveness, a conception of the knowledge of God which, with the best will in the world, he has never been able to accept.

The central thesis is that God is not known by argument, but by our being directly confronted with Him. In other words, we are pre-

sented with an intuitive theory of religious knowledge. It is primarily the negative side of his thesis which seems unnecessary and unacceptable, but there are serious difficulties, also, in the form in which he presents his positive thesis. Some doctrine of intuitive religious knowledge would seem to be necessary in any adequate philosophy of religion—the present writer holds such a doctrine—but all depends upon the way in which it is expressed.

Dr. Baillie occupies a standpoint which is, perhaps, inevitable to the sincere religionist, but which presents difficulties for the philosophy of religion. He starts with his own experience of God expressed in the language of Christian devotion and Christian theology. He accepts the "conditioning" of this experience, by a Christian home, and a Christian society, and with it the language thus conditioned. In a certain sense he speaks that language throughout. He can thus speak meaningfully to his co-religionists, but can he speak equally meaningfully to others? One is bound to ask the question whether intuitive knowledge of God, or of the Divine, can include all the *particularity* of Dr. Baillie's experience—whether, indeed, this very particularity does not condemn the position to a sort of solipsism, either personal or racial. This is a crucial issue for the evaluation of the entire standpoint, for it is just here that this modern position comes into conflict with classical Christian philosophy. That philosophy found it possible, and even necessary, to translate the language of Christian devotion—"the loving Father in Heaven"—into the more universal terms of the Good, or of the most Perfect Being, and it was here that the intuitive element of religious knowledge was found.

Dr. Baillie is not unaware of the possible solipsistic implications of his position and, in a section entitled "Solipsism Toward God," he denies them. "Why," he asks, "should we who believe in God think it necessary to allow that because some men, the so-called atheists, deny the existence of God, God cannot therefore be directly present to their consciousness as He is to ours?" There is, of course, no reason that we should allow this, except the atheists' own affirmation (which surely should have some weight); but certainly we can scarcely insist that He is directly present in precisely the way in which He is present for Dr. Baillie. In any case, it does not seem to help much philosophically to appeal to a distinctiion between consciousness and self-consciousness and to hold that "God may be present without our knowing it." Nor does it help much to appeal to an analogy betwen knowledge of God

and knowledge of other selves. Dr. Baillie makes much of this immediate knowledge of other mind. Indeed his position on this point (greatly influenced apparently by Cook Wilson) seems, in a way, to be the heart of the book. With this I am in sympathy; but, after all, while the immediate knowledge of other mind cannot be explained by analogical inference, analogy is the basis of our knowledge of its characters. Perhaps I can summarize my difficulties in the following way: The problem of the language of religion and of religious symbolism is crucial for the philosophy of religion; it scarcely receives adequate treatment in this book.

I have suggested some of the difficulties which, for me, inhere in the positive side of his thesis; let us now turn to the negative.

It is wholly natural that the eminent theologian should never want to read another page on the theistic proofs, but it is neither wise nor philosophical. One who feels so strongly the "immediate confrontation with God" will feel like saying, "God has no need of natural or logical witnesses." One who denies that confrontation will, however, have to be in some way convinced of His being. God may not have need of natural or logical witnesses, but man does. The instinct of catholicism is right on this point. We can understand Cardinal Newman when he says that he "expects little from the traditional proofs and that, were it not for the voice that speaks so clearly in his conscience and his heart, he would be an atheist or a pantheist in his view of world," but surely the voice that speaks in the conscience and in the heart is not enough. If we did not hear that voice we would never seek God, for the idea itself would have no meaning, but certainly we must find Him also in nature and in reason. One cannot help feeling that, like the dialectical theologians whose negations he criticizes, Dr. Baillie himself has too completely accepted the naturalism and agnosticism, in so far as the human reason is concerned, which constitutes the premises of their position.

Something less than justice is, accordingly, done to the theistic proofs themselves. I do not refer to his ignoring of the repeated attempts to reconstruct the argument since Kant. I suppose he thinks that they are all unsuccessful. I refer, rather, to his treatment of the classical formulations in St. Thomas, and his comments on Neo-Scholasticism in general. There are undoubtedly elements of truth in his criticism of this argument. The Thomist thesis, that only the physical object

is known immediately, and that all other knowledge, whether of God or of other selves, is inferential, seems to me fatal to any real theory of religious knowledge. But two things must be remembered. The element of ontologism, which I think cannot be excluded from the Thomist argument as a whole, and the doctrine of "transcendentals" corrects this error. In any case, as many Neo-Scholastics are insisting, the modern disjunction between the sphere of value and the sphere of being did not exist for St. Thomas. *Omne ens inquantum ens est bonum.*

When all is said, however, Professor Baillie's position with regard to our knowledge of God is very persuasive, and one would like to accept it. Perhaps from the standpoint of theology—the postulate of revelation—it is not only tenable but is the only position. But for the philosopher there is an insuperable difficulty. It arises from an initial ambiguity and consequent dispute over the notion of knowledge itself. As one reads, it become increasingly clear that knowledge here means something significantly different from what it does in science and philosophy. Only that which is communicable and verifiable is knowledge in the latter sense, and it is only propositions that in the last analysis are thus verifiable. Propositions about God are propositions about a transcendent being. "Proof" of some kind there must be. Dr. Baillie does not go to the length of some of the dialectical theologians, of saying that "the representations of the transcendent are not objects concerning whose existence or non-existence a discussion would be possible," but he does go rather far. There is, he tells us, "something better than proof." That there are many things better than proof or demonstration, either empirical or logical, who would deny? But that does not alter the fact that, in some contexts, some universes of discourse, there is no substitute for it. In any case, man will go on seeking for it so long as he believes in God.

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Science and Wisdom. By JACQUES MARITAIN. Translated by BERNARD WALL. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. x + 241 pp. $3.00.

This book is an attempt to show the relation between religion and philosophy. "It goes without saying among Christians that faith exercises an external and negative control which guards the philosopher

from errors against revealed doctrine into which he might otherwise fall. But faith is not only a negative norm in matters of philosophy."[1] Religion is the wisdom which guarantees the science of philosophy. M. Maritain does not deny the other wisdom which arises from science itself. The relations of these two wisdoms and the sciences over which they preside provide the book with its problem. If the terminology (wisdom, science) is unfamiliar to American readers, it might be well to consult St. Augustine's use of these words in the *De Trinitate* before reading this book. The expressions, wisdom and science, offer a neat method for expressing some notions which would otherwise require an extended verbiage.

The present volume is a translation from the French (*Science et Sagesse*) of some years ago. It contains two parts and an appendix. The first part is a series of three lectures which were delivered at Rome in 1934. They bear the subtitle, "Science and Wisdom." The first lecture is a review of the subject in ancient times with some application of it to present conditions. The second lecture is on "the philosophy of nature." It is an appeal not to neglect the purely human wisdom which grows out of science. The third lecture has a quotation from John of St. Thomas beside its title: "Ita ergo philosophandum est in fide." The divine wisdom must now be reconciled and fitted into its place along with human wisdom. Part Two is an eighty-three page reply to some objections raised by Fr. Thomas Deman to Maritain's position on the relation of science to wisdom as applied to moral philosophy. The appendix consists of some replies to the objections of Fr. J. M. Ramirez. They are also concerned with the relation between science and wisdom as it applies to the problems of moral philosophy.

Many readers of this book will feel like praising M. Maritain for a courageous effort to find places for science, philosophy, and religion in the confusion of modern thought. Contemporary thinkers are often confronted with the apparent necessity of choosing between philosophy and religion, when what they desire is to find a place for each. To anyone who has faced this problem, the present volume will seem to be refreshing. If the book is read with this in mind, it may assume a meaning which it would not otherwise have. M. Maritain has this

1. P. viii of preface.

in mind when he writes: "My study is addressed to philosophers who are unbelievers as well as to those who believe: but more, perhaps, to some of the latter, especially to certain neo-scholastics who do not seem to be free from prejudices on the subject under discussion."[2] Why does he say that his book is meant for "unbelievers"? He is firmly convinced that the philosophy of the book is so sound that an unbeliever ought to accept it, even though the impetus to consider the problem comes from a different source. Not merely possible—but necessary—places are found for philosophy and religion. The divine wisdom and the human wisdom meet in such a way that the divine wisdom becomes necessary to the sciences, e.g., the science of moral philosophy. It would be possible to approach the task by asking what is the matter with current philosophy. The answer would be that some higher wisdom is lacking which could correct the mistakes of philosophers. An unbelieving philosopher should be interested in the discussion of such a problem, since it is of vital importance to philosophy. "The peculiar problem of the age lying ahead of us will be to reconcile science and wisdom in a vital spiritual harmony. The very sciences themselves seem to invite the intelligence to take up such a task."[3]

This book is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject. It merely points the way which the author believes philosophers and theologians should take in order to solve some of their difficulties. It will be interesting to see whether it is not followed by something of a more detailed nature. The test of it would come there. The second part, or the reflections on moral philosophy provides some testing of the relation between wisdom and science. Moral theology is distinguished from moral philosophy: "While moral theology descends from revealed principles, moral philosophy adequately considered, from the fact of its subalternation to theology, in a manner mounts upwards to them. . . .[4] As soon as the validity of moral philosophy as a practical science has been recognized, it is 'ipso facto' subordinated by theology."[5] Some readers will have a great deal of difficulty with the conception of moral philosophy involved. If this is the

2. *Ibid.*
3. P. 32.
4. P. 176.
5. P. 182.

moral philosophy necessary in order to work out a co-ordination between philosophy and theology, then this book is very limited in its value, for it will be unsatisfactory to all except moralists of one type. If moral philosophy gives birth to certain eternally true rules for living which are static and unchanging—if this is the notion involved—then, to many scholars the underlying doctrine will be unacceptable. The way in which philosophy and religion are related depends upon the conception of philosophy and the conception of religion. If one is well satisfied with one's theory of moral philosophy and cannot agree with M. Maritain, the whole book is undermined, for a new relation of wisdom and science must be discovered which is adequate to one's own moral philosophy.

The breadth of vision which *Science and Wisdom* shows makes it worth reading. One's imagination is stirred by the asides which are made about the history of philosophy. The problems facing philosophers today are seen in the light of a comprehensive picture of all the problems of the past. Science has developed little by little, but it is not the product of empiricists alone. "In truth, modern science was opened up not only by empiricists like Roger Bacon and eclectics like the fourteenth-century doctors of Paris, but also by doctors of wisdom like Albert the Great."[6] The contemporary problem of relating divine wisdom and human wisdom was once solved, but new developments in the sciences and in philosophy, as well as in theology, have made a new solution necessary. Descartes cut theology off from philosophy so that divine wisdom could no longer connect with human wisdom. Kant separated science from metaphysics, and metaphysics could no longer be considered to be a science. M. Maritain does not worship the past. He recognizes the mistake of the Middle Ages in subordinating science to theology: "Thus the sciences and philosophy will no longer be as they were so often in the Middle Ages, in a position of subservience to theology. The full and effective recognition of their autonomy is a precious gain made by the efforts of recent centuries."[7] One gets the impression that the author believes in some finished pattern into which science, philosophy, and theology ought to fit, that, philosophically speaking, history may some day come to an end with the discovery of this pattern, and that the exploration of the fields of

6. P. 26.
7. P. 33.

knowledge by trained scholars may be completed. Philosophy has the choice of remaining in error and changing, or finding the truth. If faced with these alternatives, would not most philosophers choose to remain in error? The ancient world was a period of conflicting wisdoms. The Middle Ages was a time when it was popular to harmonize wisdoms. The modern era has seen the triumph of scientific wisdom over theological wisdom. If we are to return to another period of harmonizing wisdom, must it not be to an ever changing and harmonizing process, rather than a return to a harmony which is complete and final?

Science and Wisdom is worth the consideration of the learned American public. It should be read especially by anyone who tries to combine religious conviction with scholarship in philosophy and the sciences.

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The Soul of the Universe. By GUSTAF STRÖMBERG. Philadelphia: David McKay Company, 1940. xviii + 244 pp. $2.00.

This book, by an astrophysicist with remarkably diversified interests, contains a summary of the principal results of physics and biology plus some philosophical speculations designed to unify these results and to connect them with religious ideas. From quantum mechanics the author takes the idea of an "immaterial" aspect of the physical, the wave side of the wave-particle duality, and then seeks to interpret the integrating and creative factors in biology as higher types of "pilot-wave" systems guiding material particles. Thus, corresponding to genes on the material side, genes as structures of particles, we have "genii" on the immaterial or wave side. The genie is thus a pilot-wave system of a type higher than that known in physics. Both particles and waves are "physical" in that both have spatio-temporal structure, but only particles have *rest mass*, the distinctive trait of the material as opposed to the immaterial. The soul is a sort of super-genie, or super-pilot-wave system, although this does not fully describe it. The soul of the universe is the immaterial side of the universe as a unity, a profoundly integrated whole. That the cosmos is a unity is the contribution of relativity, the inertia of a body, for example, being no mere private affair of that body but is the entire universe as in-

fluencing its behavior. Thus the universe is no mere sum of its parts, for every part is, each in its own way, the universe acting as one. The universe is a single dynamic agent as truly as are its parts. Since all dynamic units have an immaterial side, the supreme dynamic unit, the cosmos, has a supreme form of immateriality, a super-soul. Moreover, this cosmic soul enables us to explain the qualitative aspect of sensations (which in physics are taken as mere clues to the quantitative aspects) without reducing them to the mere private possessions of human experience, a conception which would be incompatible with the unity of the universe.

The book is expertly pronounced (by Einstein and others) competent as to the facts of physics, and a biological authority (Professor Ralph S. Lillie) says that the "occasional slips in points of detail" as to biological data "are not especially important." He also says of the book, "It is interesting, imaginative, suggestive—but would be better for being more critical." One of the more startling conclusions is that the soul probably comes from the mother (in view of the possibility of parthenogenesis)—a charming reversal of Aristotle's depreciation of the mother as providing merely the "matter," or even merely the environment, for the "form," or more spiritual element as coming from the father.

There are good things in the book, brilliant perspectives upon scientific data; and the philosophizing, while as such amateurish, is refreshing, and in certain respects perhaps sounder than that of some experts. To me, the inability of many philosophers to see that the unity of the universe must be prior to that of its parts, and that this cosmic unity cannot be merely material or indeed less than conscious, furnishes some justification for the naïvetés of a scientist outside his field. In the tortuous details of the history of metaphysics and theology, these basic truths—as I am confident they will eventually be regarded—have become more or less obscured. For instance, it has been thought that to admit the unity of the universe means to give up the freedom of the human individual. Mr. Strömberg does not accept this alleged consequence, in which I believe he is a better philosopher than monists like Bradley on the one hand, or their pluralistic opponents like James, on the other. Only recently have metaphysicians (or at least one of them, Whitehead) come to see that the "solidarity" of the

world is compatible with, indeed requires, a certain degree of independence of action of the individuals embraced in that solidarity. However much the cosmic individual may dominate, as well as antedate, the lesser individuals, it does not subject them to a control so absolute that they possess no dynamic individuality of their own, for, in that case, there would be no lesser individuals to control. Individuality is dynamic or nothing; if one agent or power were completely responsible for all that happens, no other agent or power, indeed no other concrete reality, would exist as in any way distinguishable, even as part from whole, from the cosmic reality.

We have passed from a mechanical to a social view of reality which even present-day physics tends to illustrate and support. But our author does not succeed in carrying his analysis far with respect to such philosophical problems. To take another example, the question of the relation between the physical and the psychical is not very convincingly treated. The author seems, at times, to suggest the idealistic doctrine that even the material aspect of the physical is ultimately psychic, but he does not make clear how this is to be understood. He seems not to appreciate the possibilities of the panpsychic version of idealism, according to which the physical consists of low-grade psyches socially interacting in rudimentary fashion, the various modes of this interaction being the spatial structures studied by physics. The difference between entities with rest mass and those without them (waves) is a mere detail; in both cases it is all a question of type of interaction between individuals (perhaps momentary in some cases) whose inner "stuff" or quality is not in the slightest illuminated by being called material or physical, since the only properties known or conceivable concerning being in space and time are spatio-temporal *patterns* of relationship, which the social-psychic view can completely describe in its own terms, plus whatever properties of feeling, sensation, desire, memory, volition, in other words analogues, however distant, of our own inner life, our experience as such, which we wish to attribute to the entities around us. Mr. Strömberg seems both to see all this and yet not to see it: that is, he leaves the question in some confusion. He is an idealist who cannot banish the ghost of dualism which haunts him.

The author writes simply and pleasantly, with honesty and courage.

Such a book at least helps to prove one truth, that mere science is powerless to put an end to metaphysical or religious speculation. Some of us are glad that it is so!

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The Spiritual Aspects of the New Poetry. By AMOS N. WILDER. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940. xxiv + 262 pp. $2.50.

This is a critical study of the "new poetry" from the point of view of one who is concerned with values. It is an extraordinarily well-informed and critical appraisal of our contemporary poetry with relation to its contribution to the spiritual life of our times. Lest it be objected that Mr. Wilder's approach looks to art for doctrine, "even for didacticism and at worst propaganda," and thus effaces any clear distinction between poetry as an autonomous discipline and the other interests which may find expression in it, it must be noted that the author insists that this material, viewed as *poetry*, "must always first be judged by the aesthetic canons of poetry and not by the alleged superior spirituality or truth of its contents." But since this poetry does evidence basic viewpoints or convictions which are of tremendous significance for the common life of our times, Mr. Wilder is surely justified in his major effort to assess modern poetry with respect to its religious and moral values.

Mr. Wilder wants to know what light the new poetry throws upon the religious and ethical attitudes of men today, what light is thrown on contemporary culture and social conditions by these findings, and at what points these new poets pass into unreality, irresponsibility and error. While he is chiefly concerned with the modernists and experimentalists of the last two decades, he has not hesitated to pass judgment upon the poetry and outlook of the traditionalists as well.

The author counts himself a traditionalist "in the best sense of the term," and a careful and sympathetic study of this present work, while it may not resolve fundamental differences with the author, does nevertheless derive a profound respect for and consideration of his point of view. The standpoint adopted as a basis for criticism is the Christian tradition. By this is meant "classical Christianity," Christianity in its creative as opposed to its ossified moments and aspects, the

tradition most profoundly disclosed in the New Testament, in moments of the Catholic Church, Orthodox and Latin, and in the "initiatory phases and essential motives" of the Reformation. In confronting the ills of contemporary life, the Christian tradition challenges with its emphasis on personality and the responsible self. For Mr. Wilder this seems to be the simplest and most pertinent affirmation from which to assess the spiritual meaning of the new poetry.

The significance of the new poetry lies in the fact that it has plunged fearlessly into the deepest aspects of human experience. It has refused intellectual, economic, and social insulation from life. Its motive, or initial push, has perhaps been the vast disillusionment with respect to tradition and the old certainties, but having once been set upon its course, much of the new poetry has pursued its quest of meaning with courage and singular integrity. Even the "sense of spiritual insecurity in modern poetry, while it prompts to negation, nevertheless has the merit of depth." The modern world has become a haunted world, an age of twilight and phantoms, and these poets are wrestling with principalities and powers of darkness, not against flesh and blood. The traditionalists (in somewhat less than the best sense of the term!) among us have failed to understand the new poetry, chiefly because they have taken their tradition for granted, and in this perilous security have allowed themselves to live insensitively and unsympathetically in the life of today.

The root of the problem of religious poetry in America is the valuation placed upon the classical tradition. Mr. Wilder believes that we can have no balanced view of the scope of literature as long as the Hebrew tradition is excluded as "sacred." Why has professional criticism, with few exceptions, ignored the fact that Western culture has two roots, Greek and Hebrew? Why does Ezra Pound scour heaven and earth in search of new fertilizing factors for English poetry and never pause to note our cultural roots in Hebrew poetry and prophecy? Upon the consideration of these historical backgrounds of our culture, Mr. Wilder feels that no contemporary literature can be immediately deprecated because it has "didactic" content. In fact, "all other things being equal, that literature which concerns itself with the greater subject matter, such as 'the moral order of the universe,' will be the greater literature; and for the American folk tradition, that

literature that shows a mastery of the raw material of life in terms of religious insight will strike most deeply into the heart of the times."

The judgment upon the tradionalist poets is that they have not explored deeply enough into our cultural inheritance to tap springs of unmistakable power. They have failed to relate tradition to the ills of the modern mood. It might further be suggested that the peculiar psychology of traditionalism places an added burden on the traditionalist in his attempt to make the unmistakable power of our inheritance pertinent to our modern needs. Emotional attachment even to the best of tradition tends to destroy the sensitivity and acute discrimination which are necessary to the task of rendering our inheritance intelligible and efficacious within the unique present. The traditionalist may reach to a considerable depth of our cultural inheritance, but he may fail to tap springs of power because the psychological character of his attachment to tradition has obscured his capacity to discriminate. I think there is the difficulty of a vicious circle here.

The significant conclusion of Mr. Wilder's discussion of the problem of religious poetry seems to me to be expressed in this sentence: "We will have greater religious poetry when the devout and mystical poets among us enter as deeply into the experience of grace as our poets of negation enter into the experience of perdition." Perhaps this is the best sense of the term traditionalist. It would seem, however, to centralize the reality of present experience, rather than that of our traditional inheritance. The problem of the traditionalist would then be to re-define the relation between the content of our inheritance and the unique content of our present experience. This might conceivably suck dry any actual resource that one presumes to find in classical tradition. That is, the relation between tradition and today would be a relation of analogy and example, rather than real and actual continuity.

Upon the basis of what he believes to be the "essential Christian position," Mr. Wilder is justly critical of the modern alternative faiths of the new pantheism, primitivism, naturism, negation, moral equivalence, depersonalization, and nihilism. Christianity is a tragic view; it recognizes evil and accepts responsibility in its midst. But unlike the view of an ultimate and final tragedy, it is aware of "redemptive forces of enormous urgency present through the whole texture of existence." Reinhold Niebuhr has written that "Christianity's view

of history is tragic insofar as it recognizes evil as an inevitable concomitant of even the highest spiritual enterprises. It is beyond tragedy inasfar as it does not regard evil as inherent in existence itself but as finally under the dominion of a good God."[1]

The factors making for negation in the work of the writers of today are of course many, but perhaps chief among them is the changed views of the self and the recognition of the large role which the irrational elements in personality have to play. As a result, confidence in human freedom, stability and survival has been shaken. The self has been depersonalized and "whirl is king." A strange turn has seen a compensation for this lack of confidence in the self expressed in a vigorous social realism and in the revolutionary and proletarian poets. This seems to me to be one of the surest signs of the impermanence of this kind of poetry, as such. It has passionately mistaken abstractions and theoretical social constructions for the permanences of the personal life. It will perish because it has no relation to the most urgent needs of our times, which are demands of the spiritual aspects of persons. It will perish for essentially the same reason that war cannot solve the problems of the human spirit.

Throughout his study of the new poetry, Mr. Wilder has variously concluded his appraisals from the major premise of the fact and determinant worth of the self, of human personality. This is the human pole of the di-polar man-God affirmations of classical Christianity. In directing my remarks to the emphasis on personality, I do not mean to imply that Mr. Wilder in any place regards human personality as self-sufficient, nor that he affirms any radical discontinuity between God and man. Mr. Wilder's theological basis for the emphasis on personality is assumed rather than argued. It should be clear that this study of the spiritual aspects of the new poetry is not intended to be a theological disquisition.

On the basis of the general considerations which we have suggested, Mr. Wilder examines the works of such moderns as Conrad Aiken, Hart Crane, D. H. Lawrence, W. H. Auden, T. S. Eliot, Archibald MacLeish, Robert Frost, Kenneth Patchen (the proletarian poet who struggles to keep clear of passing phases), and W. B. Yeats. In view of my special interest in the life and poetry of Robinson Jeffers, I shall devote my concluding remarks to Mr. Wilder's discussion of this

1. *Beyond Tragedy* (New York, 1937), pp. x-xi.

poet. These remarks may further serve to clarify Mr. Wilder's conception of "negation," which he has identified as a characteristic mark of a considerable portion of the new poetry.

The negativism of Robinson Jeffers stems from his preoccupation with nature, with what lies behind and before the human consciousness, with the higher values of power which he sees in the elemental and untamed forces of nature. The sense of the comparative inconsequence of man and the doctrine of the corruptness of the human nature are corollaries of this stern naturism and elementalism. Man stands in a tragic relation to his world.

In the *Symposium,* Plato ascribes to the comic poet, Aristophanes, a stronger consciousness of discord, while to the tragic poet, Agathon, he ascribes a deeper sense of harmony and reconciliation. This conception of tragedy still dominates literary criticism today. The tragic poet, in so far as he fails to affirm a positive reconciliation of the tensions and discord within the self and between the self and nature, is something less than a great tragic poet—he is a prophet of negation and a despoiler of human dignity. Mr. Wilder deplores this same unreality and irresponsibility among the irrationalist poets for whom the tragic sense of discord and tension has led to dehumanization and the doctrine of negation. The assumption seems to be that the tragic poet *must* somehow resolve his clues into an affirmation of ultimate salvation and redemption, that man simply refuses to acknowledge that his dream of reconciliation might be a final illusion, and human life a profound tragedy to the end.

Such a view finds the deepest meaning of tragedy to lie in affirming man's destiny *beyond tragedy*. This paradoxical conception, it seems to me, does not take seriously enough the empirical reality of man's tragic predicament. We have already noted that historic Christianity is a religion of salvation, and thus its affirmations are ultimately beyond tragedy. But this reviewer does not feel that Mr. Jeffers has affirmed any comparable human destiny, nor that he has, thereby, made death preferable to the living. For Mr. Jeffers, life is profoundly tragic. Its tragic resources are a certain strength and courage to live out this life in the awareness of its beauty and wholeness, to find the considerable meaning and value which free men from both "death desired and death dreaded." But this strength is not redemption from the tragic situation.

It seems to me that Mr. Jeffers is misrepresented when it is said—as Mr. Wilder has written—that "the positive teaching of Jeffers offers an escape for man from this condition into a nihilist Nirvana—a return through the original fountain." There is no Nirvana for Jeffers (he is temperamentally unsuited to the term!) unless it be death itself. Death is the completion of the circle of life, the return to elemental unconsciousness, but Mr. Jeffers does not preach that man should *seek* or desire this dénouement. Likewise, neither should he dread its inevitability.

The positive teaching of Mr. Jeffers offers, not escape from life, but a return to its elemental roots. This is the destiny of the living. The religious resource of sensuous-mystical relation to things is the clue to the strength and courage which make life a noble act without benefit of ultimate guesses and cosmic plans of redemption. The "unstated being," to which Mr. Wilder refers, is the unconscious power to which consciousness returns at death, and the "one power" of which all things are constituted; but in life it is significant as the other-than-human to which the self-conscious creature relates himself in an aesthetic and religious mode. Mr. Jeffers' positive message to his fellows is to call them to love the "all but inhuman God," the divine beauty of the universe—"not man apart from that." It is the call to "break out of humanity," to forsake the incestuous introversion, the net in which all that is human is caught.

The idealism of the poet's metaphors (e.g., "breaking out of humanity") and his passion for pointing men to the way of strength and courage have unfortunately deceived his critics into Nietzschean categories of interpretation. This side of Jeffers "leans toward Nietzsche"; but Jeffersian values, it seems to this reviewer, are too profoundly rooted in the tragic context ever to be identified with the "superman" and the romantic redemption of Nietzsche.

Upon such considerations I feel that, while Mr. Wilder is justified in naming the Jeffersian religious philosophy negative and nihilistic from the point of view of classical Christianity, he has at the same time contributed to a misunderstanding of this poet's tragic realism and has restricted the meaning of the tragic sense of life. I agree with Mr. Wilder that the stability of the self and the integrity of the individual consciousness are the primary clues in assessing the spiritual contributions of the new poetry. But it seems to me that the positive

aspects of Mr. Jeffers' poetry, rather than negating the individual consciousness, have established the religious resource upon the profound and unique integrity of the self in its natural relation to the elemental and untamed powers in nature, to the greatest beauty, which is the organic "wholeness of life and things."

In the appendix of the book is a brief but excellent "Orientation and Reading Guide," including biographical and bibliographical notes on the new poets and new critics mentioned throughout this highly commended and major study of the spiritual aspects of the new poetry.

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Man's Search for Himself. By EDWIN EWART AUBREY. Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1940. 222 pp. $1.75.

In his Cole Lectures at Vanderbilt University, Professor Aubrey has dealt wisely and comprehensively with the problem of man. The style of the book is good, but the extreme condensation of the material makes it difficult to absorb, so that it loses some of the power of communication which Professor Aubrey feels is necessary to theology. The insights into the nature of man are altogether admirable, with sufficient awareness of the conflicts within and among men, and with an understanding of the way to achieve integration at the level of Christian ideals.

Because man is in conflict, he attempts "to find out what he means in his widest context of behavior and in the deepest reaches of his own individual contact with the world of which he is a part" (p. 15). The scientific study of man in the end requires philosophy; the approach through literature and art demands both analysis and synthesis, and this leads also to philosophy. If man is "a sample of the universe" (Calhoun's phrase), the attitude man takes toward the world makes a great deal of difference, and this brings in religion as a basic element in man's search for himself. "Religion is the activity of men living in this existential relation to the depths of their own being and to that which is creative in the universe" (p. 35). The problem of man is the problem of God, which, for the Christian, means putting Christ at the center of life. If Jesus' life and teachings are "germinative" for the Christian life, "the Christian approach to a conception of man is thus creative and growing, appropriating to itself successive findings

from science or art or philosophy as the centuries move" (p. 37). This means that the Christian has experiences different from others, because he is committed to Jesus Christ, and this, in turn, affects the functioning of his organic nature. This involves a view of the church, the function of which is to provide fellowship viewed in the perspective of a vital relationship with Christ, cultivating a community based on this relationship. Because the ideal of the Christian life is not achieved, there is a sense of failure which is blended with hope.

Following this careful statement of the problem, Aubrey proceeds to an analysis of man's ultimate solitude. The skeptic, the mystic, and the prophet are peculiarly lonely. The ethics of love transcends this individualism, for love "requires the will to enter so far as possible into the life of another so as to see and feel the situation as he experiences it" (p. 79). This process can never be complete, and there is always the tragic sense of inaccessibility. But there is also the possibility of communion with God, who is the metaphysical foundation of all community. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as the bond of social cohesion and the basis of individualism, provides the answer to this dilemma.

This brings us to the problem of integration, which is needed for sanity and growth. The criterion for both community and integration is "the longest time range, the widest scope, the deepest fulfilment of the participating members, and capacity for self-transformation in the determination of ends" (p. 133). Given a religious perspective, we have here the basis for integration. There are levels of integration, and to learn and do the will of God is to adapt oneself to the central currents of cosmic life, and this is expressed in the kingdom of God, where there is growth of individual and community life in an ultimate integration. This involves freedom, which means "we can stamp our initials upon reality." It "involves freedom within the self by an integration of the rational and nonrational factors in personality, freedom within society by a reconciliation of individual uniqueness with community of life, and freedom within the physical world by a creative reorganization of matter in harmony with the laws of nature" (pp. 181-182).

Aubrey summarizes his position with seven propositions:

(1) We live in a dynamic world.
(2) Every life is a unique bottle-neck of time.
(3) These unique human beings are bound together and find their individual fullness only in fellowship.

(4) This fellowship is not attainable by rational communication.
(5) Men ought therefore to love one another.
(6) No better embodiment of love in a dynamic world is to be found than Jesus Christ.
(7) The universe is one, and all its parts are continuous with one another (pp. 208-216).

There are three points in Aubrey's treatment which call for comment:

(1) While he sees deeply into the meaning of community and fellowship, and into the importance of its religious basis, he does not attempt to show how a man can achieve full integration or escape fully from solitude. It cannot be done, on either social or religious grounds. By showing the essential continuity between all parts of the organic universe, man's place in church, society, and cosmos is indicated; but this still does not eliminate the hidden and deep solitude of even the most extroverted soul.

(2) The use of Trinitarian formulae in terms intelligible to the modern man is an unusual feature. When a man is confronted by Jesus Christ, by his message and his life, he faces the appeal to return to the conditions of communion and freedom. Jesus is not all of God, but the church has claimed that Jesus and God, "though separate persons, were at one." "If God be love-in-a-dynamic-world then Jesus' life is divine, for he incarnates that." This is not entirely clear, but it places Jesus in the unique position he deserves.

(3) His doctrine of the Holy Spirit is more distinctive, clear, and defensible than his Christology. It is a reassertion of the immanence of God without sacrificing God's transcendence, for in the Holy Spirit "the integration of both individual and social life is achieved, and men find the inspiration of their own creative insights in and through the life of community" (p. 118). The church is "a fellowship of the Holy Spirit." The Holy Spirit provides the cosmic ground for all fellowship, and thus the basis is determined for all social and individual salvation in terms of integration.

The ample footnotes are helpful, but the index is too limited.

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BOOK NOTES

The Work of the Gods in Tikopia. By RAYMOND FIRTH. In two volumes, being Monographs I and II of *Monographs on Social Anthropology*, published for the London School of Economics and Political Science by Percy Lund, Humphreys and Co., Ltd., 1940. xii + 378 pp., 8 plates. 7/6 each.

These two volumes are the raw materials out of which conceptual statements about religion are built up. The student of comparative religions is used to handling formal and abstract descriptions of gods, religious concepts, ritual patterns, but relatively unused to being dragged through the endless minutiae of recorded religious behavior in a living culture. This has been specially true of Polynesian religion, which has usually been discussed in terms of cosmological ideas rather than human participation. Dr. Firth had the precious privilege of studying the only completely living Polynesian culture, that of the little island of Tikopia. The great cultures of Hawaii, New Zealand, Tahiti, the Marquesas, Samoa, and Tonga had all succumbed to the impact of white civilization before the scientific recording of ethnographic material had been developed. From the sterile and lifeless accounts of informants, toothless old men who remembered a little of what their grandparents had told them, students have tried to reconstruct some picture of Polynesian religious life. In these volumes Dr. Firth gives us, with untiring faithfulness to detail, the account of just what prayers, what ritual gestures, what ceremonial exchanges accompany a round of ceremonial, adjusted to the season, to various types of work. and to the prerogatives of chiefs. The pattern, monotonous and repetitious, emerges from these hundreds of pages of description. The book provides excellent exercise for those who wish to know just how the final neat and orderly statements about primitive religious practice are finally derived from days of recording small, unexciting, essentially similiar detail. Dr. Firth has reserved his theoretical discussion for a later volume. For this discussion the present volumes provide the factual background on ceremonial.

MARGARET MEAD

The Other Side of the Jordan. By NELSON GLUECK. New Haven: American Schools of Oriental Research, 1940. xviii + 208 pp. $2.50.

This book embodies the ripe, hard-won fruit of several years of archeological exploration and excavation in Transjordan, once a thriving area. The economic basis of life in the Biblical and Roman periods in this region, the author shows, consisted not merely of agriculture and of the commerce which passed through the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aqabah, but of extensive copper mining, the metal being refined in the furnaces of Solomon's port of Ezion-Geber, which were discovered by Glueck. In preparing this

concise synthesis of his numerous reports in various periodicals, the author has made accessible the major result of his work (abundantly illustrated) to the wider public to which his personal talents and objective achievements entitle him. For historians of religion, however, there is less of direct interest than they are accustomed to find in the scholarly literature relating to Palestinian archeology, due simply to the nature of the material involved.

Nevertheless, as the excavator of a Nabataean temple which was in use from B.C. 25 to A.D. 125 at an elevated site some twenty miles south-east of lower tip of the Dead Sea, Glueck's brief section describing the structure is worthy of special mention here. This lofty place of worship was entered through an east court, from which four steps led to the temple gate. Here stood the figure of Atargatis (identified with Artemis), represented as the goddess of fruit and foliage. In the middle of the temple stood the shrine, likewise facing eastward. In addition to another figure of Atargatis (as grain-goddess, and, under the influence of the cult as practiced at Ascalon, as fish-goddess), there was found her consort, Hadad (identified with Zeus), in a sandstone relief, with a life-size head set on a three-quarter length body. This god of the heavens is curly-haired and bearded, and over his left shoulder and arm appears his thunderbolt; the figure is flanked by two bulls. These features coincide closely with several of those described by Lucian. There should also be mentioned the unusual winged goddess holding aloft a cornucopia and combining the characteristics of Tyche and Nike, and the triclinia, or feast-chambers, with a high bench running along three of the four walls, which undoubtedly served a religious function.

JOSHUA STARR

Indian Underworld. By M. PAUL DARE. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1940. 218 pp. $2.50.

The jacket informs us that this is "the most amazing recital of Hindu ritual and black magic that has appeared since *Mother India*, and that it "is the cool record of an anthropologist." Although the author has gathered most interesting and not a little harrowing material, his book lacks the peculiar quality which made Miss Mayo's book so provocative; and the accounts which the book contains are not sufficiently detailed and documented to serve anthropologists. Mr. Dare's sources, aside from his own investigations, are largely newspaper reports. Aside from this, his most quoted reference is Miles's *Land of the Lingam.* The inconclusive character of his writing appears with his discussion of the rope trick in the first chapter. His account is a skilful shifting from point to point, and the avoidance of a conclusion. He finally leaves the subject with an indifferent hint at "mass-suggestion." His descriptions all through the chapter lack the careful reporting necessary to lift his material out of the realm of "magic" as it is exhibited by "magicians" in the West. His inadequate conclusion merely shows this: "When all the cases of suggestion, hypnotism,

and sleight-of-hand have been ruled out, however, all who know the East and who do not possess a biased mind, bull-headed mentality, are bound to admit that there is left in all oriental magic a very considerable residuum only explicable by allowing to its exponents the possession of supernatural power, that can and does set at defiance those 'laws' which the West in its self-sufficiency, thinks are immutable."

In spite of all this, the book contains a great deal of interesting material. The "Superstition Racket," in its portrayal of the relation between crime and superstition, has the peculiar flavor of India. The chapters on sacrifice, human and animal, contain many gruesome details. Here are found his most arresting pages. Although Indian history and the press of the country are continually referring to these matters, still, in the West, these things are not generally known. For this reason these chapters will attract many readers. But here, as in later chapters, he leaves the impression that his conclusions and theories are snap judgments. He shows the temper of his mind when he writes: "Western science does not, and never will, know what power the ancient earth-forces may possess, and is not entitled to declare that the sacrifice of the victim does not, for instance, terminate a drought." These chapters on sacrifice contain a long list of items, including human sacrifice for the fertility of the fields, *sati*, temple women, buried but not dead lepers, ecstatic suicide, and self-torture. We would like more complete reporting on the translation of objects and persons, and on photographs that do not include parts of the field of vision. As they are, they are interesting but not conclusive. Indians tell the snake-people stories better than Mr. Dare does.

Finally, the author takes us beyond the veil, and comes out at indestructible thought waves, for "that is why it is possible calmly to believe that powerful maledictions uttered with the effective vibration coefficients in ancient Egypt, and concentrated into effective malevolence by a magic, or a science of psycho-physics, the West has lost, may yet wreak havoc on modern disturbers of Egyptian tombs." The author indulges in some ugly generalizations about the people of India, not the least objectionable of which is, "India is so over populated by its 350,000,000 undernourished and mostly weak-minded inhabitants. . . ." His illustrations are all of a kind, belonging to asceticism, which has very little place in the book.

GEORGE W. BRIGGS

The Book of Job Interpreted. By EMILY S. HAMBLEN. Illustrated with the designs of William Blake. New York: Delphic Studios, 1939. xi + 271 pp. $3.50.

The author's "method" combines what she calls "psychological interpretation" with the pursuit of fantastic derivations, which are philologically false, regardless of their spiritual truth. Her guiding philological principle seems to be (it as nowhere formally stated) that all language, and par-

ticularly Hebrew, is derived from a proto-Sanskrit which is both phonetically and psychologically preserved best in Greek. That nonsensical results must follow the application of such a principle is obvious.

It is fortunate for the usefulness of the book that in it are reproduced the stimulating designs of William Blake. These illustrations are as fine as they have been any time these past hundred years.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

The Story of the Lord Jesus. A Harmony of the Four Gospels with Other Selections from the Old and New Testaments, Arranged in Daily Readings for Young People. Compiled by J. ELWIN WRIGHT and ELIZABETH M. EVANS. Boston, Mass.: New England Fellowship, 1940. 282 pp. $1.25.

In discussing this book it is necessary to begin with the statement that it is something regrettably more than "The Story of the Lord Jesus," and it is not "A Harmony of the Four Gospels." It is rather a group of selections from the Bible and an attempt to supply material from which to indoctrinate the student with certain fundamentalist dogmas concerning the interpretation of Jesus Christ in formal Church theology. To this end daily readings are furnished, each consisting of an episode in the life of Christ from the Weymouth translation of the Gospels, to which is added a selection from the Weymouth Acts or Epistles, or the King James translation of the Old Testament, and a prayer, apparently written by the compilers.

The New Testament selections seem to this layman to be well chosen and adequate (though they constitute by no means a "harmony of the Gospels," simply parts of several versions of the Gospel story). I would vastly have preferred to see the King James translation used rather than the Weymouth, but that is a matter of personal preference. My rather strong objections to the book are based upon different grounds.

What is the story of Jesus, and how is it to be told to Americans in 1940? Surely the world has passed beyond the stage of controversy over objective details. Surely it has passed beyond the point at which the spiritual reality of Jesus must be documented by a tenuous connection between Old Testament prophecies and the birth of Christ. If the Christian religion has made any progress at all out of the darkness of the past, surely it has left behind all traces of Calvinistic damnation, of authoritarian assurance neatly voicing the attitude of God toward blundering mankind. The only story of Jesus which can be told today with such force that it will command the minds and hearts of thinking men, women, and children, is the story of the Christ idea, the story of human love and purity, of the never ending search for and undying reverence for truth, the story of humility before all, and of condemnation of none.

This is the story which it seems to me the Gospels tell, when left to themselves to tell it. It is the story which the Gospel selections in the Wright and Evans book tells. It is in the foreword, in modifying headings placed over

selections from the Gospels, in the juxtaposition of New and Old Testament material under the same heading, and in the group of unusually insipid, self-satisfied, and self-centered prayers throughout the book that *The Story of the Lord Jesus* seems to me actually to deny the true story of the Christ.

The book is evidently intended for young people. The title page says so, and the jacket quotes special rates for those who will order it in quantity for use in the public schools. Is it conceivable that any school today would impress children with the mechanical sense of guilt, and the refusal to accept personal responsibility, contained in this prayer: "Our dear Father: We realize that the whole human race has deserved death, just as Barabbas did, but that the Lord Jesus Christ died in our place in order that we might go free" (p. 245). Will the Christian religion as represented by our Church writers never arrive at the sane, calm recognition of death as a normal part of life which is inherent in the religions of India and China? Must the parents of twentieth century children, who, I believe, take religion much more seriously than a superficial examination of Church attendance might indicate, continue forever to choose between keeping their children away from Church and subjecting them to such a morbid fear of death and such unhealthy feelings of guilt as this book is calculated to stimulate?

ROBERT O. BALLOU

New York City

Die Confessio Dosithei (Jerusalem 1672) Geschichte, Inhalt und Bedeutung. By CURT R. A. GEORGI. Munich, Verlag Ernst Reinhardt, 1940. 102 pp. R.M. 4.50.

This is a good, objective study of the origin, history, and contents of the Confession of Dositheus, Patriarch of Jerusalem, in which the author endeavors to place the work among the tangled religious developments in the East, during the seventeenth century.

This was a period when the Orthodox Church, under the oppression of the Sultans, was at its lowest point intellectually and materially. Both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism were bidding for support, and the various patriarchs were compelled to rely upon the foreign ambassadors in Constantinople for material aid and personal protection. Some of these ambassadors were sincere representatives of their church and government. Others were interested only in political advantages. Under such circumstances the helpless Orthodox, with their educational system disrupted and their young men being trained abroad, found themselves obliged to adopt a definite attitude to the new learning. Some, like Lukaris, rested on Protestant support and went as far as they could to satisfy their friends. Others, like Dositheus, at the time of the preparation of the Confession were seeking aid from the Roman Catholic representatives and did likewise. In both cases the Orthodox leaders must be sharply differentiated from those men who were seeking to create a union which would deny the Orthodox tradition.

The Confession of Dositheus marks the extreme point of Latin penetration into Orthodox thought and, as such, is deserving of serious consideration, but this is only one episode in the long history which commenced with the efforts to secure Western aid before the fall of the capital city. That story in its broad outlines deserves more consideration than it has hitherto received, and this work is an excellent study of one of the important moments in the movement. It is only to be regretted that the author has used so little of the modern studies in English and in modern Greek, but this is probably to be explained by the political and intellectual situation of the present day. It is eminently fair, and within its range it can be recommended.

C. A. M.

Slæva Bohu, the Story of the Dukhobors. By J. F. C. Wright. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1940. x + 438 pp. $3.50.

This is an interesting and well-written account of a most remarkable chapter in Russian and Canadian relations—the experiences of the Russian sect of the Dukhobors, and the author has handled his subject with a good choice of material and as much impartiality as any approximately normal person can give to the antics which he has to describe. The weakest part is undoubtedly the account of the movement before 1850, for it seems almost certain that the original Dukhobors had little to do with the movement of the Raskolniks, or Old Believers. They are related, rather, to the Khlysty, and to the source from which came the celebrated Rasputin, although their creed differed markedly from his.

At all events, after a series of episodes in the Caucasus that concerned the coming to divine power among them of Peter Verigin, it was decided, with the approval of Leo Tolstoy and other high-minded pacifists and idealists, to send them to Canada, where they could be free from the "persecutions" of the Imperial Russian Government. They came, and every act of the Canadian government seemed to them still more violent persecution. Their "Christ," Peter Verigin, was finally killed in an explosion on a train in 1924, and his son succeeded to divine power, until his death in 1939. It was a weird tale of events, of nude parades, and finally of arson, and even murder, all practiced by the sincere Christians who were consciously avoiding violence in every form.

In fact, we have here a study that may almost be classed as an account of abnormal psychology, if we dare apply that term to sincere religious people who rebel against the normal mode of living in the world. The author has written the story in a vivid style, with a great deal of picturesque conversation that might be true, and with a use of interpolated Russian words to convey the atmosphere. We might have wished that he had given us translations of some of their psalms and an exposition of their doctrines, which were based on a rarely paralleled use of common words with an entirely different meaning to the faithful. The combination of the peasant slyness and

love of concealment, together with this strange vocabulary, made their problem a baffling one for the Canadian Government, which had assumed in the beginning that they were normal refugees from oppression. The reader must then look elsewhere for the definite doctrines of the sect, but the external history of the performances of the leaders and members is well and fairly told, and the work deserves a high place among those which aim to tell the story of fanatical and unusual groups.

C. A. M.

God, Some Conversations. By JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER. A Translation with a Critical Introduction and Notes, by FREDERICK H. BURKHARDT. New York: Veritas Press, 1940. xiv + 247 pp. $2.50.

This book is a smooth, readable translation of one of Herder's finest works, *Gespräche über Gott.* It is strange that one hundred and fifty-three years should have elapsed, since its publication in 1787, before its appearance in an English translation. Apart from this permanent result, Dr. Burkhardt's translation comes at a moment of transition and fluctuating change in modern times, much like the end of the eighteenth century in Germany. As Professor Horace L. Friess states in his Foreword, our own religious, philosophical and cultural problems "receive a significant focus and clarification" in this work.

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) belonged to a brilliant period of German literature, never since surpassed. Goethe, Lessing, and J. G. Hamann were his friends. Few of his contemporaries were so prolific. Like Goethe, Herder's interests ranged widely, his expressions were multiform. Suphan's collection of his works, in thirty-three volumes, include sermons, essays, drama, poems, hymns, addresses, and philosophical treatises. This restlessness denied him the achievement of an exhaustive treatment of any one subject. Yet no writer in his generation was more creative, more fertile in ideas, more like an intellectual ferment in many different realms of thought. The center of his interest was man, the folk-life of peoples, their customs, songs, intimate, daily activities—these "genre" were clues to reality.

The *Conversations* were written as the result of a controversy between Jacobi and Mendelssohn over Lessing's estimate of, and relationship to, Spinoza. Herder made the central issue that of the interpretation of the Spinozistic philosophy. The translator properly examines critically the accuracy of Herder's interpretation, but lays primary stress on the way in which the *Conversations* reveal Herder's own conception of God.

To Herder, the problem of religious interpretation was that of the unification of thought and feeling, of natural science and religion. He had reacted against the Enlightenment, which reduced all reality to rational order, and the universe to a mechanism. This cold intellectualism had, for him, robbed life of its essential character of spontaneity and mystery. In contrast to the concept of mechanism, he introduced that of organicism

whose characteristics are growth, movement, creative activity. He has Theophron say: "All the forces of nature function organically. Every organization is nothing less than a system of living forces, which serve a principal force in accordance with eternal laws of wisdom, goodness and beauty" (p. 190). God reveals himself through these creative, persistent forces which never die, and which inevitably produce order and lead to progress. This dynamic view of God, immanent in the actual physical processes of nature, lies squarely in the channel of one important stream of present-day thought.

Herder is also not without interest in the contemporary struggle between an arrogant nationalism and the vague, facile internationalism of modern liberalism. He propounded a theory of national culture to combat the superficial vision of a world-culture, which marked the German *Aufklärung*. His was not a narrow, exclusive nationalism, but a deeply humanistic, tolerant one. National cultures were the natural expression, through the arts, philosophy, religion, and literature, of fundamental entities, the mysterious product of group-life. This "cultural pluralism" was based upon a philosophy which had eliminated the distinction between God and the universe, mind and matter. It is well to remember, in reading the *Conversations*, that Herder is among the first to develop a philosophy of nationalism, and yet would have violently reacted against the narrow nationalism of the twentieth century.

The translation is admirably implemented by a critical introduction. An appendix sets forth the main revisions appearing in the second edition of the *Conversations*, in 1800; it also locates various quotations and references made in the main text. There is a selected bibliography and an index. The whole volume is a happy example of thorough and illuminating treatment; it ought to lead to a new interest in Herder's other writings.

MAYNARD CASSADY

A Teacher and His Times: A Story of Two Worlds. By WILLIAM ADAMS BROWN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940. xiv + 391 pp. $3.50.

It has often been said that the main quest in education is to find the teacher. This book describes the life and the experiences of an eminent teacher. Fortunate has been the institution which has had the benefit of his services for many years. Particularly fortunate have been the company of students who have had the privilege of coming under his influence through personal association with him. Together with his informing lectures, it was in his seminars and discussion groups, supplemented by private interviews, that his rare qualities as a teacher were best known and prized.

Descended from a distinguished family, whose members were noted for their public service, the life of Professor Brown includes a period of over seventy years which have been notable for the wide range of his activities, still fruitfully continued in his present retirement as emeritus professor.

To read this book is a liberal education; it is to learn through biography. The opening chapter gives the author's memoirs of "a world that is gone,"

but which forms the background for an intelligent understanding of the present. He describes his education as a boy and in early manhood, with a fascinating account of Vienna, which he visited with his family before going to college. Yale University, which he attended, is depicted as it was in the "eighties." This is followed by the considerations which led him to choose the ministry as his profession, with study at Union Theological Seminary and graduate study in Berlin. When soon thereafter he became a teacher in the Seminary, he also engaged in church work in New York which, he says, "proved a salutary check against exclusive preoccupation with purely academic interests," a viewpoint which he illustrated throughout his career.

It is significant that he refers in his student days to "learning to think for oneself," which remained a characteristic, and which also indicates what he most sought to do for his students. For this reason he did not escape adverse criticism, and he relates "how it feels to be a heretic."

"Widening Horizons" express his own growth and the movements, as well, which "crossing the national frontiers" extended to foreign lands, and in which Professor Brown has had an important part, especially in those making for world unity. The chapters on the World War and the "Postwar Ideals and Disillusionment" are a discerning portrayal.

The problems of a teacher in "a world that has lost its way" are shown in a stimulating analysis. He discusses the need of "a philosophy for a scientific age," which he calls the "missing factor in American education"; and he points out "the place of religion in the education of a democracy."

The life of Professor Brown is—as the sub-title of the book suggests—"The Story of Two Worlds." But while one may be regarded as dead, he does not hold that the new world is powerless to be born. He maintains that an adequate philosophy and a creative faith have in them the potency to mold a finer world-order than has yet been seen.

This book, containing many illustrations, written with a charm of style, and permeated throughout with sympathetic understanding and a charity of spirit which does not blur fairness of judgment, is an outstanding autobiography.

R. C. K.

Great Jewish Women. By ELMA EHRLICH LEVINGER. New York: Behrman's Jewish Book House, 1940. 159 pp. $1.50.

Stories of the lives of Jewish heroines from biblical times to the present day, for young readers.

Judaism and the American Mind. By PHILIP DAVID BOOKSTABER. New York: Bloch Publishing Co., Inc., 1939. XXIII + 248 pp. $2.50.

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